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ABSTRACT 
Revolutionary movements emerged from the “Arab spring” have determined 
undergoing socio-political changes in the region with significant implications and 
impacts on democratic transition and future sustainability. In this framework, the study 
explores Tunisian public universities’ social dimension and democratic implications 
of institutional partnerships in cooperation with local communities. In particular, it 
examines institutional, academic and students’ social responsibility as central elements 
of universities’ missions and students’ education. Existing complex dynamics linking 
social responsibility, social capital and democracy are considered within university 
contexts, taking also into consideration the role of Islam and Islamic values. In fact, 
university and students’ social responsibility have the potential to contribute to the 
redefinition of a post-revolution public sphere inspired by democratic participation and 
society-wide shared norms. Change in government policies affecting freedom of 
expression, restricted associational rights and political participation might result in 
institutional autonomy, allowing universities to fulfil their role in society while 
responding to economic and socio-cultural challenges.  
The study involved a sample of academic professors and students from Humanities 
and Engineering faculties from one public university. Research fieldwork was 
conducted combining qualitative and quantitative data collection. Questionnaires were 
employed to gather information from undergraduate students to explore university 
social responsibility, social capital creation, students’ identity formation, Islam and 
democracy. Interviews were used both to obtain insights from students and professors 
to consider their perceptions and self-awareness of social responsibility, while 
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deepening contextual knowledge. Furthermore, official government documents and 
government policies in relation to higher education reforms were also consulted. 
In particular, the research points out the development of a structured under-
utilisation of social capital for social responsibility. Government political control and 
socio-cultural censorship, as well as HE policies and legal frameworks have limited 
universities’ autonomy and their social dimension, restricting opportunities for 
students’ political and civic engagement in society. These aspects have also affected 
the provision of education for democracy and civic engagement courses; extra-
curricular volunteering programs; as well as, support for community partnerships. 
Furthermore, Islamic associations’ social, political and cultural role has been under 
governmental control resulting in fragmented, marginal and often antagonist 
contributions to democracy and social responsibility. As such, in Tunisia, since the 
independence, the regime have hindered the development of a shared culture based on 
civically and politically active citizenship for the stabilisation and reproduction of 
democratic attitudes, behaviours and habits.    
Research findings present reflections and implications in relation to universities’ 
third mission in Tunisia to advance institutional and students’ autonomy to fulfil their 
wider civic role in society. Furthermore, suggestions for future research in the field 
have been made as a way to advance knowledge and provide information to support 
future policies and reforms. 
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PREFACE 
 
 The research project was developed during the period 2007-2008, while I was 
working in Tunisia on Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation projects. In 2009, I 
travelled back to Italy, where the reading of Giovanni Sartori’s book “Democrazia: 
cos’è” (Democracy: what is it) and Hannah Arendt “Vita Activa: on Human 
Condition”, further influenced my intellectual curiosity in understanding existing 
connections between contexts and human agency. At this early stage, the research 
project was initially planned to investigate the relationship between democracy and 
civil society organisations (CSOs) in Tunisia. However, in 2010 after exchanging 
views and engaging in discussion with Italian professors, the topic developed towards 
the social dimension of public universities and their contribution to democracy. In 
particular, the study considered how existing interactions between political, social, 
economic, religious and cultural contexts impact democracy and social participation. 
In this new framework, universities and students are identified as key actors to foster 
civic skills, democratic attitudes and civic engagement to support democracy 
sustainability in the Arab region.  
 In this sense, the research has been initially developed with reference to the 
period prior to the “Jasmine Revolution” or “Dignity Revolution”, which took place 
in Tunisia in December 2010. The ousting of long-time President Ben Ali in January 
2011, ushered in complex and new socio-political scenarios leading to Arab countries’ 
radical reconfigurations, implying both research conceptual and analytical 
framework’s redefinition. In particular, the outcome of the uprisings urged an overall 
reconsideration of existing relationships between public institutions, Islamic political 
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parties and revitalised civil society organisations. In this framework, the research, 
undertaken between the end of 2011 and October 2015, has been re-structured, 
reflecting a specific political and historical transitional period towards democratic 
stabilisation in Tunisia, characterised by an initial phase of public demonstrations and 
social unrests; a second phase where, for the first time, a freely elected provisional 
government led to the drafting a new constitutional law; and, a present phase, where a 
newly elected government and president in late 2014 were confronted with undergoing 
major reforms to consolidate democracy despite growing security challenges.  
Such changing circumstances are central to critically understand the unique 
opportunity of developing a similar study in this specific time and space in relation to 
research fieldwork, data analysis and research project’s significance. In particular, data 
collection was conducted in April-May 2013, during an ongoing period of both social 
and political unsettled conditions and occasional disorders affecting public security 
and political stability in the country. In Tunisia, revolutionary aspirations and demands 
were gradually substituted by new economic challenges, within growing political, 
social and religious tensions. Hopes and aspirations advocating for a new social and 
political environment, were shortly replaced by widespread disenchantment and 
dissatisfaction. On the other hand, the rise of extremist Islamic movements in Syria, 
Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and the call for renewed jihadi movements replaced 
media attention, overshadowing the “Arab spring” unfulfilled democratic 
expectations. As such, field access, data collection and related data analysis during this 
period clearly reflect the research context in this specific space, time and environment. 
In fact, they contain distinctive if not unique information if compared to the pre-
revolution period or if, the same research had been conducted a few years later. In this 
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sense, the same research might not have been possible to be conducted during Ben Ali 
regime or, at present, where recent terrorist attacks have reinstated basic freedoms.    
In the present-day, the research relevance in understanding both democracy 
building and its future sustainability in Tunisia and, to a certain extent in North Africa, 
is a priority. In particular, the research attempts to understand the present and future 
role of universities and students alike as agents of cultural, social and political change 
in Tunisia. Their role in developing and supporting programs and projects for social 
responsibility and civic engagements certainly lies at the centre of a wider societal 
commitment to human rights defence, tolerance, social justice, citizens’ basic 
freedoms and individual/collective duties. In Tunisia, universities can be central actors 
in the redefinition of public spaces, allowing for the integration, mutual understanding 
and co-existence of marginalised, oppositional and conflicting social forces which 
define the very nature and dynamics of democratic, social and political systems.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
In the last decades, higher education institutions have been exposed to rapidly 
changing global economic, social and cultural dynamics with consequences on 
national systems’ reconfigurations. Universities committed to varying degrees in 
wider reforms of privatisation, have been increasingly involved in multiple and diverse 
roles in society, primarily to support the development of knowledge economy and 
national policies for technological innovations and economic growth. The Tunisian 
higher education system has been expanding to meet national priorities in line with 
growing social and economic demands. Increasing social pressure led to the 
establishment of private and international universities alongside thirteen public 
universities to diversify educational offers and provision, decentralising to interior and 
Southern regions. For this, universities have acquired a central position in creating 
jobs, training a qualified workforce, advancing innovation and supporting regional 
economies. Notwithstanding, their role in promoting social innovation, civic 
engagement, democracy building and social responsibility as part of an inclusive role 
in advancing public services with an impact on local communities, has been rather 
under-developed and under-achieved.  
In international contexts, higher education institutions have been re-adapting 
to different extents their primary missions - teaching and research - while re-
establishing their commitment to society and service to the community. To the same 
extent, this implied institutionalising a new managerial approach to knowledge 
production, shaping cultural environments and the relationships amongst 
administrative staff, professors and students with local associations and private 
businesses. The fulfilment of these aims has de facto determined the nature, objectives, 
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structure and implementation of national economic and political strategies. However, 
the lack of academic freedom, institutional autonomy and available human and 
economic resources, have limited the actual capacity and infrastructure, undermining 
missions’ fulfilment. In particular, there are different elements that might function as 
enablers or vectors of change, as well as, barriers to it. The protection of basic rights, 
foremost freedoms of thoughts, expression, association and socio-political 
participation are fundamental to guarantee personal emancipation within 
environments, limiting personal threat or influence that might jeopardise these 
achievements. These aspects are main determinants as they establish the legal and 
social framework to develop individual social entrepreneurship and community 
partnerships, supporting university social responsibility and students’ participation. 
In the research context, notions of democracy, social responsibility and Islam 
are considered through individual perceptions, awareness and commitment. In this 
sense, it is important to understand to what extent Islamic values represented by 
Islamic political parties and associations shape identities and influence the realisation 
of social responsibility in Tunisia. The relationships between individual social and 
political behaviours, moral consciousness and interactions with socio-political national 
settings and main narratives, are important conditions for the formation of individual 
or collective identities. Prevailing geographic, historical, socio-cultural, religious and 
political constraints over individual adaptability and compatibility to context, often 
determines socio-political cleavages. In fact, existing mediating social institutions 
such as families, educational institutions and civil and religious associations dictate 
the development of integrative or non-integrative frameworks defining norms, 
attitudes, habits and perceptions that are foundational to individual/collective actions. 
To the same extent, universities’ third mission development are explored in relation to 
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social networks and academic social capital creation; democracy building in the Arab 
region; students’ civic engagement and the relationship between Islam, politics, 
students’ identity and its ethical and cultural role in society.  
University social responsibility has been so far only partially taken into 
consideration. To the same extent, international studies (UNESCO, 2009; GUNI, 
2014; Watson et al, 2011) have acknowledged universities’ social dimension in 
partnership with external stakeholders, namely private business and local 
communities. In Tunisia, however, both 1989 and 2008 higher education reforms have 
failed to directly address universities’ social responsibility and students’ social and 
democratic role hampering active, creative and innovative contributions to the 
development of a shared public sphere. In particular, structural and institutional 
limitations have hindered the development of an institutional ethos and integrative 
approach. As a result, the defence and strengthening of basic academic freedoms are 
often misconstrued or accommodated to conform to governmental policies, cultural, 
religious or social habits, as well as predetermined educational objectives and 
missions. As a result, public universities did not commit to provide wider opportunities 
for students’ volunteering and civic engagement, undermining also the establishment 
of democratic habits. In this sense, research gaps have identified a lack of scientific 
research on Tunisian public universities’ social mission and implications for students’ 
social responsibility framed by the political system and Islam. 
In particular, the centrality of shared values, common objectives, social 
interactions, trust and reciprocity is supportive of academic social capital which is 
potentially also functional to civic engagement and volunteering. Academic social 
capital is an important concept in understanding social relations and human networks 
in the pursuit of civic engagement and social responsibility within university contexts. 
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In this sense, social responsibility can be better defined as a multi-dimensional value-
led concept based on co-constructed human interrelationships. As previous studies 
explored (E3M project, 2012; OEU, 2006; Akhtarkhavari & Tavanti, 2011; GUNI, 
2014), existing or latent on-campus interactions between administrative staff, 
professors and students are key in advancing university-community cooperative 
programs and projects. Universities and students’ social responsibility implies a 
voluntary commitment to public goods in the wider framework of social justice, human 
rights, democracy, community well-being and socio-economic sustainability. In 
Tunisia, social and civic relationships have been long organised by the government 
centralised party system and police control, including inside university campuses. 
Freedom of expression, participation and association were all constrained and 
supervised by a well-structured system based on censorship which often promoted 
passive attitudes of adaptation to the status quo or subversive anti-regime activities. 
Universities were rather operating in seclusion to local surroundings under-evaluating 
their role in society, constraining students’ learning experience and under-estimating 
undergoing socio-political impacts in the region. In this sense, addressing university 
social responsibility in relation to academic social capital formation, students’ civic 
engagement and Islam, defines central issues in post-revolution Tunisia.  
To the same extent, social capital creation in Tunisian public university 
contexts is an under-researched field of study, including particularly socio-cultural 
impacts of Islamic values and changing role of Islamic associations and political 
parties. In this sense, structural and infrastructural factors are interlinked to individual 
or collective elements of identity building and awareness raising. Most often, social 
capital is associated to community volunteering and social networking; company 
related professional networks; economic private business networks; social status, 
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social networks and economic benefits (Coleman, 1998); or, in education, the impact 
on students’ success rates (Budgen et al, 2014). Alternatively, it has been used to 
understand the relationship between volunteering and democracy (Putnam et al., 1993; 
Portes, 1998; Fukuyama, 1999; Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010) and promotion and access 
to information (Lindon et al, 2002). However, considerations of how institutional 
settings foster cultural environments conducive to higher levels of social capital and 
knowledge-led socialisation and civic engagement, imply an understanding of 
interrelated structural, cognitive and relational dimensions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). In post-revolution Tunisia, the interest in further exploring emergent dynamics 
fostering universities’ social responsibility and social capital (Ferman, 2006; 
Carpenter et al, 2010), also relates to shifting shared norms and values framing 
cultural, political and civic engagement.  
In particular, the democratic deficit in Arab countries (Diamond, 2010; Tawli 
et al, 2010; Volpi, 2004) and the historical and cultural legacy of Islam are taken into 
consideration as central elements specific to the region. In Tunisia contemporary 
history, the transition from Beylical regency to French protectorate and ensuing 
national independence, have reinforced rather than eradicated the encroachment of a 
semi-democratic system (Jamal, 2007; Sadiki, 2002). In particular, the endurance of 
non-democratic political governance has engendered citizens’ basic political and civil 
rights infringements; lack of free and fair democratic elections; citizens’ deficient 
parliamentary representation and inadequate participation in decision-making 
processes. These aspects have generated a democratic deficit characterised by public 
democratic institutions’ underdevelopment and lack of legitimacy which are also 
linked to transparency and accountability. To the same extent, Tunisian public 
universities, founded within a national political project, have not been considered to 
6 
 
date as institutions promoting democratic values and civic projects, if considered 
antagonistic and conflicting with the dictatorial regime. In this sense, the relationship 
between social capital, civic engagement, democracy building and Islam might have 
been negatively correlated rather than self-reinforcing. 
In fact, the under-development of Islamic-related social capital and the limited 
contribution of Islamic political parties to democracy can also be associated to the 
impoverishment of socio-cultural participatory habits. This is considered significant in 
relation to the role of Islam and Islamic values in identity building, social participation 
and conflicting dynamics within a secular national project. For instance, Islamic values 
also form individual and collective moral consciousness influenced by and related to 
political and social conditions of modern society (Riaz, 2002). In particular, Islam and 
Islamic principles are key determinants for social engagement, charity donations and 
volunteering that are central to community well-being and social justice (Farooqi, 
2006; Maluana, 2011; Fukuyama, 2001). However, in Arab countries, the 
nationalisation project based on social modernisation and gradual secularisation, 
established conflicting and non-accommodating policies, opposing a secular ruling 
elite within a mostly religious society. In this framework, Tunisian social and political 
tensions have exacerbated post-revolution political dialogue, social coexistence and 
democratic consolidation due to a process of “twin tolerations” and open 
confrontations between religious citizens and the State (Stepan, 2000), impacting on a 
democratic transition and the creation of a new public sphere. Understanding the 
relationships, limitations and barriers connecting democracy to civic participation and 
Islamic values opens up new windows exploring the foundations to context-based 
democracy sustainability, including the pacification and normalisation of moderate 
and fundamentalist Islamic parties. 
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In particular, the development of complex dynamics defining social capital and 
democracy building rooted in different contexts, frames also the presence of a 
fragmented and non-integrated institutional framework. Limited opportunities for 
political and civic engagement have further engendered the under-utilisation of social 
capital for social responsibility. Furthermore, students have often not been accounted 
as central agents, vital to universities’ third missions, bridging academic social capital 
within local communities. In this sense, this study focuses on social, political and 
ethical multi-factor elements existing between institutional social responsibilities, 
academic social capital, the democratic context and Islam in developing students’ SR 
in Tunisian public universities. The research findings consider constraints and 
opportunities for successfully implementing social responsibility in Tunisian public 
universities. To the same extent, in post-revolution changing political participation and 
social settings, Islamic political parties and associations are considered central to 
undergoing transitory period of democracy building and consolidation.  
 
Research Problem and Context.  
 
Since the end of WWII, schools and universities have played a crucial role in 
reducing analphabetic rates, endorsing cultural, civic and human values while 
gradually opening access to information and knowledge to the masses in the attempt 
to democratise education and foster civil, political and social rights. In this sense, 
upholding and promoting human values became a cornerstone mission to education. 
In particular, education to democracy fostering civic values and social responsibility 
address central issues defining present societies and their future development. The 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in art. 26 championed the 
development of a new humanistic approach:  
“education shall be free (at least elementary) and directed 
to the full development of the human personality, addressing the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; promoting 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial 
or religious groups for the maintenance of peace”.  
 
 
As such, universities’ social dimension is an approach theoretically pertaining to 
teaching, research and institutional commitment to society to advance public goods for 
communities’ well-being, so called universities’ third missions. Furthermore, it 
considers administration-professors-students relationships, interconnecting class 
contents, on-campus shared environments and off-campus engagement as central 
elements to create pro-active embedded cultural norms and principles.  
At present, however, the prevailing entrepreneurial university model has been 
supporting the shift from a humanistic to a more scientific and research-intensive 
knowledge production with increasing pressures on economic efficiency, institutional 
accountability and business-like profitability logics. Internationally, university social 
dimension is broadly speaking a rather neglected mission, institutionally and 
politically. Comparative studies - in most advanced economies and stable democracies 
often associated with Western countries - have shown how implementation of a 
democratic and social agenda is complex, often fragmented and discontinued due also 
to available funding. On the other hand, in less developed countries with unequal 
economic development and semi-democratic regimes, political structural limitations 
and socio-cultural barriers often render its implementation subaltern or restrained. In 
Tunisia, tensions between central government national policies, citizens’ political and 
socio-cultural aspirations and religious ethical entitlements, have so far prevented the 
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establishment of a freer and more democratic society, engendering a conflictual 
paradigm to the detriment of social cohesion.  
In particular, public universities’ autonomy and academic freedom are both key 
to foster university and students’ social responsibility, although still under-achieved in 
Tunisia. In particular, the 2011 revolutionary movements have exposed how social 
fragmentation and the lack of political consensus are rather challenging in order to 
achieve sustainable democracies in the Arab region. Notwithstanding, Tunisia has 
since then stood out from other regional realities managing to commit to and support 
the recognition of basic freedoms and citizens’ rights while resisting the pressure from 
emergent radical forces or the restoration of the pre-revolution regime. As such, the 
Tunisian paradigm can be, if successful, an example for other countries in the region 
struggling to support the coexistence of politically and socially conflicting forces, 
including the revival of religious extremism and new Jihadi movements in Syria and 
Iraq. For these reasons, there is a growing need to understand how these complex 
dynamics will affect the establishment of context-based democratic or vice versa anti-
democratic processes, implying social agency reconfigurations.  
In fact, the study, conducted between 2011 and 2015, sought to explore impacts 
and limitations of university social responsibility, during post-Ben Ali regime, in 
relation to the transitory period of unsettled democratisation process amidst socio-
political tensions and economic constraints. A preliminary hypothesis focused on how 
theoretical assumptions that restricted socio-political and religious environments 
might also affect identity building, civic engagement and social capital formation 
supportive of a more democratic society. To the same extent, structural and subjective 
factors are explored to underline faculty embedded culture and reproduced patterns of 
students’ social responsibility. As such, the present study has a key objective to 
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understand how universities can be part of the development and implementation of a 
renewed democratic society in Tunisia, inclusive of Islamic political parties and 
associations. In particular, the adoption of an integrative framework including civil 
society and community leaders in knowledge production and transfer in cooperation 
with universities, public institutions and the private sectors represents a sustainable 
paradigm for fostering a more inclusive and cohesive society where shared norms of 
community engagement are also functional to developing more democratic attitudes, 
ownership and active citizenry.  
 
Research Methodology 
  
As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, the study focused on 
participants who are actively involved in higher education, namely undergraduate 
students and professors. Data were collected through a survey questionnaire divided 
up in four main parts: an initial section relating to open-ended questions on democracy, 
social responsibility and the role of students in Tunisia; a second, exploring students’ 
social capital formation, students’ identity building and Islamic social values; a third 
one investigating universities and students’ social responsibility and academic social 
capital; a final one in relation to participants’ socio-demographic information. Semi-
structured interviews were also conducted with volunteering participants in order to 
further explore perceptions, insights, views and experiences of the purposive sample. 
The sample was selected amongst undergraduate students from two faculties 
(Humanities and Engineering) from one public university in Tunisia; students and also 
members of one association founded after the revolution. Finally, professors were also 
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selected from the same two faculties1. The motivation was to consider if faculty 
contexts, family socio-economic background, social networks, individual identity, 
values and habits, would differ within the two faculties and also determine distinct 
attitudes and type of engagement to social responsibility. 
 
Content of Thesis 
 
The research comprises an abstract, a preface and eight chapters. Chapter one 
consists of a brief introduction to the study, exploring the research context, research 
problems and methodology. Chapter two presents research context background in four 
subsections in relation to modern history and politics in Tunisia; the role of Islam and 
the national education system with reference to the higher education system. Chapter 
three presents the literature review, addressing previous studies and academic 
contributions on university missions and social dimensions; social capital and its 
contextualisation in university environments; democracy and Islam in the Arab region. 
Chapter four explains research methodology; population and sampling; research 
methods; data collection and analysis. Chapter five provides data analysis on the 
relationship between democracy and Islam with reference to students’ identity, value-
system and implications for social capital creation in universities and the wider impact 
on democracy building in post-revolution Tunisia. Chapter six presents findings on 
university social responsibilities and social capital in order to highlight present 
dynamics of political and social participation within university contexts. In particular, 
it examines how pre-revolution barriers and limitations to university and students’ 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive and detailed account of study methodology see Chapter 3. 
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social responsibility have shifted campus social relations and related civic networks 
for social participation. Chapter seven expands upon the previous two chapters’ data 
analysis and further aims to contextualise research findings in relation to previous 
studies explored in the literature review, highlighting relevant debates and newly 
emerged arguments as contributions to knowledge in the area of higher education.   
Finally, chapter eight presents the conclusion exploring research contribution 
to knowledge and sets to the fore policy implications and further research into the 
fields. The appendices include questionnaire, supervisors’ letter and other relevant 
materials including tables and graphs not included in the main body of the research but 
relevant to its comprehension.  
 
Summary 
 
This introductory section aimed at providing a general understanding of the 
research with reference to research context, problems, aims, methodology overview, 
study limitations and contribution to knowledge. In the post-revolution period, the 
relationship amongst university social responsibility, students’ civic engagement, 
Islam and democracy has been an emerging area of study in connection with recent 
events in the Arab region. Furthermore, the necessity of re-considering the 
contribution of public institutions as social agents able to support a public sphere based 
on dialogue and tolerance, is fundamental to sustain a democratic project in the area. 
In this sense, the research offers an important contribution as it examines present 
factors and tensions in factual settings in Tunisia after the revolution. Furthermore, it 
advances relevant recommendations related to higher education reforms in line with 
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international trends of a more structured model of engaged university for social, 
economic and democratic cooperation within local communities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER 2: The Tunisian Context 
 
Introduction 
 
 The chapter presents background information in reference to the research 
context of contemporary Tunisia. It considers country geographic, historical, political, 
economic and Islamic determinants that characterise modern Tunisia. It aims to 
explore and discuss most relevant historical and political events, by exploring country 
facts and figures, in order to understand underlying factors in the light of country’s 
recent developments. To the same extent, it also explores recent developments in the 
Tunisian education system. It focuses on national reforms from an historical 
perspective with reference to higher education institutions and the way in which 
country socio-cultural, political and economic environments have contributed to its 
definition and development.  
 
Tunisia: Geography, Population and the Economy 
 Tunisia is the northernmost and smallest country of the Western part of the 
Mediterranean Sea, often referred to as the Maghreb region (denoting Tunisia, 
Morocco and Algeria but often also extended to include Libya and Mauritania)2. 
Tunisia shares territorial borders with Algeria and Libya, at West and East, with a total 
area of almost 163,000 square kilometres (64,000 sq. miles), with 1,300 kilometres 
(810 miles) of coastline. Geographically, it is delimited to the North by the Eastern 
                                                 
2 http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/maghreb/. [Accessed 02/02/2015] 
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end of the Atlas Mountains and to the South by the Northern reaches of the Sahara 
desert. Tunisia has formed, since the earliest times, the natural conjunction between 
the Western and Eastern parts of the Mediterranean basin. It lies at close distance by 
sea from the island of Malta and around 45 miles away from the Italian island of 
Pantelleria and less than 100 miles from Italy’s biggest island, Sicily. As such, due to 
its vicinity to Southern Europe, it has historically covered a strategic position bridging 
two continents culturally, economically and socially.  
 
Figure 1. Geographical Map of Tunisia3 
 
                                                 
3 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/tunisia_pol_1990.jpg. [Accessed 25/05/2015]  
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Most of the country's land, especially in the North and North-East, is fertile soil. The 
climate is moderate with hot and dry summers and mild winters with frequent rains. 
These characteristics also denote country reliance on agricultural production which is 
an important contributor to national economy and international exports. 
As of 2012, its population is estimated around 10.875 million, with an average 
population growth rate in 2010-2015 of 1.1% relatively lower than other Arab 
countries (Morocco, Algeria and Egypt) and closer to other European and 
Mediterranean countries like Italy, Spain or Greece. In 20114, the majority of the 
population lived in urban areas (equal to 66.7%); the population aged 0-14 years was 
23.2%, lower if compared to other Arab countries; whereas male labour force 
participation was of 70,6% and female of 25,1%, with an unemployment rate of 17,2%. 
Internet usage is relatively high, especially in the capital Tunis and major coastal 
towns, around 42%, lower than Morocco and Egypt (55% and 44%) but higher than 
Algeria and Libya (15% and 14% respectively). However, between 2011 and 2014, 
levels of unemployment rose sharply due both to the joint effect of post-revolution 
economic recession and political instability in the region. In particular, these events 
have profoundly impacted the Tunisia-EU trade and specifically tourism. In fact, 
growing urbanisation and modernisation projects have led to coastal development 
plans and economic growth, attracting large investments, in spite of interior regions (a 
common pattern also in other neighbouring nations). Especially in Tunisia, these 
dynamics are key to understanding how governmental policies have gradually 
reinforced a parallel socio-cultural, political and economic cleavage.  
                                                 
4 https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=TUNISIA#Social. [Accessed 10/06/2015] 
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Tunisia has historically been, due to its geographical position, a country 
projected economically towards the Mediterranean and European nations rather than 
their neighbouring countries or towards the inland. Tunisia, in fact, was the first 
Maghreb country to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, in July 1995 and the 
first to sign in 2008, a Free Trade Area agreement to progressively remove trade 
barriers and harmonise common standards. In 2012, the EU was Tunisia's first trading 
partner with a total trade accounting for 62.9%, dominated by machinery and transport 
equipment, textiles and clothing, fuels, mining and chemicals. On the other hand, EU 
trade still represents over 60% of total share in trade (France, Italy and Germany 
representing over 60% of exports and over 40% of imports); whereas other regional 
Arab partners5 combined, represent only around five per cent6. Trade exchanges 
patterns with European partners confirm how Tunisia’s economy has acquired a 
distinct European dimension with trends of growing dependency. As such, these 
considerations suggest how Tunisia’s integration into both South-South regional 
markets and global trading networks are rather limited with an impact on political, 
cultural and social developments in the region.  
In this sense, Tunisia’s geographical position at the centre of the Mediterranean 
Sea is a key element, defining it as a central hub in between Africa and Europe. 
Moreover, political, economic, cultural and linguistic connections with European 
countries have shaped society past and modern history, while still maintaining its long-
lasting Arab and Islamic traditions firmly rooted in society.  
 
                                                 
5 Despite the Agadir Agreement was signed in 2004 and put into force since 2007 establishing a Free Trade Area 
between Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/. [Accessed 14/06/2015]. 
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Tunisian Modern History 
  
 The history of North Africa has been widely influenced by the Mediterranean 
multi-cultural and historical richness, characterised by social complex realities, 
political conflicts, economic and cultural exchanges. At the centre of the 
Mediterranean Sea, Tunisia has been historically key for thriving civilisations, trade 
and culture amalgamating European civilisations from the North, Berber from South 
and Asian influences from West. In the Mediterranean, from the Phoenicians (first to 
settle colonies all along the Mediterranean coasts), to the flourishing of Greek colonies 
and, afterwards, to the Roman Empire - great civilisations contributed to the cultural 
enrichment and economic expansion of Cartage (modern Tunis) which played a major 
role as a naval super-power and economic hub, exporting olive oil, wine and fine art 
crafts in connection with Berber inland traders and Mediterranean merchants.  
Over the centuries, the relative socio-political stability, cultural development 
and economic thrust in the region created an extensive cultural heritage built upon the 
assimilation and integration of successive dominant ruling elites, re-moulding while 
respecting local customs and traditions. The coexistence of different official languages 
such as Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Berber, Aramaic, Syriac, etc. testified the complexity 
of coexisting social realities. In fact, North Africa played a vital role in shaping the 
development also of Western Civilisation thanks to the infusion and diffusion of 
transcultural, social, religious and linguistic influences imprinted and intertwined over 
the centuries (Naylor, 2009: 15). However, political and social fragmentation 
represented a constant pattern of critical instability. In the transition from the Vandal 
domination to the Byzantines, between the IV-XV centuries, North Africa was 
characterised by a period of turmoil and instability. In this period, growing Christianity 
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disputes and divisions further fractured social and cultural cohesion (see Ibn Khaldun 
Assabyia in chapter 3) that had previously bonded the pagan past (Naylor, 2009: 56).  
The later Arabic conquest of North Africa7 was based on renewed but often 
conflicting alliances, political subordination and religious conversion of autochthone 
Berber tribes by the newly established Arab-Islamic domination, reinforcing pre-
existing lines of divisions. On the other hand, between the VIII and XV centuries, 
despite internal rivalry and power-struggle relations amongst succeeding Berber 
dynasties (Fatimidis, Almoravids, Almohas, Marinids, Hafsids, Zayyanids), a 
relatively long and stable period of coexistence (Convivencia during Spanish Moorish 
kingdoms8), guaranteed social integration between Jews, Christians and Muslims. This 
period, known as the “Golden Age” of cultural emancipation, was established around 
(Falagas et al, 2006: 1581-1582): 
 The pursuit of religious precepts of the Quran, such as “the scholar’s ink is 
more sacred than the blood of martyrs” and Prophet preaching “For every 
disease, Allah has given a cure”. 
 
 The ease of communication across the Muslim Empire uniting an extensive 
geographic area as ever before, while Arabic language became common usage. 
 
 The use of Chinese paper production’s techniques, as books became more 
available in modern libraries (Cairo, Aleppo, Baghdad, Iran, central Asia and 
Spain), including the foundation of the House of Wisdom in Baghdad in 1004. 
                                                 
7 The Arab conquest of the Maghreb in the VII century was initiated not by a plan coming from the Arab caliphate 
but by Egyptian military chiefs’ personal intention to spread Islam, gain military prestige and economic drives 
(Abun-Nasr, 1987: 28, 33). 
8Fernández-Morera (2006:23) in the article "The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise", rather confirms that “cultural 
achievements of Islamic Spain cannot obscure the fact that it was never an example of peaceful convivencia”. 
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Translations of classics from Greek, Latin and Chinese into Arabic removed language 
barriers and defined a vital cultural awakening and key contribution to the European 
Renaissance (see chapter 3).  
 In the XV century, the collapse of the Eastern Roman Empire with the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 by the Turks and the completion of Spanish Reconquista in 
1492, established new social and political reconfigurations in the region. Between the 
XVI and XVIII, the fast expansion of the Ottoman Empire from the Anatolian region 
to the Balkan and the reunification of North Africa, implied the incorporation of new 
political alliances and the imposition of new habits and cultural traditions. The three 
regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli received administrative recognition by 
Constantinople with various degrees of local autonomy under the sultan’s authority 
(Naylor, 2009: 119). The outcome of the 1683 battle of Vienna9, opposing Muslims 
and Christians’ powers, inverted the course of long-lasting conflicting equilibrium 
with the gradual Ottoman Empire’s dissolution. In the XIX and XX centuries, in the 
Mediterranean, European colonialist supremacy eventually redefined modernisation 
processes as Spain, France, England and Italy increased political and economic 
pressures, establishing protectorates and expanding their spheres of influence.  
In particular, in 1830, thirty years after Napoleon’s military expedition in 
Egypt, France embarked upon its first campaign in Algeria, establishing first a colony 
annexed later as French territories which lasted until 1962. Seemingly, Morocco 
became a Franco-Hispano protectorate between 1912-1956; while Tunisia fell under 
French control between 1881 and 1956. European colonisation considerably interfered 
with the Arab-Islamic socio-cultural consolidation process, as foreign rule imposed a 
                                                 
9 The battle represented the apex but also a turning point in the Ottoman Empire’s gradual decline with significant 
implications in the modern Euro-Mediterranean history. 
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conflicting and often incompatible cultural, economic and political system upon ruling 
elites and local population. As a matter of fact, European domination imposed a 
subaltern modernisation, favouring global North-South inequalities and internal 
stratification of social and cultural cleavages at the expense of a process of gradual 
reforms. In Tunisia, since the beginning of 1800, the Beylical power gradually came 
under growing pressures due to the rejection of recognising Ottoman sovereignty, 
despite the enforcement of 1839 Ottoman reforms (tanzimat) and French consul 
coercive measures to direct the reforms, limiting Bey’s independence and powers to 
rule (Abun-Nasr, 1989: 273, 278). Furthermore, the polarisation between traditional-
religious and modernist-secularist values and social structures, accentuated the 
uncomfortable adaptation to new national political projects while challenging patterns 
of historical development in the region.  
In particular, the demise of the Ottoman Empire meant also the end of Islamic 
Caliphate twelve centuries rule with Ataturk in 1923, a symbol of Muslim unity 
between religion and politics. National borders were redesigned as a result of 
international peace Treaties based on Western powers’ arbitrary redefinition of North 
African modern-nation states. However, the political development left unresolved 
socio-cultural, ethnic and religious issues. During the inter-world wars’ period, an even 
more aggressive and assertive colonial policy in the region mirrored intensive 
economic exploitation and political repression. In Tunisia, foreign-rule acted as a 
catalyst to national identity, sense of belonging and nationhood. The Islamic revival 
supported grass-root movements to end the colonial rule constructed upon the 
coloniser vs colonised system, where the colonised was the symbol of “backwardness, 
unprivileged political status and economically disposed” (Abun-Nasr, 1989: 324). As 
a result, the Second World War was welcomed as an opportunity to push for national 
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independence from foreign occupancy. Tunisian political elites in an attempt to 
mobilise economic support from the bourgeoisie and to gain support from the masses, 
organised a national-wide network of local councils. The objective to obtain 
independence amidst international support while accommodating French colonial 
power to avoid repressions, eventually led to the proclamation of national 
independence10.  
In this framework, social, religious and political consolidation in Tunisia has 
been long rooted in historical legacies, suggesting a need for further revaluating 
different contributions of co-existing cultures to the establishment of modern Tunisia. 
In this framework, Maghreb historical, linguistic, cultural, political plurality or 
hybridity, constructed around post-colonial binary subjectivities, locates Tunisia as the 
link between the “West” or European cultural and the Arab-Berber dimensions, 
offering “the possibility for intra-civilizational commutative communication and 
comprehension” (Naylor, 2009: 249). Furthermore, in present days, the relevance of 
defining a public sphere respecting and tolerating diversities and minorities is an 
unaccomplished cultural, social, religious and political project which lies at the centre 
of the complex process of democratic change in the area.  
 
Modern Politics in Tunisia 
 
Political alliances historically dominated modern Maghreb history. 
Nevertheless, the role of political leading figures, such as the Roman proconsul, Berber 
leaders, Ottoman governors, Beylical rulers or the French resident-General, always 
                                                 
10 The independence was proclaimed in Libya in 1951, Egypt in 1953, Tunisia and Morocco 1956, Algeria in 1962. 
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represented a key reference intended to promote stability and unity, despite conflicting 
interests, religious diversity or social fragmentation. National movements, supporting 
Tunisian independence and the safeguard of national interests against French 
occupancy, were gradually and prominently directed by a young lawyer Habib 
Bourguiba11. His nationalist commitment increasingly dominated the public scene in 
1934 when in conflict with the old guard of the Destour Party, he founded the Neo-
Destour party, a prominent political force active in the systematic anti-French struggle 
in cooperation with the national union UGTT (Abun-Nasr, 1989: 360-367). In 
particular, after the declaration of independence in 1956, Habib Bourghiba emerged as 
the resilient national leader, considered as the founder of modern Tunisia.  
The French Protectorate, designed to rule via the Beylical symbolic presence, 
was soon replaced by the newly adopted parliamentary system, inspired by the French 
model. Arabic was established as the official language and Islam as the national 
religion according to the 1959 Constitutional law12. Modern Tunisia was initially 
inspired by democratic ideals and principles based on a constitutional republic model 
where the President is appointed head of state and the Prime Minister head of 
government upon a bicameral legislature. However, no effective alternation of ruling 
power was ever established due to de facto single party state rule supporting a semi-
dictatorial regime (see chapter 3). 
 In this sense, modern Tunisia was allegedly founded around a centralised 
democratic project strongly based on a well-structured administrative system. In this 
perspective, however, the State was defined as a main agent of development, guarantor 
                                                 
11Born in Monastir 3rd August 1903 – Monastir, 6 April 2000, political leader of Berber origin, educated in France 
in Law where he was deeply inspired in his political and cultural ideals. 
12 The nationalisation process considered French as a privileged language in public life including the education 
system (although Berber Amazigh has never been officially recognised). 
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of a progressive socio-cultural modernisation and planned economic liberalisation to 
the detriment of political and civil liberties and rights. As a consequence, the role of 
Islam in society also was constrained and reframed under governmental legislation. To 
a certain extent, this process of national integration, modernisation and 
homogenisation did not lead to the integration and recognition of Tunisian cultural, 
social and religious richness. In fact, it rather incorporated an elitist, exclusive and 
often undemocratic system. To the same extent, religious-inspired political parties as 
well as any party supporting a regionalist agenda were outlawed and controlled with 
repressive measures in order to preserve national unity. 
The overarching secular and Western oriented political, cultural and socio-
economic project shaped the evolution of the country. This secularist frame came as a 
counter-alternative to and rejection of the long-lasting significance of Islam and 
Islamic laws in the regulation of private and public affairs. Bourguiba often blamed 
traditional institutions for the backwardness of the country, as he aimed to reform three 
major areas: social and legal by promulgating the Personal status code; cultural by 
pursuing the expansion of education to achieve social change; and economic by 
redistributing arable lands (Abun-Nasr, 1989: 420-421). For instance, amongst them, 
the most significant reform was the promulgation in 1956 of the “Code du Statut 
personel”, regulating positive rights as opposed to Islamic tradition. In particular, it 
reconsidered legal marriage (i.e. polygamy forbidden); men and women’s equal right 
to divorce in civil tribunals; child protection; abortion and family inheritance, 
representing the first positive law in the Arab world promoting equality between men 
and women. However, the discrepancy between central government policies pursuing 
a developed, modern and secular Tunisia contrasted with a more traditional, religious, 
conservative and economically backward interior, developing a binary system.  
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On the other hand, the Neo-Destour party was key to foster regime consensus, 
mass mobilisation and social control, replacing the traditional Ulema authority while 
civil tribunals gradually replaced Islamic Qadi system and Quranic Law. Public 
nationalist celebrations were used as propaganda to commemorate the independence, 
relegating Islamic values and social traditional habits to a more private sphere. This 
paradigm, from one side, deprived the population of the tools to politically and socially 
engage; from the other, disrupted traditional Islamic form of identity building and 
community networking, channelling growing discontent.  In the early 1980s, political 
and social confrontation along the secular vs. religious dividing lines reached its 
peak13. The unrelenting repression against violent social unrest confirmed the 
unsuitability of a thirty-year long uncompromising governing system. The peaceful 
coup d'état orchestrated by General Ben Ali in 198714, was then welcomed with much 
hope and uncertainty. 
Ben Ali, despite his initial commitment to democracy, religious tolerance and 
socio-economic improvement, pursued thereafter an agenda considered more a 
continuity rather than avant-gardist to Bourguiba. In particular, the replacement of the 
Neo-Destour party with the newly founded RCD15, re-confirmed a conservative stance 
towards political opposition parties and the adoption of one party rule16. The 
development of a new National Pact implied some concessions to the more 
conservative sectors of society, above all the Ulemas by acknowledging the centrality 
of the Arab and Islamic identity; granting public visibility to Islam, including call for 
                                                 
13 MTI Islamist members were jailed as their leaders Ghannouchi and Morou jailed in 1981 (Perkins, 2004: 171). 
14 Born in Hammam-Sousse, 3rd September 1936, Ben Ali has been Tunisian second President until 2011 after 23 
years of rule, ousted and obliged to the exile after the 2011 Jasmine revolution.  
15 From the Arabic name يطارقميدلا يروتسدلا عمجتلا, mostly known in its French translation Rassemblement 
Constitutionnel Démocratique (Democratic Constitutional Assembly).  
16Presidential elections were held periodically (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009) but all largely re-reconfirmed 
Ben Ali ruling party in power. In 2002, the constitution was changed to lift term limits to approve his re-election. 
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prayers via TV and radio channels; as well as the release of political prisoners 
including Ghannouchi, legalising MTI student unions and offering MTI leaders to 
participate in the government (Perkins, 2004: 185-188). However, over time, 
government’s system of police capillary controls restrained political participation and 
silenced dissidents that could threaten the regime status-quo. On the other hand, the 
regime maintained high public expenditure for social policies around 19% during the 
period 1987-2005, including social welfare, education and health while reductions in 
social spending on food subsidies were compensated by increases in the minimum 
wage (Ben Romdhane, 2007 in Paciello, 2011:4). These policies aimed at increasing 
middle-class support and decreasing poverty amongst the poorest sections of society 
while being a powerful tool for social control and passive consensus.  
In general, in spite of remarkable economic success and political stability, the 
unresolved cleavages coastal vs. rural and secular vs religious deepened 
dissatisfaction amongst the population. Moreover, lack of democratic freedoms, 
increasing political and judicial corruption, socio-cultural marginalisation and growing 
unemployment, especially amongst the youth, channelled growing dissidents 
exacerbated by economic stagnation. In particular, Tunisians17 experienced a drop in 
satisfaction regarding the availability of affordable housing (only 41% in 2010 from 
74% in 2009); public transportation systems with a decline from 2009 (74%) to 2010 
(55%); roads and highways’ quality from (59%) in 2009 to (50%) in 2010; also in 
relation to local schools and educational institutions (67%) in 2010 when compared 
with 2009 (73%); and healthcare about half (51%) in 2010 with a drop from previous 
year (71%), highlighting government's failure to cope with growing socio-economic 
                                                 
17Gallup 2010 survey: http://www.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx, [last access 
on 17/07/2015]. 
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demands. In fact, the 2011 revolution ushered then a period of agitated socio-cultural 
readjustment, political instability, social and civil confrontations, radicalisation of 
religious extremism and further economic recession (see chapter 3). In this framework, 
the implementation of a democratic multi-party political system, inclusive of religious 
parties and the commemorative establishment of a national celebration on Tuesday the 
14th of January as day of the Revolution and the Youth, have marked two key events 
symbolising a new phase for political, social and civic participation.  
The post-colonial and post-independence reconfiguration of North Africa 
brought to the fore unresolved issues of sectarianism, religious extremism, ideological 
and political vacuum, cultural fragmentation and economic destabilisation; while the 
emergence of a self-proclaimed Caliphate in Syria and Iraq have hijacked the so-called 
Arab spring democratic movements. Western interference in the region has recently 
further fragmented and destabilised the social, cultural, religious and political 
organisation. The presence of new but old secularists and moderate Islamists’ political 
parties has both marked a crucial moment in MENA countries, often destabilised by 
the rise of more Islamic extremists. At present, however, the recognition of minorities’ 
rights, the inclusion of marginalised inland areas and the re-evaluation of Islam in 
society, might appear rather uncertain but realistically the only real solution to promote 
social cohesion and democracy. In particular, a new political agenda would need to 
reconsider unity within diversity as a viable solution. 
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The Islamic Context 
 
In the framework of the research context, Islamic principles are analysed in 
reference to democracy, social responsibility, social justice and education. In 
particular, as Islam is the State religion and the majority of Tunisians are Moslems, 
Islamic values, traditions and principles have played and still play an important role in 
society. Islam’s influence was considered central to understanding the extent to which 
Islamic principles and ethics are considered and reproduced in modern Tunisia.  
 
The role of Islam in society 
 
Islam is one of the three monotheistic religions along with Judaism and Christianity 
and is the world’s second largest religion, with an estimated 1.6 billion followers, 
constituting about 23% of the world population18. Historically, Islam gave rise to some 
of the greatest world civilisations and the Islamic world constitutes nowadays a 
significant part of humanity suggesting the importance of understanding its religious, 
social and political trends (Riaz, 2002: 1). Islam is a word derived from the Arabic 
words silm and salamah, meaning surrendering, guiding to peace and contentment, 
establishing security and accord (Krause, 2011: 171); and in religious terms, 
resignation to the divine will of God (Hughes, 1995:220), as the observance of the 
divine law of the Holy book, the Qu’ran. The submission to God’s will is considered 
mandatory and it revolves around the so-called five Pillars of Islam (arkān al-Islām 
                                                 
18 http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/. [Accessed 18/08/2015]. 
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ملاسلإا ناكرأ; also arkān al-dīn نيدلا ناكرأ), considered the foundation of Muslim 
believers’ faith and life conducts19: 
1. Shahadah: declaring there is no god except God, and Muhammad is God's 
Messenger; 
2. Salat: ritual prayer five times a day; 
3. Sawm: fasting and self-control during the month of Ramadan; 
4. Zakat: giving 2.5% of one’s savings to the poor and needy; 
5. Hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime (if able to do so). 
 
Islam, however, not only contains spiritual rules for worship but also provides 
an ethical, socio-cultural, political and economic model for regulating individual and 
community life. It provides a value-system centred on how to improve oneself and live 
in honesty and respectfully in society, being compliant with all tenets of Islam. In this 
sense, mosques comprehensively embodied the place where the community gathers, 
the centre of social leadership and command regulating moral, social and political 
order. In particular, it is the uniqueness of the divinity of God and the acceptance of 
the tawhid (La Illaha Illa Allah – there is no god but God and Muhammed is his 
messenger), the founding principle expressing the unity and exceptionality of God and 
divine Law (Ahmad, 1992: 4). The occurrence of apostasy, renouncing to one’s own 
religion in a society entirely dominated by one religion, shaped both the political and 
legal system as giving up one's religion, also meant being disloyal to the state and 
society (Peters & De Vries, 1976 :24)20.  
                                                 
19 In particular, these values and principles are central elements further explored in the study (see chapter 3). 
20 These considerations have impacted on subjective identity-building, socialisation processes, political loyalty to 
the ruler or the State and the co-relationship with other religions. 
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In particular, Qur’an is the Holy book, source of both Islamic canon law 
(Shari’ah) and jurisprudence (fiqh), complemented by the hadith (speech) or traditions 
traced back through the companions of the Prophet forming the Sunnah - practices or 
deeds of the Prophet (Ahmad, 1992: 7-8)21. Islamic fiqh, in particular, are distinguished 
between the facts of the tashri’ (interpreting the divine law) and taujih (guidance) both 
forms relating to the ascertainment of what is halal (permitted) and what is haram 
(forbidden) in making provisions in the Shari’ah, concerning human lawful or 
unlawful deeds (Tibi, 2001:157). In terms of social responsibility and civic 
engagement, this has been a central point as the definition of good and bad refers to 
individual conducts of morality and social behaviour. It also referred to guidance for 
the early community of believers (Ummah), discerning common interests and social 
norms.  
The concept of Ummah, in fact, appears sixty-four times in the Qur’an, with 
reference to “ the followers of a prophet; divine plan of salvation; religious group; a 
small group within a larger community of believers; misguided people; an order of 
being” (Riaz, 2002: 85-86). In the aftermath of the Caliphate’s expansion and the 
unification of different populations, it turned to be synonym and symbol of the Islamic 
community, universally applied beyond geographical, linguistic or ethnic differences 
shifting its original religious reference to a wider socio-political usage. In this sense, 
the Ummah soon became a framework for the unification of diverse tribal identities 
under Islam as a new overarching identity supported by “jiwar (temporary protection 
of a neighbour), hilf (a full mutual alliance), wala (loyalty) and later mu’akhah 
(brotherhood), to confer tribes fictive kinship status on outsiders” (Riaz, 2002: 87-88).  
                                                 
21 Additional sources of law have also been the informed consensus of the community (ijma) and analogy of the 
law or interpretation (qiyas) and ijtihad (schools formulation of the law) (Ahmad, 1992).  
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Furthermore, in Islam, values such as mutual respect, communitarian solidarity 
and interconnected social bonds are paramount and all foundational to a society where 
social responsibility and community cohesion are core elements. To the same extent, 
Qur’an confirms the relevance of judging and entrusting the affairs of State to people 
responsible according to justice: “Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to 
those worthy of them, and that when you judge between people, you judge with justice. 
Surely Allah admonishes you with what is excellent. Surely Allah is ever Hearing, 
Seeing” (Maulana, 2011: 379). Islam also provided a reference to the form of 
government, taxation and administration, social relations, relations with foreign states, 
setting the basis for a self-regulating and self-sufficient system (Esposito & Voll, 
1996). The supremacy of Islam and the supreme loyalty to God introduced a new 
socio-legal-theological frame of reference whose norms and values entrusted by 
believers aimed at overcoming risks of tribal fragmentation.  
In particular, after the death of Muhammed in 632 A.D., the succession was 
established according to two institutions to guarantee unity and continuity of power: 
the shura, based on Q42:38, refers to Muslims ‘who conduct their affairs by mutual 
consultation” and bai’at - oath of allegiance – from the community or selected few 
(Bennet, 1998: 46-47). The use of consultation and dialogue are thus clearly reflecting 
an early socio-political system for democratic consensus and decision-making within 
the community. These aspects reveal how the unity amongst religion, government or 
local councils and economic and social life has been the most significant characteristic 
for the expansion and organic development of a non-homogeneous Islamic Ummah 
under elected or nominated Khalifas22. In particular, the protection and well-being of 
the community also granted freedom to criticise or monitor government’s activity or 
                                                 
22 Until the abolition by Ataturk at the beginning of the 20th century. 
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even refuse to obey if the rulers/government ruled against the law or the people. This 
is an important aspect linked to individual participation and responsibility towards the 
common good of the community.  
In the same framework, respect for human freedom for religious belief is also 
present in the Islamic society as the Qur’an refers to: “There is no compulsion in 
religion” (2:256) and “the Truth is from your Lord; so let him who please believe and 
let him who please disbelieve” (18:29), (Maulana, 2011: 67). These verses are often 
contentious in relation to religious tolerance based on individual right rather than 
obligation, to choose freely a religion accordingly. However, they highlight how 
historically respect for religious minorities was acknowledged. In post-revolution 
Tunisia, the present ideological struggle between different Islamic moderate parties 
and ultra-conservative currents seem to deviate from classical principles, as 
confrontational narratives on establishing the “true” Islam implies the redefinition of 
human rights and civil liberties23.  
Furthermore, Islamic values related to social responsibility and social capital 
seem to reinforce connections with democratic principles and social justice (see also 
chapter 4). In particular, the Qur’an refers to “Zakat obligatory charity for the poor 
and the needy and those employed to administer it; those whose hearts are made to 
incline (to truth) and (to free) the captives; and those in debt or in the way of Allah and 
for the wayfarer — an ordinance from Allah; as “Allah is Knowing, Wise” (Maulana, 
2011: 580). Zakat reveals a strong and direct ordinance from Allah, applying to all 
believers. To the same extent, Sadaqa also referred to sadaqa tatawwu`iyya (voluntary 
charity), in relation to responsibility to people with no sufficient means for living, has 
                                                 
23 The ideology pursued by the self-proclaimed Caliphate in Syria and Iraq is based on punishing often also by 
death minority groups or non-believers (Yazid, Christians, Assyrians, Shia and Shia minority sects, etc.).  
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been a social practice of donations and public fundraising. These two complementary 
and normative social conducts reflect the centrality of community well-being, 
community solidarity, often also referred to Maslaha or public good/interest in Islamic 
jurisprudence, embedded in Islamic values for the Muslim Ummah. In this sense, it is 
possible to find reference to maslaha also as Quranic preaching “Indeed, God 
command justice, doing good and generosity towards relatives and He forbids what is 
shameful, blameworthy and oppressive. He teaches you, so that you may take heed”, 
which includes a double reference to doing good as a manifestation of God’s grace and 
mercy, as well as social welfare and community well-being (Bin Sattam, 2015: 10,11).  
To the same extent, it is important to highlight and understand how Islamic 
values and principles as endorsement of individual faith have for centuries shaped 
everyday habits in society. As an example, volunteering (Tatawa), considered as 
Islamic values in relation to God’s will, is also an important principle purposeful to 
social action and participation in the community. Tatawa is found in the Qur’an: “[…] 
whoever among you is sick or on a journey, (he shall fast) a (like) number of other 
days. And those who find it extremely hard may effect redemption by feeding a poor 
man. So whoever does good spontaneously, it is better for him; and that you fast is 
better for you if you know”, where fasting is here called tatawwu‘ or the spontaneous 
doing of good, but it also means the doing of an act, a social act with effort (Maulana, 
2011: 229)24. There is a reference to individual autonomy and freedom to engage with 
God and with people in society in order to apply social justice and good actions as 
God’s will. In fact, despite a reductionist ontological and epistemological framework, 
Islam consistently influences believers’ social life. Volunteering in Arab tradition is 
not linked much to the Latin root voluntas (personal will or being compassionate) but 
                                                 
24 The same reference of spontaneous acts is also linked to spontaneous prayers as beneficial actions. 
34 
 
from the root ta’ (to obey) or “being rendered obedient as a relationship of obedience 
toward God (Mittermaier, 2014: 520). 
On the other hand, in relation to education, in the Qur’an learning and the 
pursuit of education are espoused, becoming central elements to all believers. From 
the first revelation, the application of knowledge had a clear importance as God 
ordered  “read and write” (96:1–5); while the Prophet refers to the acquisition of 
knowledge as being as great a need of humanity as the acquisition of wealth: “There 
shall be no envy but in two: the person whom Allah has given wealth and the power 
to spend it in the service of truth and the person whom Allah has granted knowledge 
and he judges by it and teaches it” (B. 3:75); and also “who has a slave-girl and he 
trains her in the best manner and he gives her the best education, then he sets her free 
and marries her” (B. 3:31), (Maulana, 2011: 359). These three references seem to 
confirm how education and the pursuit of knowledge are obligations as well as a basic 
right for Moslems. There is an emphasis on learning, teaching and receiving education 
as key elements to pursue truth and knowledge while achieving personal emancipation 
and freedom.  
Islamic principles directly refer to the right to education, social equality and 
responsibility to the community, democratic participation and civic engagement as 
much as to freedom of expression in relation to the study’s conceptual framework, 
findings and data analysis. The thesis aims at understanding and conceptualising 
university and student social responsibility in the context of public universities with 
reference to Islamic principles shaping identity, social values and cultural habits. 
Tunisian public universities and political institutions have not integrated Islamic 
norms, values and principles in national laws and regulations following a centralised 
secular project, rejecting any major role of Islamic institutions in the administration of 
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State affairs, social or political life. However, the study presents Islamic principles not 
being forcibly in contradiction with social responsibility, democracy, civic 
engagement and academic or individual freedom to participate in society. On the 
contrary, the marginalisation of Islam and Islamic values in the political project might 
have hindered the adoption or positive integration of principles like justice, equality 
and respect for human freedoms highly valued in Islam and, if re-considered in relation 
to universities’ social role in local communities, could be also positively supportive to 
current democratic development.  
 
 
The Education System in Tunisia 
 
This section explores public education and the higher education system in 
Tunisia. It firstly considers pre-independence historical contexts. Secondly, it exposes 
the impact of national reforms in the development of higher education’s aims, 
principles, structures and characteristics. It explores how post-independence policies 
and regulations have developed a common institutional framework and how public 
schooling and higher education have been shaped to adjust political settings, social 
demands and economic conditions. 
 
Tunisian Education System: an historical overview 
 
 In Tunisia, prior to the French protectorate in 1881, an education system 
established by the State already existed, based upon a diversification of institutions 
offering both traditional and modern educational curriculum. In particular, the 
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establishment of kuttab (Koranic school) and the Zaytuna25 (Islamic theology and 
jurisprudence), co-existed with a more modern and European-inspired model of 
education – the Bardo Polytechnic founded in 1840 and the Sadiki College in 1875 
(including mathematics, physics, literature and history) (Sraieb, 1993: 239)26. Existing 
economic, political and cultural exchanges interconnecting Tunisia with European 
partners, influenced local elites, embracing a different approach and attitudes towards 
educational models and values alike. In particular, a trend of continuity within 
diversification in the education system confirms how gradual modernisation policies 
implied the introduction of a modern and secular curricula specifically to form the new 
elites, the military apparatus and state administration officers. The creation of parallel 
and often not reciprocal nor convergent education systems reproduced lines of 
cleavages between the majority of the population with access to a more traditional-
Islamic schooling system and ruling elites with access to a secular and modern one. 
 In fact, the French protectorate, established in 1881 with the Bardo Treaty and 
1883 La Marsa convention, exposed Tunisia to new logics of colonial dependency. 
These events impacted profoundly educational reforms due to the subaltern 
replacement of the European-imported cultural development model. In fact, the new 
education system in Tunisia was soon built upon the creation of Franco-Arab schools 
based on the ideas supported by the French Minister of Education, Jules Ferry (Sraieb, 
1993: 241), aiming at: 
1- Respecting the pre-French occupation system and status quo of Muslim 
population’s religious identity, as well as the numerous Italian community. 
 
                                                 
25Mosque and University in Tunis. 
26 Schools for Jew and Christian children were already established and recognised (Sraieb, 1993: 240). 
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2- Imposing gradually French as the teaching language for Tunisians but also for 
other Europeans living in Tunisia. 
 
3- Developing professional training to provide skilled labour both for private and 
public institutions. 
 
The key objective pursued by colonial rule was to impose a bilingual system where 
French would eventually become the predominant language in the education system; 
but also incorporating within the same sphere public administration, trade and the 
everyday lives of local communities. In this way, the Protectorate would be also seen 
as the newly established political authority, redefining social habits and cultural 
spaces. To the same extent, the implementation of teaching Islamic theology and 
Arabic in schools was culturally hybridised by the introduction of French, history, 
geography and arithmetic in order to open local communities to a more European-like 
way of life and values. In this perspective, the traditional Tunisian identity was to be 
redefined and reshaped by the francisation of society.  
 On the other hand, between 1881 and WWII, a degree of resistance from the 
local population and refusal from local authorities including Ulemas and kuttab 
directors to adopt a hybrid system, marked a growing division between the capital 
Tunis and coastal cities such as Monastir where contacts with Europeans were regular, 
in contrast with inland rural regions and southern cities, retrenched within an even 
more conservative closure. In particular, the project of gradual assimilation proved to 
be unsuccessful. In fact, in 1949 the level of public schooling and educational success 
rate of students aged between five and fourteen, enrolled in public school with a hybrid 
system of education, reflected an underlying marginalisation and non-integration of 
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the local Tunisian population, if compared to French and other Europeans. In fact, 
during the French protectorate, the formation received in schools with a modern 
curriculum taught in French guaranteed better chances for socio-economic 
achievements, differently to students educated in schools with a traditional curriculum 
taught in Arabic. Furthermore, Tunisian students, representing over 70% of the total 
student population, despite having access to these privileged channels, only 12% of 
eligible students achieved success in public schools. 
 
Table 1 – Level of Public Schooling in Tunisia (Sraieb, 1992: 249). 
 
Students aged  
Educated 
students Percentage 
 
(5-14 years old)     
French 27500 26000 94% 
European 45500 35000 77% 
Tunisian 775000 95000 12% 
 
  
These cultural and social cleavage became overtime motivation for growing 
resentment amongst the local population. In fact, the struggle for improving public 
education for Tunisians against the colonial administration, initially brought up by the 
movements of Jeunes-Tunisiens (Young Tunisians), evolved into a general movement 
for national independence further organised around political parties (Destour in 1920 
and Neo-Destour in 1934) and national unions, such as CGTT in 1924 and UGTT in 
1946 (Sraieb, 1994: 51). As such, cultural, linguistic, religious, political but also socio-
economic grievances consolidated local movements of resistance characterised by 
embedded a binary and subaltern system of the coloniser vs colonised, tradition vs 
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modernity, religion vs secular, French vs Arabic, urban vs rural. On the other hand, 
these rich narratives, framing tensions in the definition of the new national Tunisian 
identity, seem to be still relevant in present-day Tunisia. 
 
The Birth of National Public Education System in Tunisia 
 
After the 1956 independence, the foundational elements of Tunisian national 
identity were founded with reference to post-colonial socio-cultural, as well as 
economic and political configurations. The preamble to the 1959 Tunisian first 
constitution enshrines key values and principles upon which modern Tunisia was 
established. In fact, it is stated27:   
“In the name of God, the Merciful, We, the representatives of the 
Tunisian people, meeting in the National Constituent Assembly, 
proclaim the will of the people, who is free from foreign domination 
thanks to its powerful cohesion and the fight it has delivered to 
tyranny, exploitation and regression: 
 
to consolidate national unity and remain faithful to the human values 
of […] dignity of man, justice and freedom […] peace, progress and 
free cooperation among nations; 
 
to remain faithful to the teachings of Islam, unity of the Greater 
Maghreb, to its connection to the Arab family, cooperation with the 
peoples who fight for justice and freedom; 
 
for a democracy based on the sovereignty of the people and 
characterised by a stable political system based on the separation of 
powers. 
 
We proclaim that the republic constitutes: 
the best guarantee for the respect of human rights, equality of 
citizens in rights and duties, to achieve prosperity, economic 
development and exploitation of national wealth the benefit of the 
people;  
[…] to protect the family and the right of citizens to work, health and 
education”. 
                                                 
27 Researcher own-translation from French (previously translated original text from Arabic to French). 
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In this framework, the end of foreign domination (associated with tyranny, exploitation 
and regression brought by French occupancy) and the emergence of the State as 
guarantor of national unity, political stability and democracy are framed within the 
respect of human values and citizens’ will and rights. In particular, it defines the State 
as an engine of economic development and protector of the family, providing work, 
health services and, also, education for all citizens. To the same extent, the constitution 
reconfirms the significance of historical connections with Islam, the Arabic identity 
and political unity to the Greater Maghreb. These elements of change, however, 
despite continuity of post-colonial economic and political ties, structured concurrent 
and often contentious dynamics imposed by centralised government policies, 
supporting an incomplete project of subaltern modernisation.  
In particular, the national education reform was one of the most important 
transformations enacted by Bourguiba who perceived education to be the main factor 
of socio-cultural and economic development. The promulgation of national law n° 58-
118 4th of November 1958, established, under the competence of the State Secretary 
for National Education, Youth and Sports, a free and compulsory education system 
from the age of six and for at least 6 years with no distinction on the basis of sex, racial, 
religious or social status, contributing to national development, national cultural 
emancipation while preparing children for their role as citizens (Art 1, 2 and 3). It also 
considered the distinction of two levels of education: a first 6 years primary education 
based on general learning including language and arithmetic; and a second 6 years 
secondary education divided in general, economic/commercial and 
technical/industrial, including specialisation in Arabic and foreign language and 
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literature; science, mathematics and technical subjects (Art. 7-19)28.  It also defines the 
establishment of higher education institutions, providing scientific, technical, 
humanistic and artistic higher level of education in the pursuit of scientific 
development of research (Art. 25). 
The founding principles of the national education system supported social 
modernisation and political “nationalisation” project, reflecting a European-centred 
model. The implementation of Tunisia’s top-down reforms was financially supported 
by a dedicated budget rising from 18% in 1959 to a peak of 34.5% in 1971, expressed 
in the 1959 manifesto “Nouvelle conception de l’enseignement en Tunisie, based on 
the elite’s confidence that the school, properly funded and correctly guided, could 
produce the good society as a: 
“…modern state, Tunisia must impose upon itself, among the 
first tasks of the liberation […] that of creating a system of teaching 
and education, conforming at once to its genius, to its cultural 
tradition and to the ideals of the present times” (Webb, 2013: 24). 
 
The new education system, built upon pre-existing pre-colonial and colonial 
infrastructures, aimed at educating the previously excluded masses in order to reduce 
illiteracy. In fact, in 1984 nearly 50% of the population aged 10 was deemed to be 
literate, against only 15% in 1956 (despite high levels of school drop-outs, higher 
divergences in rural areas and women representation), whereas only 8% of students 
aged 18-24 had access to higher education (De Bouttemont, 2002: 130).  
However, implications of economic downturns in the 1970s and consequent 
rising unemployment rates, especially in the young population, affected the expected 
                                                 
28 In Art 40-56, private education institutions are also regulated and allowed prior to State approval and inspection 
respecting national law and the interest of good morals, hygiene and public order.  
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impacts of educational change at a national scale and accentuated shortcomings of a 
rather visionary project of modernising society through education. To the same extent, 
the main objective of establishing a modern Tunisian identity around notions of 
national progress and patriotism, inspired by the European Enlightenment movements, 
implied that Islam had a role as a source of identity and values subordinated to the 
State (Webb, 2013: 19). In fact, if Islamic references were used to justify a secular 
form of government, education gradually turned to become more “Islamised” and 
linked to the Islamic heritage, as the state sought an alliance with Islamists to counter 
its leftist opponents (Cesari, 2014: 91). In particular, the secular vs. religious cleavage 
long dominated both education reforms and social change alike in a political 
environment of growing social control and political repression. 
 In fact, political events occurred in 1987, with the coup d’état orchestrated by 
the General Ben Ali to the detriment of Bourguiba’s long-lasting rule, took place in a 
crucial moment of economic crisis and political tensions. The opportunity given by a 
renewed National Pact implied a broader cooperation framework with all social and 
political forces, fostering economic reforms under IMF programmes. At the same time, 
it also led to the promulgation of the first out of three reforms, framed by the 
orientation Law in 1989 and established by decree n° 91-65 of 29th July 1991, 
representing the first structural reform to meet the challenges of “massification”. In 
particular, the reform reconfirmed the objective of developing a national and modern 
Tunisian identity in line with the Maghreb, Arab and Islamic sense of belonging for 
the integral development of learning and the realisation of responsible citizens (Art 1). 
Compulsory school increased from 6 to 9 schooling years (Art. 7) and reconsidered 
Arabic as the basic language for teaching humanities, scientific and technical subjects 
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(Art. 9). The introduction of a fine equal to 200 dinars was put into place as a deterrent 
in order to increase enrolments and meet national targets of literacy (Art. 32).  
In this sense, the reform managed to provide students with a longer period of 
education and training in order to improve long-term students’ skills and formation. 
At the same time, it focused on reforming national curricula, attributing to professional 
training and technical skills a central role, while reconsidering teaching quality with 
new training, didactic, teaching methods with the establishment in 1995 of a National 
Council dedicated to quality evaluation. In this perspective, the reform’s objectives 
were set to improve the quality of teaching with the development of a new training 
school, inspired by the French system linking training with employment in order to 
(De Bouttement, 2002: 130): 
- tackle unemployment rates; 
- open the school to society and the modern world; 
- establish French as learning language from the third grade, essential to 
increase job opportunities. 
 
In particular, despite the formal rehabilitation of Islamic values and Arabic language 
in education, the mainstream strategy remained to pursue a secularisation project 
initiated by Bourguiba. In fact, the role of French in the education system and the 
introduction of English as a second language followed increasing openness to modern 
curricula imposed by socio-economic reforms. This became clear as the intention to 
eradicate the roots of cultural Islamism was pursued by strengthened bilingualism 
(Vermeren, 2009: 59).  
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On the other hand, in spite of significant investments up to 7% of the budget 
resulting in important achievements as 99% of eligible children were attending 
compulsory schooling with a sharp reduction on illiteracy rates (Country Report 2000, 
Education for all); socio-economic adjustments targeted social and welfare provision, 
widened wealth unequal distribution and increased job insecurity (Murphy, 1997: 
117), increasing urban-rural economic and cultural divide. In this framework, with the 
promulgation of the Orientation Law n° 2002-80 of July 23rd 2002, the government 
reinforced the idea of free education being a primary national priority (Art. 1), where 
students lie at the centre of education (Art. 2), aiming at developing a sense of loyalty, 
love for the nation and sense of belonging to the national, Maghreb, Arab, Islamic, 
African and Mediterranean identity upon the respect of knowledge, labour, solidarity, 
tolerance, moderation and modernity comprising principles of liberty, democracy, 
social justice and human rights (Art. 3). Furthermore, there is a reference to developing 
a sense of citizenship, civic responsibility and the development of a moral, affective, 
mental and physical individual personality (Art. 8). To the same extent, it stressed the 
importance of allowing students to learn how to use their knowledge and skills to real-
life problems in order to adapt to changes, learn how to be innovative, how to work in 
a team and how to develop competencies for long-life learning (Art 10).  
At the beginning of the new century, the government embraced a structural 
reform more flexible to adapt to the fast-changing global economy and the integration 
of Tunisia in the Euro-Mediterranean market. In fact, the reference to the 
Mediterranean identity, the link to civic responsibility and democracy, as well as, the 
connection to long-life learning are three key elements confirming the on-going 
process of economic, cultural proximity and political engagement within the Euro-
Mediterranean partners, rather than with the Arabic and Muslim neighbours. On the 
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other hand, educational unresolved and critical issues linking technical and 
professional trainings to employment are represented highlighting existing structural 
and economic problems to students’ employability. 
In this framework, primary education became almost universal for both sexes 
reaching 93.4%29; whereas level of repeating years and schooling drop-out both 
decreased sharply (OIT, 2013: 19-20, 27). The 2002 orientation law marked an 
important step in the development and consolidation of the national education system, 
further integrating and standardising it in cooperation with European neighbouring 
countries. On the other hand, issues of participation, democracy, citizenships or social 
justice increasingly occupied a central role in the development of higher education 
institutions, as constitutional principles upon which national education reforms were 
founded, remained unaccomplished with broader consequences in the development of 
students’ identity formation, socialisation and predisposition to social responsibility 
and civic engagement (Hamami, 2012). 
 
 
The Higher Education System: from its foundation to the 2008 
National Reform 
 
Higher education in Tunisia is relatively “young”, since modern national 
universities were founded only during the 60-70s. At the dawn of Tunisian 
independence, there were only two HE institutions founded to respond to colonial 
needs: the “Institut Agronomique de Tunis” (1876) and the “Institut Pasteur de Tunis” 
(1902), (Rezig, 2004: 2). In fact, if the University of Tunis was founded in 1960, from 
                                                 
29 Access to basic and secondary education mainly benefited girls who have become, since 2005, the majority of 
total enrolled students. 
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the Institute of Higher Studies established in 1945; only, in the early 1970s, academic 
institutions were also founded in the coastal cities of Sfax, Monastir and Sousse in line 
with government's decentralisation policies (Dhaher, 2009: 90). As table 2 shows, 
public higher education was initially considered an elitist and centralised project with 
the establishment of HEIs in the capital Tunis where few members of society were 
trained to become part of the political and economic ruling class. However, women’s 
access to university was gradually increased as the nation opened up to substantial 
legal, economic and socio-cultural reforms.  
 
Table 2 – Evolution of students’ enrolment 1961 to 2008 in public universities30. 
Year Number of Students  % Women 
1961/62 2,310 5 
1965/66 5,456 18,6 
1971/72 11,069 22,9 
1975/76 17,235 25,8 
1981/82 28,449 33 
1985/86 41,590 36,1 
1991/92 76,097 40,5 
1995/96 112,634 43,7 
1999/00 180,044 50,4 
2002/03 262,502 55,1 
2007/08 350,828 59,1 
Source: Ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche scientifique et de la Technologie 
2008. 
 
Overtime, the expansion of a compulsory national schooling system further 
provided more students with a national diploma to grant access to universities, 
expanding enrolment rates. In this sense, socio-economic and demographic pressures 
                                                 
30 However, if undergraduates’ success rates constantly improved to reach 62% in 1994/1995 and 71.3 per cent in 
2007/2008, years’ repetition and drops-out were still higher than expected (Dhaher, 2009: 91). 
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increased government investments allowing for the reorganisation and regionalisation 
of HEIs to coastal cities and Southern regions of the country to reduce economic and 
cultural fragmentation. As a result, in 2010 Tunisia had 22,000 teaching staff and 
370,000 students31 (over 38% of 19-24 population age, with an annual intake of 75.000 
new students) distributed in 13 public universities encompassing 194 HEIs of which 
34 private institutions (attracting about 13.000 students with a total of 65.657 graduates 
in June 2009, representing a national success rate of 73.4% (Tempus, 2010: 3). In this 
sense, the public higher education system expanded in terms of infrastructures, 
diversification of the offer, and adaption to internationalisation trends, increasing 
teaching personnel, enrolments and success rate.  
This rapid expansion, particularly in the last 20 years, has been welcomed as one 
of the most important accomplishments of modern Tunisia and as an example for 
neighbouring countries in the region to meet ongoing globalisation challenges and 
reconfigurations. However, as noted by World Bank reports (Abdelssalem, 2011), in 
the MENA region efforts to expand access to education and accumulate human capital, 
have not been able to meet ‘‘new economic, demographic and financial challenges’’ 
or to take advantage of ‘‘globalisation and the increasing emphasis on knowledge in 
the development process, the region’s enormous youth bulge and the additional 
financial resources required to expand higher levels of instruction’’. In particular, the 
national HE system was exposed to: 
-  increasing economic budget expenditures’ due to lower returns on investments 
(i.e. low enrolments’ rate in private universities); 
                                                 
31 In public universities, more than 102.000 students receive government grants, while over 55 000 benefit from 
university accommodation at reduced rates (Ibid).   
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-  social challenges due to low access to jobs, exposing graduates to semi-
employment or unemployment;  
- lack of human and structural resources to provide quality education and to 
attract international students.  
In this framework, the public higher education system has been developed 
around four major reforms. As previously noticed, the 1958 foundational law 
established the national education system and framed universities’ role, programs and 
exams for each faculty in the pursuit of scientific progress, research for national 
development and graduates’ technical and non-technical training (Art. 25). In fact, this 
early reform mirrored two post-independence national priorities, functional to nation-
building context: 
1- forming new teachers to expand national compulsory education;  
2- providing skilled workers for State bureaucracy and technical/non-
technical workers for the private sector.  
 
However, only with national law 89-70, 28th July 198932, promulgated by the new 
President Ben Ali, universities were reconfigured to foster scientific and technological 
progress, national development but also contribution to develop cultural, social and 
political environments, including the consolidation of Arab and Muslim culture (Art 
1). In fact, the changing nature of Tunisian society urged also universities to pursue 
new missions linked to national economic growth and socio-cultural needs to favour 
cultural, sport and social activities (not intended as outreach engagement); while 
developing Maghreb and worldwide cooperation programs (Art. 2). On the other hand, 
                                                 
32 This national law integrated three previous reforms – law 69-3 24th January 1969: law 76-65 12th July 1976; law 
86-80 9th August 1986 – ratified under President Bourguiba. 
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the formation of scientific councils (with a consultative character), formed by the 
deans of faculty, departments’ directors, teaching staff, students’ representatives, 
economic and socio-cultural representatives, created new organisational structures 
(Art. 16). Faculty deans, elected only by presidential decree, became primarily 
responsible for budget expenditures, internal scientific, pedagogic and research 
organisation, assuming control over campus order and discipline in coordination with 
the university Rector and the local public force (Art. 15). In particular, these two 
elements have long impacted upon institutional autonomy and academic freedom as 
universities became directly dependent to the political power via appointed deans; 
whereas university social responsibility and campus life was constrained and 
controlled by a university police (see chapters 3 and 5).  
On the other hand, national strategies to develop university-government-
industry partnerships were a result of national openness to neo-capital global logics 
and dynamics of international scientific cooperation. In this sense, President Ben Ali’s 
newly approved national privatisation policies were encouraged by increasing 
investments in higher education by the World Bank. In fact, from December 1991 to 
June 2014, the WB in coordination with other private donors financed three projects 
for a total investment of $328 million dollars. In particular, the 1991 restructuring 
project aimed at “making the higher education system more cost effective and 
responsive to the needs of the country”; diversifying the higher education system and 
improving output of trained technical and managerial labour force; revising curricula 
to enhance teaching and learning quality and strengthening planning and managerial 
capacities33. The 1998 project promoted access to higher education; improving internal 
                                                 
33 http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P005726/higher-education-restructuring-project?lang=en&tab=overview. 
[Last accessed 04/11/2015].  
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and external efficiency while enhancing financial sustainability of public HEIs34. 
Finally, the 2006 Second HE reform Support Project aimed at expanding access to 
public higher education; modernising the HE system by strengthening quality 
assurance mechanisms, institutional and financial autonomy as well as academic 
quality and institutional performance35. These policies, supporting the development of 
an Entrepreneurial university model in Tunisia based on a human capital logic, 
restrained the scope for a wider civic and democratic reforms defining university-
community programs. Notwithstanding, the entrepreneurial model could not meet 
targets of economic efficiency, governance autonomy and profitability, to the 
detriment of teaching quality assurance36.  
 In parallel, the progressive integration in the Euro-Mediterranean socio-
cultural, political and economic area favoured the implementation of convergence 
policies for degree standardisation (EU Bologna process in 1999). In fact, the LMD37 
reform ratified by national law 25th February 2008 is the latest reform still regulating 
the HE system in Tunisia (up-to-date and after the 2011 revolution). The reform aimed 
at implementing university governance, degree flexibility and adaptability to changing 
global environments, students’ mobility and the establishment of a system of quality 
assurance (Art. 3). In particular, in line with European logic of long-life learning, it 
established the award of a three year Bachelor’s degree of 180 credits (Art. 5) and the 
division of subjects into compulsory (up to 75% of total subjects) and optional (up to 
                                                 
34 http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P005741/higher-education-reform-support?lang=en&tab=overview. [Last 
accessed 04/11/2015]. 
35 http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P075809/higher-education-reform-support-ii?lang=en&tab=overview. [Last 
accessed 04/11/2015]. 
36 National law 2000-73 25th July 2000 was ratified to normalise the foundation of private universities, opening to 
trends of HE globalisation. On the other hand, the Tenth Economic and Social Development Plan expectations of 
30.000 students enrolled in private universities in 2006, failed to be achieved as only 3500 students registered 
(Mazzella, 2006:237) and by 2010 they were about 13.000 (Tempus, 2010). 
37 In reference to the establishment of the three cycle-degree system LMD:  Licence or Bachelor degree (al-Ijaza), 
the Master degree (al-Magistir) and the Doctorate (al-Dukturah) (Tempus, 2010: 4). 
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25%), allowing for degree flexibility (Art. 25); giving access to a professional Master’s 
degree (Art. 6) and the introduction of professional internships of 30 credits (Art. 8), 
enhancing employability (Art. 25). On the other hand, the Minister of Higher 
Education, Scientific Research and Technology remains the sole responsible for policy 
implementation (Art. 45) and, as a result, universities’ autonomy and decentralisation 
remained limited and unaccomplished. For this, despite enacted curricula reforms, 
progressive internationalisation, degrees’ readability and standardisation of education 
quality, the LMD reform has unsuccessfully created the basis for a constructive and 
suitable adaptability the Tunisian context characterised by different socio-cultural, 
economic and political settings to the European ones.  
In fact, it is possible to further consider strategic aspects that have determined 
subaltern patterns of higher education system’s modernisation in Tunisia 
(Benabdallah, 2010: 120-122): 
  
- Formation: the lack of infrastructure, human and logistical resources as access 
to facilities in often overcrowded faculties are affecting achievement of 
continuous assessment, based on teacher-to-student supervision. 
 
- Competitiveness: scientific productivity, innovation and good governance 
have been under-achieved due to lack of commitment and concerted political-
unions-civil society decisions (often dominated by corporate interests).  
 
- Sustainability: the "massification" challenge coupled with constraints on 
public funding and the poorly developed private sector has urged for 
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alternatives (i.e. increase students fee), in order to tackle students’ 
employability (i.e. growing gap of Science vs. Humanity degrees). 
 
-  Quality assurance: the implementation of national quality evaluation can 
favour universities’ international rankings and students’ inter-university 
exchanges but its failure might also compromise developing partnerships with 
European most advanced universities.  
 
In Tunisia, the lack of HEIs’ structural reforms to support university autonomy, 
governance and management; limited public funding and the difficulty of 
implementing economic reforms failed to translate educational mobility into social 
mobility. Real opportunities to implement a wider development strategy for graduates 
to access the job market in synergy with other relevant stakeholders have further 
contributed to a slow implosion of the HE systems calling for new strategies and 
different considerations on universities’ missions in society38.  
 
Summary 
 
The chapter has presented background research context information on Tunisia’s 
historical, political, economic, geographical, Islamic and national education system 
development. In particular, it explored existing connections between the political 
                                                 
38 To the same extent, in the twelfth and last Tunisian national development plan 2010-2014 under Ben Ali 
presidency, despite one reference to anchoring “volunteering culture, initiative and voluntary work in all stages of 
education”, reforms in higher education are rather centered around the conceptualisations of “human capital 
investment”, “knowledge economy” and “university-industry partnerships”, by “strengthening both overall 
productivity, the development of quality standards and the adoption of international standards; the pursuit of 
improving the business environment and promotion of promising sectors like offshoring, health services and 
improving logistics services and infrastructure, while promoting the culture of productivity, human capital and 
intensification of the use of ICT” (République Tunisienne, 2010: 17, 24, 25). 
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system, economic development, geographical proximity and cultural influences into 
contingent implications to the education system. In this sense, there are several key 
elements that emerged as central to the study: 
- Political authoritarianism is a constant trend in the historical evolution of 
Tunisian societies characterised by power centralisation and limited political, 
social and civil freedoms limiting democracy and social responsibility. 
 
- The urban vs. rural socio-cultural, economic and religious cleavage has 
consistently favoured a two-speed modernisation process in Tunisia with 
impacts on social cohesion, cultural fragmentation and economic development. 
 
- The political and cultural struggles between secularists and Islamists have 
favoured the development of a binary system for identity-building and 
socialisation dynamics within non-integrative frames for democracy building. 
 
In this perspective, university and students’ social responsibility has been defined by 
society-wide embedded tensions restricting its definition, implementation and 
development in line with social demands and challenges. The establishment of a new 
framework incorporating all actors of society, engaging within society and embracing 
the democratic ethos of the revolution, inclusive of Islamic based associational and 
political agents, seems to be a sustainable approach, often refuted, to overcome 
historical cleavages and fragmentation across socio-economic, religious and cultural 
lines.  
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CHAPTER 3 – Literature Review 
 
The chapter presents the main theories, concepts, implications and limitations 
of academic debates on universities’ social dimension in the Tunisian context. In 
particular, three interrelated key aspects have been identified: social responsibility, 
social capital formation and democracy building. In particular, the chapter is structured 
in three main sections and it aims at exploring the following themes: 
1- Democracy and religion: exploring the secular-religious interplay 
between Islam and the State and its impact on universities’ campus life and 
students’ identity as well as the role of Islam in the development of 
democracy, social capital and civic engagement. 
  
2- University social responsibility: investigating the role of universities as 
social agents in partnership with external stakeholders and specifically the 
local community, promoting inclusive institutional socio-cultural, political 
and civic engagement. 
 
3- Social capital and civic engagement: presenting an analysis of main 
social capital theories and debates; universities’ role in contributing to 
academic and students’ socio-cultural, civic and political participation. 
 
 
In the conclusion, the main research questions are presented and gaps in the literature 
review highlighted. To the same extent, research relevance and implications are 
discussed in the light of key issues emerged from the literature review. 
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Democracy, Civic Engagement and Islam 
 
Democracy: Concepts and Historical Developments 
 
The notion of democracy conveys political ideals, socio-cultural principles and 
values that are central to modern societies. Nowadays, representative democracy can 
be defined as “a political system of governance in which rulers are held accountable 
for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through elected 
representatives […] which offers a variety of competitive processes and channels for 
the expression of interests and values - associational as well as partisan, functional as 
well as territorial, collective as well as individual” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991: 76-78). 
In Muslim tradition too, the term jumhuriwat, first used in Turkish in the eighteenth 
century, derived from the Arabic jamhur, meaning people or assembly of people; and 
in Islamic faith, culture and history, the political order aimed at twin goals of ad1 
(justice) and shura (consultation) (Ahmad, 2000: 2), sharing a similar decision-making 
model compatible with modern democratic institutions.  
In fact, democratic systems are commonly characterised by majority elected 
governments; a pluralistic political party system; competitive, free and fair elections; 
a legal system for the defence of civic and political rights and the protection of 
minorities. Social cohesion is often achieved through public-private procedures of 
cooperation, dialogue and consensus to address conflicting interests. Modern 
democracies worldwide, however, while sharing common organisational, institutional 
and embedded principles, vary in terms of implementation, structures and historical 
development, reflecting different socio-political systems. As a consequence, 
democracy is neither a fixed category nor an end-product but the result of a complex 
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socio-cultural, economic, political and historical process of constant re-adaptations, 
shaping governing institutions, patterns for political participation and the notion of 
citizenship itself.  
 In the Arab world, in particular, enduring authoritarian 'pseudo-democracies', 
(as a distinct analytical category and political phenomenon), are reinforced by 
“structural opposition between liberalism, republicanism and Islamism […] where 
non-liberal associative models become more effective than 'laissez-faire' models of 
liberal mobilisation in competitive political settings” (Volpi, 2004: 1061, 1075). In 
fact, the evolution of grassroot democratic movements have created a hybrid system 
characterised by the juxtaposition of colonial and neo-colonial imported Western 
value-system and institutions against endogenous historical, political, cultural and 
religious traditions. In this sense, both Arab nationalism and Islamism39 have been two 
of the most potent and persuasive, although often conflicting, ideological and political 
forces (Browers, 2009: 1,2), where post-independence failures to implement 
modernisation, secularisation and nationalisation polices have gradually led to the 
resurgence of political Islam. For instance, in the aftermath of WWII, while nationalist 
movements ended Western colonisation, newly empowered national states were soon 
challenged by economic fragility, administrative inefficiency and political, linguistic, 
ethnic or social fragmentation, as a result of colonial legacy.  
In the 1950s and 60s, Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies dominated 
internal politics and inspired national reforms. This political agenda of national unity 
was framed by a ‘tendency to secularism’ and the notion of a common language, the 
unified borders within a single nation-state, in opposition to a borderless Islamic 
                                                 
39 Islam provided a framework for social relations, form of government, taxation and administration; as well as, 
relations with foreign states, setting the basis for a self-regulating, self-sufficient system (Esposito & Voll, 1996). 
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Ummah, re-shaping traditional identities into the new national consciousness 
(Browers, 2009: 20). The classic idea of the unity of state and religion (din wa dawla 
Islamiyya)40 was thus replaced by a national project of economic and social 
modernisation. In this sense, the dawn of the Islamic caliphate, or “a civil state whose 
reference is Islamic’, applying the rules of Shari’a (classical forms of the Caliphate or 
Sultanate), crystallised in  a “political utopia” or “impossible nostalgia”, separated 
from history and reality, appealing to the emotions of believers for a political project 
of religious symbolism” (Belkeziz, 2014: 26, 27)41. However, authoritarian regimes 
not only imposed a system for a “restricted democracy” of one-party rule; but also 
prevented the development of an independent, critical and participatory civil society42. 
Oppositional forces (liberal-democratic, Islamist or leftist) have been systematically 
confronted with the coercive, economic, political and bureaucratic might of militaries 
or similar regime, leaving a wide range of mediating structures and formal 
organisations suffocated (Singerman, 2004:148).  
In this sense, during the so-called democratisation’s “third wave” in the early 
70s, the number of ‘democracies’ sharply increased around the world, with a single 
exception represented by the Arab region43. In this sense, some scholars have long 
supported the hypothesis that Islam and democracy were reciprocally exclusive 
(Beinin & Stork, 1997; Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996; Entelis, 1997; Esposito & Voll, 
1996; Kramer, 1993; Salame, 1994; Gellner, 1996); while others argued that Islamic 
                                                 
40 Furthermore, after Prophet Muhammed’s death in 632 A.D., the succession was established according to two 
institutions: the shura based on “Q42:38 which refers to Muslims as those ‘who conduct their affairs by mutual 
consultation”; and bai’at - oath of allegiance – amongst the community or selected few (Bennet, 2005: 46, 47). 
41 In particular, the Caliphate or the unity between Islam and politics regulating the Islamic Ummah, was firstly 
weakened during the colonisation phase and finally abolished by Turkish General Ataturk at the beginning of the 
20th century. 
42 In Tunisia, constitutional ban imposed on religious inspired political party from politics, fostered from the 1970s, 
the resurgence of Islamic movements with wide-ranging social, political and moral programs.   
43 In particular, it refers to Arab and Muslim countries but not to other Muslim countries like Indonesia, Malaysia 
or Bangladesh. 
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values and norms would rather hamper democratic government (Fukuyama, 1992; 
Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1994). However, this democratic gap, according to 
Diamond (2010) is not due to national economic development - as modernisation 
theory assumed (Lipset, 1969; Rostow, 1971) – nor to Islamic or traditional culture 
but to political and geo-political reasons (Diamond, 2010). As a matter of fact, in 
current globalisation trends, Arab countries experienced a stable economic growth - 
especially oil-rich states - but passive habits towards social and political participation, 
largely supportive of an authoritarian political status-quo.  
Tessler (2010: 251)44 further suggests that although the promotion of a 
“democratic, civic, and participatory political culture’ may be needed to promote 
democracy, Islam is not an obstacle to democracy as the division exists between ‘those 
who favour a secular democracy and those who believe in a political system both 
democratic and Islamic”. In fact, Islam, intended as a set of religious, ethical, social 
and moral norms - different from the use of political Islam in the public sphere – might 
also be consistent with, rather than in contradiction to modern Western democracies 
set of values. According to Ciftci (2010: 1460), high levels of individual support for 
democracy in Muslim countries, despite the presence of authoritarian regimes, confirm 
that “if a transition to democracy would take place, regardless of their Islamic values, 
the public would mostly be ready for it”. Furthermore, Nasr (2005: 13-19), in “The 
rise of ‘Muslim democracy”, also argued that since the early 1990s, the Islamic-
oriented (but non-Islamist) parties, outside the Arab world, successfully won political 
elections due to key factors such as: 
- the military forces’ formal withdrawal from politics;  
                                                 
44 Data drawn from the Arab barometer survey in seven countries: Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, 
Lebanon and Yemen. 
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- private sector’s independency and integration in world markets; 
- the development of a multi-party voting system.  
 
These considerations seem to have a strong correlation in explaining the ‘Arab 
exceptionalism’ since the majority of Arab countries are still dominated by a military 
or police protected political system; governments’ control over the national economy 
and the endurance of one-party political system.  
In this sense, the Arab democratisation process shows a disjunction between 
the “political top-down reform that allows people to express their choices via free and 
fair elections and the protracted bottom-up process of civic education that gives them 
the opportunity to acquire liberal democratic skills and habits” (Volpi, 2004: 1073). 
Furthermore, the division between moderate Islamic parties - embracing democratic 
and pluralistic values - and radical Islamists, concerned by the application of Shari’a 
law within an Islamic theocracy, contributed to political divisions and social 
fragmentation. According to Bayat (2007:5-10), the ‘over-religiosity’, such as 
fundamentalism, revivalism, conservatism, fanaticism or extremism which intensified 
Western anxieties, was determined by: 
- the continued foreign intervention in the region (particularly US); 
- the presence of oppressive authoritarian regimes, supported by many 
Western countries;  
- the emergence and expansion of Islamist movements due to lack of social 
mobility, economic development, social marginalisation and inequalities.  
 
In this context, the authoritarian rule of Western-backed regimes, fostered grassroot 
social and political re-legitimisation of Islamic oppositional movements as the only 
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available alternative. However, On the other hand, the emergence of radical Islamists 
implied the rise of wider support for a traditional worldview characterised by (Hassan, 
2002: 13): 
 
- an unchanging static view of the world based on the absence of the idea of 
development; 
- the finality and self-sufficiency of Islam; 
- the idealisation of early Islam and of Prophet Muhammad. 
 
 
In fact, the support for a radical Islamist value-system model is often 
understood as anti-democratic, anti-capitalist and anti-Western as it promotes an anti-
hegemonic and anti-historic vision of modernity. By the middle of the twentieth 
century, with the occurring shortcomings of Islamic modernist movements, in several 
Middle Eastern countries, Muslim brotherhoods continued to call for the establishment 
of an Islamic state, confirming a growing social polarisation and fragmentation based 
on the Islamic 's religious authority (Hefner, 2001: 494- 495)45. In this sense, the 
association of Islam with violence and terrorism amplified since September 11th 2001 
suicide attacks, has given prominence to extremist groups (often linked to Al-Qaeda). 
In particular, despite the early contributions of scholars (Omar, 2003; Lawrence, 1998) 
who attempted a positive reformulation of the unconstructive Islam-violence model; 
the presence of a radicalised minority still dominates the media and overshadows the 
reality of Muslim societies and the key role Islam plays in society. In fact, rather than 
                                                 
45 This has been further radicalised with the self-proclaimed emergence of Daesh or commonly referred to as ISIL 
(Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) caliphate in the latest development of the Syrian civil war in early 2011 as a 
result of Arab spring spill-over impacts in the region. 
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framing the issue around ‘Is Islam compatible with democracy?’, the focus should be 
on how Muslims as social agents are able to develop and support socio-cultural and 
political conditions to allow more democratic habits and shared values to flourish. The 
dichotomous sense of loyalty both to modern nation-states and traditional religious 
beliefs, has triggered a conflicting if not incompatible double identity in the Arab 
world which could eventually be integrated around a new ethos of community 
participation in the pursuit of the common good of society and civic equality by 
strengthening the inclusiveness of opposite cultures (Sachedina, 2006: 22), as the case 
of post-revolution Tunisia might potentially suggest. 
 
 
Religion, Politics and the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia 
 
In Tunisia, since 1956 national independence, state hegemony embodied by 
l'Etat-patron (State as tutelary) and I'Etat-parti (State as party), controlled and 
censored democratic participation, associational life, the press and organised 
opposition, promoting an ethos of singularity vs. pluralism, loyalty vs. autonomy, co-
optation but not contestation (Sadiki, 2002 58, 63), fuelling embedded clientelism, 
corruption and nepotism. The modernisation project was a gradual top-down process 
where civic freedoms were largely restricted. The social and political role of Islam, 
perceived as a threat to state legitimacy, was also weakened in the nationalisation 
process. The first elected president Habib Bourguiba initiated a complete 
dismantlement of Islamic institutions, bringing national religious life under the control 
of the state, politically neutralising the Ulema - Tunisia's religious leaders - integrating 
the Zaytouna mosque into the new Université de Tunis with a western-styled 
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curriculum46; annexing lands, once used to finance mosques and other religious 
organisations while pursuing cultural de-legitimisation of Islam by deliberately 
attacking the wearing of Hijab and customs linked to holy month of Ramadan (Boulby, 
1988: 591, 592). The modernist elite embraced the fervent process of political and 
social laicisation, inspired by the French legacy, which also implied the separation 
between citizenship rights and religion, the latter being relegated to the private sphere. 
Furthermore, the divergence between Arabic, language of identity, and French, 
language of modernity (Lamchichi, 2000: 37) exposed considerable contradictions 
between the language of the “colonisers and oppressors but also the language of 
freedom and emancipation” (Wolton, 2008:60). 
However, in opposition to post-independence governmental policies, political 
Islam emerged in Tunisia in the late 1970s with the foundation of the MTI (Islamic 
Tendency Movement)47 to bring Islamic and Arabic revival through mosque activities, 
informal and clandestine activities and the election of independent candidates to 
respond to authoritarian rules. This revival fomented rising tensions and clashes 
between militants and police, including the imprisonment and sentencing of activists, 
reaching its peak in the riots of 1984. From 1987, with the ‘bloodless’ presidential 
coup d’état of General Ben Ali, notwithstanding the proclaimed determination towards 
democratisation, inclusion and normalisation, the regime continued to administer and 
control religion. In fact, policies aimed at rehabilitating the Islamic-Arabic identity and 
the political amnesty agreed upon 600 MTI activists including Ghannouchi in 1987-
1988 (Frégosi & Zeghali, 2005: 26), can be considered as pre-empting strategies to 
                                                 
46 Only in 1989 the Zaytouna Mosque, under Ben Ali, was allowed to grant traditional degree. 
47 This was the founding movement which in 1989 changed its name in present-day Ennahdha political party 
(legalised the 1st of March 2011) which won the majority of seats at the Constituent election in 2011 and became 
the main opposition party in the newly elected parliament in 2014. 
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reduce socio-political tensions, regime confrontations or destabilisation and social 
polarisation within a wider framework of government’s repressive social pacification.   
The long-standing tensions between Islam, society and state politics 
characterised civil society organisations, political participation and democratic 
contribution to social change. The Tunisian socio-political system was favoured by 
(Ayeb, 2011: 469): 
- a real organised economic mafia built around the president family; a very 
effective modern police system;  
- a clientelistic policy with a particular preference for the middle social 
class48; and  
- the marginalisation of the Southern, central and Western regions.  
 
As a consequence, the events that followed December the 17th 2010, when a 26-year-
old Tunisian fruit and vegetable vendor set himself on fire, marked the democratic 
political waves of contestations across the region. Protests and revolts sparked from 
Tunisia, affecting all Arab countries from Morocco to Syria, including Bahrein and 
Yemen. In Tunisia, civil society was swiftly organised via internet- related local, 
national and international virtual networks - including “Islamists of various stripes, 
left-wing trade unionists, economic and social liberals, and French-style secularists”- 
acting in solidarity against the regime (Deane, 2013: 14). The revolution, in fact, 
witnessed the transversal participation of youths, professionals, intellectuals and 
students. Popular discontent towards economic neo-liberal policies unable to respond 
                                                 
48 In particular, the economic reform of the mid 70s have facilitated the flourishing of the middle class, often well-
educated, mainly Westernised especially in urban settings, which constitutes almost half the population in Tunisia.   
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to rising unemployment, economic stagnation, political oppression, public institutions’ 
corruption and government unwillingness to meet unattended social needs and social 
justice demands, fuelled unprecedented changes on virtually all Arab countries.  
In this new framework, the Arab middle-class, regime’s main beneficiaries of 
economic and social policies in exchange of legitimacy, historically remained 
uninterested in political reforms and participative democracy; however, economic 
hardships, increasing repression and lack of political space, gradually endangered the 
implicit social contract, leading to political uprisings (Prasad, 2014: iii). As a 
consequence, as Boose argued (2012: 310): 
“[…] the Arab world is charting a revolutionary path through 
an era of unfamiliar democratisation where there is no way to 
predict the outcome until it is over”. 
 
 
In particular, notwithstanding waves of anti-authoritarian revolts were launched by 
demonstrators “calling for dignity, elections, democracy, good governance and human 
rights - what one might reasonably call a secular, liberal, democratic agenda - 
protesters were not primary beneficiaries of elections that ensued49” (Fradkin, 2013: 
5). For this, in Arab countries, transition to democracy might have not yet translated 
in civil and political rights’ recognition, religious tolerance or the protection and 
inclusion of socially marginalised and most vulnerable citizens. According to Stepan 
(2012: 89, 90), Tunisia is struggling to achieve democratic consolidation through a 
process of “twin tolerations” to bring closer divergent political standpoints, 
confronting: 
                                                 
49 In Tunisia, despite youth participation to mass street manifestation, only 17% of Tunisians aged 18-35 registered 
to vote in the national elections (McCurdy, 2011), showing an alarming trends of high abstention rate, political 
disenchantment and refusal to perform citizens’ rights in the first multi-party system political election.  
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-  Religious citizens toward the state: based on freedom of democratically 
elected officials to legislate and govern not under religious supremacy claims. 
- State towards religious citizens: based on religious citizens to freely express 
their views and values within civil society and politics under constitutional law.  
 
In the aftermath of the “Jasmine revolution” in Tunisia, the previously banned50 
moderate Islamist party Ennahda51 won 89 seats or 37 percent of the popular vote to 
form a transitory coalition government with the secular party led by Marzouki’s 
Congress for the Republic (CPR) with 29 seats and Ettakatol with 20 seats. This 
political compromise represented the only viable solution to implement a pacification 
process to guarantee new democratic governance and stability in Tunisia, avoiding the 
risk of dialogue breakdown along the religious vs. secular divide. On the other hand, 
the 2014 parliamentary and presidential election won by the secular party Nidaa 
Tounes, confirmed the necessity of a continuous dialogue with the moderate Islamic 
opposition to support democratic institutions. In this sense, the endorsement of a 
moderate version of political Islam in a democratic multi-party system could integrate 
a generation of young unemployed population with only “theoretical exposure to 
freedom of belief, expression, and assembly into a system that fosters open political 
debate and contestation” (Anderson, 2011: 4).  
On the other hand, however, violent Islamist unrests, street manifestations and 
recent terrorist attacks have also dominated the scene in Tunisia, leading to growing 
social tensions and public security concerns. The present conflicting dynamics are 
                                                 
50 Art 8 of the Tunisian Constitution (Law n° 59-57 1st June 1959) declared that “any political party cannot be 
inspired in its principles, objectives, activities or program on one religion, language, race, sex or region”. 
51 Under the leadership of Mohammed Ghannouchi, returned in Tunisia after being exiled in the UK.  
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shaping future democratic trajectories exposed to the challenge of radical Islamists. In 
this sense, according to Charfi, Islamism is a liberticidal, anti-democratic, anti-
feminist and anti-progress movement, both in its moderate or more radical Salafist52 
version, due to their indiscriminate use of physical violence and proselytism aiming at 
“Islamising” society (Charfi, 2012: 329). Tunisia, a predominantly Muslim country of 
Maliki tradition, never had a strong jihadist opposition, adopting a more moderate and 
modernist political Islam. However, Bourguiba’s anti-Islam legacy, reconfigured by 
Ben Ali’s authoritative policies, created a far most radical climate for “global jihad by 
foreclosing all opportunities for moderate political Islamists to engage in politics” 
(Henry 2007: 95). The authoritarian regime endangered human and political rights, 
social justice and religious tolerance, driving extremists to wage a violent opposition53. 
In this sense, the present democratic transition has opened up new opportunities 
for moderate Islamists to play a growing public role in society, despite growing 
concerns arising from most extremist groups advocating the integration of 
marginalised individuals within the “jihadist temptation”. In fact, Islamists and 
secularists, despite ideological divergences, both advocate for the rule of law, less 
corruption, freedom, generosity and dignity showing common grounds and 
congruence between Western aspirations and those espoused by Islam (Chamlou, 
2014: 12)54. The legalisation in 2012 of the political party Jabhat al-Islah (Front of 
Reform) confirmed Ennahda party’s commitment to include Salafists groups 
embracing the rules of democratic governance. However, violent activities (hisba) of 
                                                 
52 The Salafi movement has its origin from the word salafiya referring to the Prophet, the first community of 
believers and the four successors (Khulafa al Rachidun), predicating the rigorous application of Quran and the 
Sunnah but also re-vindicating violent principles inspired by early Islam’s rapid expansion.    
53 Fierce confrontations between national police and Tunisian army and Salafi local groups took place already in 
2007 in the suburban area of Soliman-Hammam Lif, South of Tunis. 
54 The lack of a governing religious institution in Islamic tradition, similar to the Church or the Vatican State in 
Rome, might be one barrier in granting pacification, dialogue, wider consensus and convergence within Islam.   
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most organised extremist group - like Ansar al-Sharia55 - mirror a more complex 
dynamic, posing a considerable threat to the democratic transition in Tunisia (Torelli 
et al, 2012: 142, 144).  
In fact, Salafists pursue an active public role through proselytism and 
predication (da’ wa) and a social role in assisting the marginalised, often an effective 
and consistent counter-government political and alternative social strategy56. 
However, several contentious events have marked post-revolution Tunisia57.  In April 
2013, a group of Salafists broke into a secondary school in Menzel Bouzelfa, 
physically and verbally assaulting the principal who had denied entry to a female 
student wearing niqab. Seemingly, the events at Manouba University in Tunis have 
been the most controversial with the provocative hailing of the Salafi flag and protests 
of two students banned to wear the niqab during exams58, showing how Salafi sit-ins 
have aroused controversies on freedom of religious expression in public spaces 
(Gartenstein-Ross, 2013: 15).  
The Ennahdha party, between 2011 and 2014, adopted an ambiguous policy59 
between “laissez-faire and open disapproval, without any timely intervention” to 
tackle extremist activities impacting on social security (Lusardi, 2012: 105-106). This 
down-playing and low-profile approach, however, did not turn out to be a successful 
strategy. The escalation of violence reached its peak following the assassination of two 
                                                 
55 Active since April 2011 under the leadership of Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi, also founder of a Tunisian jihadi group in 
Afghanistan in 2000. 
56 Presumably, out of 5,000 mosque, around 1,000 fell under Salafi Sheykh (preacher). 
57 Including the attack to the American embassy on  September 2012;  the attack to Sidi Bouzid’s Hotel Horchani 
bar, where they smashed alcohol bottles; the attacks on a synagogue in southern city of Gabes; as well as, the attack 
against anti-Islamist film director Nouri Bouzid, stabbed by a Salafi; or the attack on art-house cinema in Tunis 
prevented to show a movie about secularism; mob attack against the TV station Nessma; targeting Islamic practices 
regarded as deviant, like Sufi shrines or occupying a Christian Basilica in El Kef (Gartenstein-Ross, 2013: 14). 
58 Protests were supported by a group of 56 Salafi young men who occupied the university from 28 November 2011 
until 24 January 2012. 
59 As an example, in February 2012, Ennahdha representatives proposed introducing Sharia’a law as the source of 
Tunisian law, contrary to the separation of religion and state espoused by the party in the pre-election campaign. 
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opposition political leaders Chokri Belaid in February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi in 
July 2013, provoking a national political crisis witnessed by Ennahda prime minister’s 
resignation, brokered by the national worker union (UGTT). These events brought to 
an end the political stalemate, culminating in the ratification of Tunisia new 
Constitutional law in January 2014. In Tunisia, Salafi intentions of imposing Sharia’a 
law by violently eradicating impious behaviours and establishing their own version of 
Islam based on religious, social and economic overlapping agendas of radical activism, 
communal bonding and popular aspirations for jobs and social justice (Boukhars, 
2014: 13), were consistently marginalised in the post-revolution political project, 
despite posing threats to political stability, social cohesion and democracy60.  
In this perspective, the role of Islam in Arab society is sensitive and crucial for 
it shapes social awareness; it builds political democratic attitudes and it can support 
social cohesion. Religious values often play an important role in identity formation, 
personal behaviour and might also influence individual political views, social and 
political participation. Putnam (1993, 2000), Bourdieu (1990) and Fukuyama (2001), 
confirmed the importance of religion in creating values, norms, trust and beliefs all of 
which are central to social capital formation and civic engagement. Nonetheless, 
traditions, contexts and history shape society to a very large extent. In fact, Putnam 
(1993:107) singled out how the Catholic Church in Italy has traditionally discouraged 
civic and for a rather long period political participation as it was itself “an alternative 
to the civic community”, although still promoting social engagement and religious 
ethos. Furthermore, in Western literature on civic engagement and religion, several 
studies confirmed the positive relationship between religious traditions and Church 
                                                 
60 As the two terroristic attacks at Bardo Musuem on 18th March and at the Hotel Imperial Marhaba in Port El 
Kantaoui in Sousse on 26th June 2015, have recently confirmed. 
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attendance in fostering civic engagement (Smidt, 1999); the positive association 
between religious self-understanding, meaning and pro-social personality (Furrow et 
al, 2004). To the same extent, some other studies focused on the formation of 
adolescent identity towards social good, given that religious institutions provide 
ideological, social and spiritual settings (King, 2003); the role of religious 
organisations in offering a platform to volunteering (Marta, Rossi, & Boccacin, 1999); 
and the direct relation in male rather than female undergraduates between volunteering 
experiences, religious beliefs and relationship to God (Ozorak, 2003).  
In Arab countries, Ibrahim and Hunt-Hendrix (2011:16), also highlight how, 
amongst volunteers, the religious discourse explains motivations to volunteer and 
reflections of a generation that has ‘lost faith’ with secular development or state-led 
solutions to social problems. In this sense, Islam occupies a prominent position and 
religious education can play a significant role in promoting students’ citizenship since 
“Islamic education in Tunisian public schools aims to nurture religious tolerance, to 
promote the acceptance of Western democratic values as universal values and to 
develop students’ interest in analytical thinking on the meaning of religion” (Faour, 
2010: 17),. In fact, the promotion of citizenship and democratic participation needs 
also to be supported by public institutions, promoting cohesive cultural environments. 
However, according to Sarkissian (2012:609, 611), using data from the World Values 
Surveys (WVS), active participation in Muslim organisations is associated with 
‘greater civic engagement, while religious service attendance is not […] as religion 
may not be the key to understanding why Muslims do or do not participate in civic and 
political life’. In particular, this can confirm a lack of interconnection between Islamic 
values, civic engagement, social trust and tolerance in societies characterised by weak 
democratic settings and low associational activities.  
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For this, contrary to Western literature, political participation and social 
responsibility need to be reconsidered in the light of the long-standing conflicting 
relationship between Islam vs. State; the lack of democratic participation in an 
authoritarian setting; the emergence of extremist and violent religious groups and the 
inconsistency between traditional religious values, radical Islam, civic values and 
democratic attitudes or practices. As a consequence, social trust, civic engagement and 
democratic attitudes might also be restrained. Furthermore, if education for democratic 
citizenship in the Arab world has to be supportive of a truly democratic transition, it 
needs to be “framed along a pluralist imaginary of citizenship and be considered 
beyond gender-based discrimination and beyond the religious-tribal patriarchal 
perspective” (Waghid & Davids, 2013: 343). On the other hand, the centrality of 
education in fostering a culture of civic and political participation is an important 
indicator also in Arab countries, showing how education, religion and political 
participation are inter-related aspects foundational to individual identity. In fact, the 
expansion of schooling in the Arab world, in a context of weak economic conditions 
and low opportunity for political participation, has led more-educated individuals 
towards political participation. Social skills and human capital acquired through 
education are important assets in economic production but also in political activities 
(Campante & Chor, 2012: 175). 
In Tunisia, in particular, as Islamic socio-political participation was forbidden 
prior to 2011, there is no available research or data on the relationships between 
education, civic engagement and democracy on the basis of religiously-motivated 
social solidarity, volunteerism and public engagement in university contexts. This lack 
of comparative data and research highlights a gap in knowledge. At present, in 
particular, the tripartite conflicting division amongst secularists, moderate Islamists 
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and a minority of Islamist fundamentalists conveys central issues and implications in 
the development of a national higher education system. Universities are often socially 
and politically co-constructed, limiting the possibility to engaging students in local 
communities, reducing social inequalities and wider participation while promoting 
employability competences and skills. Their role in granting religious tolerance, 
dialogue, respect of rights as well as promoting civic engagement and democratic 
values, however, is an important area of study in post-revolution Tunisia, as emergent 
democracy in transition.  
The next section explores university third missions and social responsibility 
comparing international trends with present configurations in the Tunisian context. 
 
 
University Social Responsibility 
 
 Universities and Globalisation 
 
Higher education worldwide has been characterised by common trends, global 
in nature but locally-adapted, influencing national policies and strategies. This may 
also be seen historically. For instance, a contribution to the foundation of early 
European higher education institutions61 came from Arabic medrassas (Islamic 
seminaries62). Catholic students enrolled in medressas, influenced European 
                                                 
61 Al-Qarawiyyin University in Fez, Morocco, was founded in 859; whereas Cairo Al-Azhar University in 934. 
62 After the closure of the Academy of Athens in 529, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the rival College of 
Cordoba, Toledo and Granada were the first institutions of higher learning. The European capture of Toledo in 
1085 opened their knowledge to hundreds of books, treatises of which they had neither knowledge nor 
understanding (O’Brien, 2011: 21). 
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universities’ curricula, practices of holding a “chair”, being a “fellow” or wearing 
robes (O’ Brien, 2011: 19-22); as well as, incorporating two Islamic concepts of Awqaf 
(endowments or institutions) and Ijazah li al-tadris, licence to teach (equal to 
European universities licentia docendi) (Koshul, 1995: 40-41). In particular, Awqaf, 
operating within the framework of Islamic principles, provided a wide range of social 
services to the community, as well, private business’s development. Islamic based 
higher education institutions have adapted throughout key transition periods: from 
empire-state to European occupancy and from modern nation-states to global 
reconfigurations. The Islamic educational model has been characterised by three 
distinct phases (Reetz, 2010:110): 
1- The organisation, reproduction and knowledge transfer during dynastic 
Muslim empires (the Safawids; the Moghuls and the Turkish Ottomans). 
2-  The multiplication of Islamic schools in response to the penetration of Western 
education and colonial rule replacing Muslim governance; 
3- The implementation of global Islamic revival politics, during the 1970s, when 
Muslim scholars, politicians and militants started pursuing a different agenda. 
 
In Europe, instead, universities grew out as a ‘necessity of time’ during the late 
medieval European awakening and classical revival, organised in the so-called guilds 
(communities of learners). The flourishing of locally-based “learning institutions” 
represented a model, modern universities have derived their essence from. In fact, they 
established the very name of ‘university’, the notion of curriculum, three degrees of 
education (bachelor, master, doctor); as well as, faculties with their deans, chancellors 
and rectors (Haskins, 1957:24). Their central role as sites of knowledge production-
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reproduction evolved around the notion of service “such as teaching, research, and 
other academic services to the church, governments, individuals and the public” (Scott, 
2006: 3). In Europe, higher education institutions have followed historical patterns of 
alternative political and social developments, if compared to Islamic medrassas: 
- Pre-nation-State: teaching (from medieval universities) and research (in 19th 
century Humboldt pre-unification Germany), emerged as core services. 
- Nation-State: three distinctive missions emerged: nationalisation, 
democratisation and public service to meet social and political requirements. 
- Globalisation: universities tend to internationalise63 their missions of teaching, 
research and public service in the global “information age” (Scott, 2006: 5-6). 
 
In this latest stage, internationalisation strategies brought into discussion 
nationalisation, democratisation and public service missions as universities have 
adapted to the redefinition of national, cultural and economic boundaries. 
Globalisation, in real terms, has nowadays become a hegemonic discourse. In fact, 
despite quasi-egalitarian national reforms from élite to mass higher education, global 
dynamics intensified human, natural and structural inequalities. In higher education, 
Western universities became intellectual “centres” providing direction, models and 
leading research; while “peripheral” universities tend to import best practices with low 
contribution to knowledge/research (Altbach, 1998: 20)64. In this sense, a growing 
                                                 
63 Globalisation is then understood as condensed economic integration in a global marketplace while 
internationalism refers to the promotion of global peace and well-being (Jones, 1998:143). 
64 In this sense, center-universities have developed stronger academic and institutional structures in terms of funds, 
governance, ICT, academic-research excellence, library resources, laboratories, etc. 
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North-South divide intensified as result of post-Cold War world order, culminating in 
the (Currie & Newson, 1998: 22): 
- Aspiration of virtually all society towards Western materialist/consumer based 
lifestyles and the penetration or near hegemony of Western popular culture. 
- Growing dominance of standardised models of production-consumption. 
- Increasing integration into a single global/international market, free trade and 
new labour division.  
  
In this sense, transnational technology, information and economic exchanges have 
increased the complexity of knowledge production and innovation trends within inter-
connected global networks. The knowledge economy model based on neoliberal 
economic policies of privatisation and state “downsizing” has assumed a prominent 
paradigm based on “the un-reflexive65 celebration of contemporary capitalism” 
(Kenway et al, 2006: 4-5). However, as globalisation unequally affects poorly 
interconnected economies66, in the Arab world, a context-based reflexivity on the idea 
of globalisation67, (al-‘awlama, in Arab political discourses), presents a different 
connotation expressed by the notion of taba’iyya (dependence/subordination) and 
related implications on huwiyya (identity) shaped by colonial rule (Fuentes, 2009: 201-
203). In this sense, in Arab countries, present neo-colonial and Post-Cold war order, 
has led to counter-hegemonic discourses, predominantly anti-Western and, often more 
explicitly, anti-American. Western colonial occupancy and post-colonial economic 
                                                 
65 Emphasis mine. 
66 See also Joseph Stiglitz in “Globalism's Discontents. American Prospect, January 14, 2002  
67 The first Arab term to define globalization was al-kawkab, closer to the French word mondialisation - linked to 
the idea of 19th century national colonialist economic expansion (Fuentes, 2009: 202). 
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and often cultural subordination, have hindered modernisation processes in the Arab 
region. These dynamics have also favoured the adoption of a binary education system, 
impairing the process of Arab universities to acquire an independent and integrated 
global “positionality”.   
In particular, Western liberal educational philosophy based on independence 
of thought, personal autonomy and individual experience clashed with Islamic 
education68 “based upon religion’s revelation, aimed at producing a community of 
Muslims following Islamic rules of behaviour and a strong knowledge of and 
commitment to faith” (Halstead 2004: 519). Post-independence Arab universities, 
then, have been compressed in a subaltern paradigm limiting the construction of 
alternative paths to modernity. The ruling class who benefited from Western 
development and modernisation, adopted a hybridised set of values while the rest of 
society, in favour of the egalitarian Muslim community model (Ummah), affirmed a 
defensive/offensive retrenchment of religious integrity and authenticity for identity 
construction (Camilleri, 1984). The rising tensions between the global and the 
particular, the objective and subjective have had an impact on individual agency. The 
often conflictual adaptation between modernity and Islamic traditions limited local 
communities’ means of expression, identity building and actions, often trapped in 
between socio-cultural dynamism and cross-generational alienation.  
In this sense, global dynamics have raised questions of individual-society 
relationships with reference to democracy for the realisation of humanity (Morin, 
1999: 65). To the same extent, human and environmental challenges are also 
                                                 
68 Three Arabic terms define education: Tarbiya, from the root raba¯ (to grow, increase) refers to individual 
development; Ta’dı¯b, from the root aduba (to be refined, disciplined, cultured) refers to understanding society, 
social and moral rules and social behaviour within the community and society at large; and ta’lı¯m, from the root 
’alima (to know, be informed, perceive, discern), refers to transmitting and receiving knowledge (Halstead 2004: 
522). 
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determining new directions towards a “sustainable69 economic growth, human 
development and ecological concerns” (Martens & Raza, 2010), urging for a new 
social contract anchored in wider public social responsibility. Universities, while 
conforming to strategic demands of knowledge privatisation and higher education 
marketisation/commodification, need to readdress their public role to confront and 
respond to socially relevant challenges. Social dynamics calling for social justice and 
civic engagements also reflect existing contradictions between: “professional closure 
vs. civic engagement; training for jobs vs. education for citizenship; knowledge for all 
vs. the “best” possible knowledge” (Calhoun, 2006:12). The identification and 
restructuring of universities’ social dimension for democratic citizenship and civic 
engagement is therefore becoming central in an ever more globalised world, as the 
case of Tunisia seems to suggest, opening new windows for understanding future 
developments of modern societies. 
 
University and Society: exploring University Third Mission 
 
 
Universities historically established their organisation, purpose and roles in 
society around founding ideals, values, norms and embedded ethos. Henry Newman 
envisaged a university as “a place for the communication and circulation of thoughts 
where inquiry is pushed forward […] by the collision of mind with mind, and 
knowledge with knowledge”; whereas for Humboldt, universities bore “unity of 
research and teaching, freedom of teaching and academic self-governance” (Boulton 
                                                 
69 In 2001 the first World Social Forum took place where social movements networks, NGOs and other civil society 
organizations opposed the vision of a neo-liberal world, dominated by capital or any form of imperialism 
(http://www.forumsocialmundial.org) [Accessed 18 June 2014].   
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& Lucas, 2011: 2506). For Ortega-Gasset, universities had a broader public and active 
social role of general culture transmission (intended for all citizens) and specialised 
scientific research (intended for the few) (Savignano, 1991). However, in more recent 
times, universities seem to prioritise economic profitability logics, based on expected 
returns on private investment. According to Theodore Schultz, in fact, education is: 
  […] a form of human capital, human because it becomes a part 
of man and capital because it is a source of future satisfactions, 
future earnings […] higher education is engaged in three major 
types of production activities70: discovering talent, instruction 
and research… (Schultz, 1968: 329). 
 
For this, in recent decades, universities have integrated a new ‘institutional 
consciousness’ through wide-ranging managerial and economic transformations. 
Governments consider universities to be a vital source of innovation, knowledge 
production, providers of skilled personnel; attractors of international talents; 
promoters of labour mobility and regional investment but also as agents of social 
justice and socio-cultural vitality (Boulton & Lucas, 2011: 2508). Universities develop 
integrated ‘knowledge environments’, providing internal and external services in order 
to respond to 21st century societies’ complex and multi-functional requirements. As a 
consequence, this distinctive market-oriented and business-led character has 
increasingly redefined education more as a private rather than a public good.  
In particular, the conceptualisation of the Seminal Service University, 
Enterprise University, Corporate University or Entrepreneurial University (Bridges, 
2007: 204–209) confirms how universities moved from local/national public service 
to private economic utility. In this sense, in the 90s, the Triple Helix model (university–
                                                 
70 Emphasis mine. 
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industry–government)71 offered a framework to designate new institutional, normative 
and organisational development paradigms for innovation and competitiveness in 
emergent global markets. Public higher education has gradually but significantly 
become ‘enterprised’ and hybridised, as values of competition, contracting and 
income generation are set over and against values of academic freedom and 
scholarship (Ball, 2009: 135); while logics of privatisation and commodification have 
reversed universities’ public and social role. To the same extent, as highlighted by 
Clark (2004: 357), a core element to create an Entrepreneurial university is to diversify 
funding: 
(a) other government sources (other than the core-support department); 
(b) private organized sources, particularly business firms, philanthropic 
foundations, and professional associations; and 
(c) university-generated income, for example, alumni fund-raising, garnered 
research contracts, profits from patents.  
 
However, as commercial culture increasingly replaces public culture and the language 
of the market substitutes the one of democracy; consumer rights prevail over socio-
democratic citizenship rights, limiting shared vocabulary and imagery available for 
defining, defending and reforming the state, civil society and public culture as centres 
for critical learning and citizenship (Giroux, 1999:12, 24).   
                                                 
71 See Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz “Universities and the Global Economy: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-
Government Relations”. 
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In this sense, the capitalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)72 in 
higher education mirrors the quasi-business nature of universities. CSR, in fact, refers 
to the voluntary commitment73 by companies to pursue economic activities ethically, 
supporting wider public goods and addressing social and environmental issues. CSR, 
while preserving market-oriented values and managerial competencies, reconsiders 
businesses’ social agency and responsibility based on moral and ethical grounds. In 
fact, the term “responsibility” derives from the Latin word respondere: to respond to. 
Responsible entrepreneurship, then, refers to both “economic success and positive 
contribution of a business by the inclusion of social and environmental considerations 
[…] satisfying customers’ demands, whist managing employees, suppliers and 
community expectations” (Pavlíková & Wacey, 2013: 269)74. In particular, 
organisations like universities also have a direct impact on communities both local and 
global. Topal (2009: 14), precisely points out that: 
“[…] the entire philosophy driving CSR initiatives is the power 
of grassroots, community-based collaborations working 
together to assess community needs and address university’s 
community issues, enhance resources and support a better 
quality of life for community residents”.  
 
 
Universities can offer opportunities to build partnerships with public, private 
and voluntary organisations, fostering academic, economic, cultural and social capital. 
However, the challenge lies not only in CSR definition, stakeholders’ awareness and 
                                                 
72 Islamic CSR, however, requires “a taqwa-based (God consciousness) paradigm, where corporations are not only 
driven by profit-maximization but also driven by Islam’s directions to pursue ultimate felicity in life and Hereafter 
(Al-falah)” (Darrag & E-Bassiouny,2013: 368), defining an Islamic-based moral and ethical framework. 
73International Standard ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility contains voluntary guidance but not requirements for 
a certification, assisting business to implement effective actions beyond profitability in the following areas: 
environment; human right; labour practices; organization governance; fair operation practices; consumer issues; 
and contribution to the community and society. 
74 However, the adoption of CSR and ISO 26000 show that companies still value it mainly for the effects on 
company’s reputation and customers’ loyalty (Park & Kim, 2011: 321). 
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engagement; but also in the importance to recognise how “CSR is socially constructed 
in a specific context and how to take this into account when business strategies are 
developed” (Dahlsrud, 2006: 6). For instance, in higher education, the re-adaptation 
and implications of the notion of students as customers represents a major issue. If a 
business “can legitimately talk about “customers”, when students are turned into 
customers, it can destroy the core understanding of education or student-academic 
relations” (Dahan & Senol, 2012: 98). In particular, the implementation of social 
responsibility strategies is critically connected to the very fact that universities have 
not yet endorsed a mandate to address and fulfil their role in (Brennan, 2008: 387):  
1- constructing the ‘knowledge society’; 
2- supporting a ‘just and stable’ society; and  
3- educating for a ‘critical society’.  
 
In fact, the implementation of integrative strategies for a CSR model has shown 
failures to integrate socio-democratic values while empowering other parts of the 
economy (public sector, social economy, cultural sector), and community life (social 
governance of non-economic sections of society) (Arnkil et al, 2010: 11); undermining 
the development of a fourth-Helix model - including universities, civil society with 
industry and government (Cooper, 2011: 354-355). To the same extent, a small-case 
study conducted in the UK shows that “students, staff or leaders talked very rarely and 
only superficially about issues of responsibility being included in the curriculum [...] 
showing an absence of making connections between the practice of responsibility for 
students in their learning experience at University and the practice of responsibility in 
the University as corporate entity” (Kaul & Smith, 2012: 148). 
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In this perspective, the emergent trend of universities’ “Third Mission”, “Third 
Leg” or “Third stream” (as referred to in different academic traditions), can be defined 
as the:  
      “[...] generation, use, application and exploitation of 
knowledge and other university capabilities outside academic 
environments, implying all interactions between universities 
and the rest of society75” (Mollas-Gallart 2002: iii).  
 
 
The diversification of universities’ missions in relation to knowledge transfers has then 
implied the inclusion of local communities as important actors. In particular, 
universities’ social dimension also refers to (E3M Green Paper, 2012: 3; OEU, 2006: 
157-161):  
“[…] social engagement activities such as educational outreach 
activity, services, events and facilities open to community; 
research with direct impact on the community; voluntary work; 
community grants; participation in policy-making/public 
debate; involvement in socio-cultural or sport life, public 
understanding of science, etc..”. 
 
 
In fact, University Social Responsibility (USR) shares several elements with the notion 
of CSR as public, private or corporate institutions tend to adopt a business-like 
managerial model while implementing a strategy for social responsibility and civic 
engagement in terms of:  
“volunteering as an ethical approach76, developing a sense of 
civil citizenship by encouraging students, the academic staff to 
provide social services to their local community or to promote 
ecological, environmental commitment for local and global 
sustainable development” (Vasilescu, 2010: 4178).  
                                                 
75 Third mission activities can be broadly categorised under three main areas: Technology Transfer & Innovation 
(TTI), Continuing Education (CE) for life-long-learning programs; Social Engagement (SE) (E3M European 
project). 
76 The Settlement Movement was born as a counter-reaction to social problems induced by 19th century 
urbanisation and industrialisation in England. University students and graduates worked to address cultural, 
pedagogical and social needs of poor population at the Toynbee Hall in London by developing personal connections 
with the community (Roivainen, 2002: 217).   
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In the last two decades, emerging regional and global networks77 of “engaged 
universities” indicated that most universities place more consideration on extension, 
outreach and civic engagement (Watson et al, 2011). USR, however, being an 
emergent and underdeveloped action-framework, has not yet reached a common 
definition. In particular, USR can either refer to university as an institution (i.e. as 
micro-level outreach activities of community civic engagement); or to higher 
education as a system (i.e. as macro-level key player in the public space with an 
ethical dimension) (Bahri, 2012: 11). The provision of public services, however, often 
tends to be confused with “internal service” (faculty counselling, student clubs, 
university committees, etc.) or “professional services” (professional meetings, 
publishing in journals, attending conferences, etc.); failing to embrace universities’ 
cultural, organisational and managerial changes, including: teaching/learning 
activities, scientific research and knowledge production78 (See Castañeda et al, 2007; 
Domingues Pachón, 2009; Watson et al, 2011; Scott 2006).  
In particular, integrated social commitment beyond the academic excellence 
paradigm of the “high culture’ liberal elite and ‘knowledge transfer’ market-driven 
business model”, is still an exemption as universities are more focused on generating 
more training and profits than critical thinking and social responsible education 
(Akhtarkhavari & Tavanti, 2011: 16). However, in order to capitalise human, 
infrastructural and networking resources, universities need yet to implement policies 
                                                 
77 As the Talloires networks (strengthening the civic roles and social responsibilities of higher education); Ma’an 
Arab University Alliance for Civic Engagement; Latin American Center for Service-Learning, Community-
University network in Russia; Australian Universities Community Engagement Alliance; Campus Engage in 
Ireland; Tufts University and Innovations for Civic Participation, etc. 
78 Some scholars have argued that higher education survival will much depend on connections to local communities 
(Overton & Burkhardt, 1999: 227) and relate academic research and teaching more closely to real-world issues 
(Ostrander 2004). Further studies also highlight the importance of engaged scholarship to problems exposed by the 
community as relevant academic responsibility (Kellogg Commission, 1999; Boyer, 1996; Cooper, 2011). 
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reframing institutional relationships with society. In fact, social engagement activities 
- service learning, action research and community-based partnerships - could be easily 
left on the margin of institutional commitment (Ibid, 2011: 18-19); if administrative 
staff and students are not included to play an active and more relevant role (Zlotkoswki 
& Williams, 2003; E3M, Draft Green Paper). 
 On the other hand, most advanced national economies predominantly in 
Western countries, have become leaders in adopting an institutional framework for 
social responsibility. Western-based literature on university students’ civic 
engagement and social responsibility have extensively focused on: the relations 
between civic activities and civic contexts (Zaff et al, 2008); the role of building a 
civic identity in students (Younnis et al, 1997); the centrality of civic skills and 
building competencies (Kirlin, 2002); the positive relationship between social 
participation, sense of community and social well-being (Cicognani et al, 2008); the 
relevance of community partnerships (Bringle et al, 2009); students’ commitment and 
perspectives on teaching contents and internship (Fall, 2006); campus organisation in 
creating engaged citizens (Raill et al, 2006); the relationship between race, ethnicity, 
citizenship and socio-economic status as determinants of civic engagement (Foster-
Bey, 2008); the role of critical pedagogical strategies for engaging students (Ten Dam 
& Volman, 2004); the importance of students’ involvement, ownership and degree of 
voice to increase self-awareness and political engagement (Morgan & Streb, 2001); as 
well as social capital promotion to improve engagement and retention in first year 
students (Budgen, 2014).  
However, the literature on university social responsibility and community 
engagement is predominantly based in favour of North American and European, 
mainly Anglo-Saxon, scholars (GUNI, 2014: xxxv) and research conducted that is 
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related to those specific contexts, showing a gap and need for further study in other 
regions. Furthermore, the literature is drawn nearly exclusively from the perspective 
of HEIs and its commitment and implemented policies. In particular, concepts such as 
USR or Academic Social Responsibility (ASR) place the accent on institutions’ 
commitment (high level) and academics’ participation (meso level), restricting their 
understanding, implementation and participation to the process of other stakeholders, 
including students (low level), showing a considerable gap in acknowledging students’ 
role and perspectives. In this sense, it is key to research and understand how social 
responsibility is framed and debated in Arab countries and which initiatives have been 
developed within universities, as well as, what social role students have.  
In fact, despite the importance to ensure that the students are major partners 
and their voice heard at all stages of the learning process (UNESCO, 1998), students 
have not been placed at the centre of university missions, learning processes and 
institutional wider social and democratic strategies. Furthermore, student Social 
Responsibility (SSR) focuses on individual responsibility of each student ‘as a 
personal commitment towards the other and the environment to offer a service to 
society in the pursuit of the common good’, while USR refers to the university as an 
entity, an institution or a business (Maldonado de la Calle & Armentia, 2011: 238, 
245), key to guaranteeing a sustainable process. However, students still occupy a 
subaltern position, despite being able to develop socially engaged networks with a 
variety of different actors. 
In fact, notwithstanding the close relation between university and student social 
responsibility, universities have the duty to educate students to be socially responsible, 
to enact programs/courses and to support students’ cultural identity, social awareness 
and democratic engagement. In particular, as figure 2 shows, students are also inter-
85 
 
generational filters, interlinking universities with society in the development of civic 
engagement programmes. 
 
Figure 2: The societal multiplier impact of Students Social Responsibility 
(Temporin, 2014: 93). 
           
              
             
 
Most often university commitment, campus culture, individual identity and personal 
resources shape social interactions. According to Kirlin (2002: 572), education can 
foster critical experiences in: 
- civic participation (motivation); 
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- providing money or time to contribute to civic endeavours (capacity);  
- introducing one to others concerned with civic life (networks).  
 
In particular, interactions amongst these three factors are often complex and can 
become either enablers or potential barriers to social capital for social responsibility.  
In this framework, universities, in order to meet global and national socio-
economic and democratic challenges might need to reconsider students’ 
transformational and critical role in relation to knowledge, the self and the world 
(Barnett, 1997). The emergent space acquired by civil society and citizens during the 
Arab Spring revolutionary movements, seems to suggest the possibility of a more 
inclusive citizen-centre and citizen-driven social dynamics, shifting the predominant 
economic-driven model in favour of a renewed public sphere and a shared common 
good. In higher education, the question of opening a space for discussion to further 
develop a university student-focused model based on the notion of students as co-
producers (Neary, 2012; Carey, 2013), holds the opportunity to develop students’ 
social responsibility and social awareness.  
 
University social responsibility in the Arab region: the case of 
Tunisia 
 
Globalisation in the Arab region has raised majors concern also for higher 
education institutions. Whether perceived as an opportunity or a challenge, it is raising 
questions on the very definition of education, culture and the development of a 
knowledge society (UNESCO, 2007: 10), urging universities in Arab countries to 
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assess their missions and role in society. Economic global trends and national policies 
have a direct effect on graduates’ employability, ensuing under-utilisation of human 
capital (Ben Halima et al, 2010), as well as brain-drain dynamics, social capital 
impoverishment and lack of public funding for research. In Arab states, pressures to 
liberalise their economies, supported by World Bank (WB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), have favoured state companies’ privatisation while public expenditures 
were re-routed to primary and secondary schooling to the detriment of higher 
education (Guazzone and Pioppi 2009 in Buckner, 2011: 22). Furthermore, adaptation 
to economic reforms of privatisation and limitations imposed by the central 
government on universities’ autonomy and management, have further worsened 
resources’ availability to adapt to and confront global socio-economic challenges.  
 In the last decades, in fact, Arab countries enhanced educational opportunities 
and showed a progress in the establishment of ICT systems; increasing admission 
equality and equity (i.e. increase in female students); diversification of higher 
education institutions (public, private, virtual) and its regionalisation; as well as, the 
establishment of quality assurance and control councils (UNESCO, 2009). However, 
no tangible achievements were registered regarding: improving quality of research; 
teaching and curricula reforms; administration and management decentralisation; 
Arab-to-Arab higher education cooperation or universities’ social responsibility. In 
particular, the higher education sector in Arab societies presents, amongst others, three 
areas of major constraints and emergent challenges (UNESCO, 2009: 62): 
 Serving society: they have fallen short in interacting with local communities. 
 
 Curriculum reform: they have failed to enact policies to include citizenship, 
human rights, religious tolerance and ethics for social cohesion. 
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 Degree devaluation: existing admissions systems have devalued social and 
human science specialisations, pushing students with lower marks into 
humanities;  
 
In this sense, policy makers have missed the opportunity to reform the education 
system pedagogically, favouring a student-centred and competency-based learning; 
structurally in a lifelong learning perspective; financially (diversification of funding) 
and managerially (decentralisation and coordination) (World Bank, 2008: 297-298).  
Arab universities, in fact, seem still to operate mainly in isolation from their 
local surroundings, unable to reduce the gap between local traditions, culture diversity 
and economic global trends, marginalising local population’s needs and aspirations. In 
Tunisia, in a context of turbulent democratisation process, universities have the 
opportunity to reflect upon their role in supporting a transition towards two main 
changes, as aspiring to turn into centres of excellence might not be appropriate nor 
realistic (Michavila et al,  2010:13):  
- one related to their new social role, redefining their relationships with local 
communities; and 
-  the second, concerning knowledge creation and knowledge transfer.  
 
Different authors have analysed current problems of higher education in Arab 
countries, focusing on private and public education dynamics (Akkari, 2004); the 
impact of technology transfer and R&D gap (Weiss, 2004; Bardak, 2007); the impacts 
of quality education (Heyneman, 1997) or the challenges of the labour market (Issa & 
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Siddiek, 2012), often failing to interlink economic, knowledge creation and innovation 
with cultural, political and social factors. For this, it seems that nor lack of economic 
resources nor low levels of human capital, but rather universities’ role as a source of 
change in the respective socio-cultural environments, has emerged as a central issue 
(Ridha, 2013).  
In particular, the Arab Human development report (UNDP, 2011:7), confirmed 
that “Arab knowledge today in terms of demand, production and dissemination are 
ineffectual notwithstanding the abundance of Arab human capital’, highlighting 
concerns over universities’ social commitment, community integration and their 
strategies in knowledge generation and transfer”. In this sense, higher education in 
Arab countries (Al-Rashdan, 2009: 80-84), has shown the:   
- lack of a social and educational philosophy for a clear institutional strategy; 
- lack of academic freedom due to government control in appointing university 
managers;  
- low-impact on their surroundings due to universities’ nature but also to the 
surrounding environment itself ( “Tower on Sand”); 
- weak relations between different universities within a single country and near-
total lack of cooperation between universities in different Arab countries; 
- absence of a pedagogy based on  critical, analytical approaches to problems in 
society, causing student submissiveness and fear to voice their opinions. 
 
To the same extent, Kazem (1992: 117) defines the modern educational system in the 
Arab region as “largely static, traditional and mainly Western, advocating for ‘a major 
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role of Arab universities in helping the community to define concepts of development 
and to speed up modernisation”, contributing academically to:   
- propose a concept of development interacting with the popular base; 
- activate, stimulate and guide societal interactions for a more open yet stable 
community, 
- stimulate societal movements to narrow the educated vs. masses gap; 
- prepare specialists with a strong sense of social responsibility. 
 
In this sense, university social responsibility for civic engagement and social 
participation seems to be one of the major caveats in the Arab region, presenting an 
interest in research aimed at understating dynamics, implications and impacts upon 
their socio-political systems. In fact, the development of university-community 
partnerships might also act as a catalyst, reducing economic, educational and socio-
cultural cleavages. 
In Tunisia, since the 1956 independence, the government administrated the 
expansion of the education system “driven by rapid youth population’s growth; the 
need to build a shared feeling of nationhood; a priority to establish political legitimacy 
and popular support, making education a fundamental right of citizenship” (World 
Bank, 1999: 7). In fact, universities gradually became the economic, political and 
cultural executive arm, supporting government national development plan under the 
control of the Destourien socialist political party and later under Ben Ali’s 
Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). However, the imposition of a top-down 
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political administration affected universities’ autonomy and academic freedom while 
inevitably intensifying campus confrontations (Ben Kahla, 2004: 162): 
1- In 1971, the General Tunisian Student Union (UGET) congress marked 
universities’ independence from the political power with the rise of left-
wing political representatives. 
 
2- In the early 80s, the emergence of an Islamic leadership, replacing left-wing 
units, presented a new configuration of contestations. 
 
3- In the 90s, Ben Ali’s political party (RCD), regained control of the 
university and enacted a process of de-politicisation and pacification. 
 
In the last two decades, contrary to international trends and despite 
geographical and cultural proximity to Europe, Tunisian universities’ social dimension 
was consistently curtailed affecting students’ civic engagement, while leaving an 
institutional void in the process of democracy building. In fact, the government mainly 
prioritised policies supporting graduates’ employability and human capital formation 
as ‘universities are placed at the centre of economic development in partnership with 
the industry, leading to students’ higher employability rate79’, reflecting a triple-Helix 
developmental model. Notwithstanding enacted policies, economic structural 
deficiencies and uneven national development resulted in a high level of 
unemployment, highlighting the inadequacy of an education system failing to address 
                                                 
79 Tunisian “Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology: 2010 strategy. 
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students’ employability skills and societal commitment. In 2008, the higher education 
reform stated that, amongst HE missions80: 
“[…] it lies strengthening graduates employability in the 
framework of partnership with the economic, cultural and social 
environment contributing to the diffusion of values such as 
citizenship, modernity, national identity and the interaction and 
acknowledgment of other cultures”. 
 
 
The inspirational principles for a new educational model to adapt universities to 
growing needs of a global job market while acknowledging the importance of 
democracy and the role of society, did not promote an effective reform. In fact, 
compelling issues such as social mobility, laboratory equipment, quality and 
knowledge access and production (Charlier & Croché, 2010), deepened the 
radicalisation of economic and cultural “subaltern mondialisation” (Bensaâd, 2011).  
A study conducted in Sfax University confirmed how in Tunisia “policy and 
culture have shifted to become more favourable toward university entrepreneurship 
[…] where government policy favours knowledge capitalisation and triple-helix 
development model to promote employability rather than a socially and civically 
engaged university model” (Bouhamed et al, 2010: 9-10). Seemingly, Jendouba 
university, since its foundation, has had an impact on the economic structure of the 
region becoming an engine of economic growth; however, low-level of students’ 
engagement in the community has hindered the development of political, cultural and 
social activities (i.e. cultural events, creation of public parks, cultural associations, 
political activities) (Najem, 2012: 77). In this sense, according to Dhaher (2009: 98, 
103), despite the fact that Tunisian universities need to play a strategic socio-cultural 
role to address the challenges of democratisation, knowledge society and the market 
                                                 
80 Art 2 Law n° 2008-19, 25 February 2008 reforming Higher Education. 
93 
 
economy, the unilateral character of state decision on regional development, 
undermines local actors’ responsibility and participation to context-relevant decision-
making processes.  
These considerations, then, highlight how social cohesion and civic 
participation are still dominated by an “unaccomplished modernity” within a 
democracy under construction (Tawil et al, 2010: 274-279) with severe deficits of 
social promotion affecting also the role of higher education institutions (Baduel, 
2007:10). In Tunisia, the transition to a more socially engaged university model 
seemed yet far from been embraced and implemented. The unachieved development 
of an education system, based primarily on the privileged relationship with the industry 
while disregarding other social actors, has undermined the idea of educated students 
“who will have to think and build society” (Ben Kahla, 2000: 173). In the present 
process of post-revolution national reforms and democratic transition, both 
entrepreneurial skills and a sense of social responsibility should become “major 
concerns of higher education in order to facilitate employability of graduates while 
educating them to become full participants in democratic society and promoters of 
changes that will foster equity and justice” (UNESCO, 1998:29).  
In this perspective, the 2009 UNESCO regional conference confirmed an 
increase in universities’ partnerships with local communities in the Arab region. 
Specifically, while the conference raised the issues of “disparity between culture 
acquired in the university and traditional social values and the weakness of 
participation in forming civic and political orientations among university students” 
(UNESCO, 2009:52), a trend in universities’ social responsibility is gaining higher 
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relevance, highlighting an interest for investigation. Projects and programs identified81 
in the Arab region included, amongst others: Student engagement with Communities 
for solidarity and citizenship and Outreach and Civic Engagement Unit at Lebanese 
American University (Lebanon); Community services at American University in Cairo 
(Egypt); Women for social responsibility and civic engagements (Sudan) (UNESCO 
2009); Community Action Centre in Al-Quds University (Palestine); Centres for 
community Service and Continuing Education in Kuwait University (Kuwait); 
Undergraduate Community Involvement Program in Akhawayn University and the 
Centre for Civic Education (Morocco); Centre of Volunteerism and Civic 
Responsibility at Qatar University (Qatar); Centre for Environmental Studies and 
Community Service in Taiz University (Yemen) and the Community Service and the 
Sharajah Social Empowerment Foundation at American University of Sharjah (EAU) 
(GUNI 2014).  
In Tunisia82 in 2002, the Tunisian Ministry of Higher Education in cooperation 
with the universities of Sousse, Sfax, Jendouba and the Virtual University of Tunis 
signed an educational partnership with the American University of Georgia 
(University of Georgia-Tunisia Partnership83), aiming at strengthening universities 
societal role in local communities. In particular the project included civic engagement 
for university and community development with the creation of a forum for Tunisian 
                                                 
81 It is important to highlight that the majority of civic engagement programs in Arab Universities are often 
developed by American Universities established most often during the colonisation period or as part of international 
cooperation programs. 
82 Only in 2013 after the Arab spring, the United Nations Development program (UNPD) has launched a program 
for civic education in Tunisia titled “Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE)” to 
offer short courses in civics to 10,000 university students (GUNI, 2014: 173). 
83 However, in the aftermath of the Arab revolution the partnership instead of being reinvigorated given the potential 
of the democratic transition process, it was halted (last activity reported was in 2008 and 2010 before the 
revolution). 
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students to discuss community issues and to work with their peers at university, 
secondary and elementary school level, with the following project’s outcomes84: 
 2 Workshops; 
 8 Tunisian faculty members trained; 
 5 Tunisian graduate students trained; 
 5 UGA Faculty facilitated Study Abroad Service-Learning Course; 
 8 UGA students participated in Study Abroad Service-Learning Course; 
 13 Tunisian secondary students participated in civic engagement pilot project.  
 
The partnership aimed at readdressing the role of education at different levels, 
including: capacity building workshops; faculty and staff exchanges; a health 
programme, environmental science, entrepreneurial promotion and tourism projects; 
community service and primary school awareness raising to support outreach 
programs and students’ engagement. In a long term perspective, this partnership, being 
the first and only nation-wide supported initiative, was a milestone in the Tunisian 
context creating an opportunity to establish a framework to support and develop 
student outreach activities85. 
In this framework, due to the late emergence of social responsibility and civic 
engagement programs in the Arab region, there is a considerable research deficit on 
universities’ civic roles and social responsibility as there are very few scholars or 
faculty members for whom this is a primary field for investigation; in fact, there are 
no faculty chairs dedicated to civic participation as a field of study or degrees in civic 
                                                 
84 http://www.tunisia.uga.edu/about.php?p=22 
85 http://universitieswithoutborders.org/index.php/history  
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participation or engaged citizenship has been founded yet (GUNI, 2014: 166, 177). 
For this, Arab universities have not yet developed a national network to advance a 
constructive debate via good practices’ exchanges, institutional leadership and 
community integrated programs, incorporating social responsibility and civic 
engagement in mainstream faculty courses and outreach activities. In particular, the 
analysis of over 2,000 worldwide community-university engagement (CUE) initiatives 
showed that the majority originated from Europe (30,7%), the USA/Canada (23,8%) 
and the least represented region was the Arab States with only 3,8% (only 1 in Tunisia) 
(GUNI, 2014: 113-115), showing a gap in research to address and analyse 
determinants, present challenges and future implications.  
Arab higher education institutions have so far struggled to contextualise their 
role for social responsibility as an autochthon and context-based response to social, 
political and cultural challenges. Furthermore, Tunisia, in particular, is a country 
whose national universities have not adhered yet to any international networks for 
democracy and civic engagement. In fact, there are no Tunisian universities or higher 
education institutions as members of the Arab Ma’an University Alliance for Civic 
Engagement at the American University in Cairo86, showing a counter-current political 
and cultural trend towards civic engagement policies, knowledge and best practices 
exchange. The low commitment of public institutions and Tunisian universities to 
social inclusion, social capital creation, social responsibility and democracy building 
is a central aspect worthy of further research in the field of higher education 
comparative study. In this sense, how Tunisian universities will incorporate their social 
                                                 
86 First Arab-wide centre for Civic Engagement founded in 2008 in collaboration with the global Talloires Network 
At present, some universities of the following countries are members or partners of the network: Egypt, Lebanon, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Palestine, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Morocco  
(http://www.aucegypt.edu/academics/maan/Pages/MemberUniversities.aspx, accessed on 20/09/2015 at 16:18). 
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role in support of democracy is an important but under-researched area of enquiry in 
present Arab post-revolution political and social re-configurations.  
The next section explores the relationship between social responsibility and 
social capital, identifying main theories and implications. It explains how social 
networks can be functional to foster civic engagement and explores the relationship 
between higher education, academic social capital, civic engagement and Islam. 
 
 
Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
 
Social capital theories 
 
In the social sciences, the emergence of social capital theories have been 
proving successful for it re-evaluated the role of civil society, re-explored individuals’ 
social dimension and widened the spectrum for understanding complex socio-
economic, cultural and human relations’. In this sense, the association of the two terms 
capital and social has opened new windows for prospective theoretical frameworks 
bridging economic rationality and context-based human and social relations. In Adam 
Smith’s The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, capital87 also defines 
education in terms of productivity, investment and profit. For Smith (1976: 281-282):  
[…] the acquisition of such talents and the maintenance during 
his education, study or apprenticeship, always costs a real 
expense, a capital fixed […] though it repays that expense with 
a profit. 
 
 
                                                 
87 The term capital appeared in 13th century Italy as a sum of money or value exchange to invest or trade. 
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For Karl Marx, capital personified social class struggle and power relations. Material 
means of production owned by the bourgeois class generated surplus-value and 
economic profit as result of alienated working class exploitation. However, a first 
understanding of capital beyond the economic-materialistic and power struggle 
ideological tradition, referred not to capital as:  
“[…] real estate, personal property or cold cash […] but ‘social 
capital’ as ‘good will, fellowship, sympathy and social 
intercourse among individuals and families […] whereas its 
accumulation may immediately satisfy his social needs and may 
bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial 
improvement of living conditions in the whole community” 
(Hanifan, 1916: 130).   
 
 
Social capital is here defined as a community-wide embedded resource originating 
from cooperation amongst fellow citizens. The multi-dimensional quality of social 
capital, characterised by individual investment in shared social exchanges, then 
embraces also other forms of capitals such as human, economic, cultural, etc. In 
particular, community cooperation, based on tolerance, trust, shared norms and 
reciprocity facilitates the pursuit of wider individual and collective benefits. 
Coleman (1998:98-100) defines social capital as a productive, individual rather 
than collective resource: “available to an actor […] in the structure of relations 
between actors and amongst actors […] to pursue both economic and non-economic 
interests […] making possible the achievements of certain ends that in its absence 
would not be possible”. The creation of social capital is reflected as the missing link to 
investigate relations amongst people in social networks where daily interchanges take 
place. Social capital is then rational and functional to an individual or groups as it 
holds the potential of better achieving economic or non-economic benefits. In fact, 
closed groups facilitate internal group connections and cohesion via norms of trust and 
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cooperation whereas the lack of social capital might limit social interactions, turning 
communities economically or socially dysfunctional. Bourdieu (1980:2), drawing 
from the Marxist materialistic tradition, defined social capital as the “sum of present 
or potential resources linked to a sustainable network of relations […] based on 
material and symbolic exchanges […] where the volume depends on the extension of 
connections and on the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) owned by everyone 
who is linked to”. Social relations are based on individual use of economic, cultural 
and symbolic assets interlinked and exchanged, defining a person wealth, power 
relations and status in society. Members of social networks tend to share common 
interests and benefits; although resources and networks’ access are based on power 
struggles, reinforcing social inequalities. In particular, for Bourdieu, in a field such as 
education, if there is not a dominant and legitimated paradigm of cultural capital88, 
then “the concept of social capital is also intended to act as a moderating concept on 
an overly deterministic model of cultural hegemony and social dominance” (Grenfell, 
2009: 24), considered counter-hegemonic and critical to social change. 
 On the other hand, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993: 167), argue that social 
capital ‘[…] refers to features of social organisation such as trust, norms, and networks 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions […] based 
on social networks associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness’ (Putnam, 
2000: 137). Values such as trust, trustworthiness, shared norms and obligations are 
central elements within communities and driving vectors for information’s reliability, 
honesty and reciprocity, functional to social and civic participation. Putnam thus marks 
a difference in defining social capital based on dynamics of collective values and 
                                                 
88 Bourdieu (1979) distinguishes three forms of cultural capital: 'incorporated' as set of permanent and lasting 
attitudes and social assets of each individual; ‘objectified’ in the form of material goods such as books, paintings, 
machines, etc.; and ‘institutionalised’ in the form of academic qualifications within different educational systems. 
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societal integration whereas Bourdieu focuses on implications of social struggle as 
individuals pursue own interests (Siisiäinen, 2000: 10). Investment in social capital is 
linked to higher levels of associational life and community civic engagement. In this 
sense, social networks could positively impact upon “members not directly involved 
within a community while benefiting the interest of the person who invested into it” 
(Putnam, 2000: 20), potentially supporting higher returns of “private good” and 
“public good”.  
Putnam, in fact, equated social capital to healthy democracy, highlighting the 
connection between individual or group social engagement to participatory 
citizenship. He measured the level of associational involvement and participatory 
behaviour in a community, consisting in the level of "civicness" in communities, by 
such indicators as newspaper reading, membership in voluntary associations, and 
expressions of trust in political authorities (Portes, 1998: 18). Civic participation and 
civic virtues are associated with better democratic institutions, a higher level of 
political participation, healthier neighbourhoods as communities pursue common 
interests and have mutual expectations. In Putnam’s work “Making Democracy Work” 
(1993), public administration reforms were successfully implemented in Northern 
Italy but failed in Southern Italy, mainly due to levels of social capital primarily in 
terms of voluntary associational life (Putnam 1993: 176). Citizens’ interactions thus 
are intended to increase trust, cooperation, access and share of information fostering 
social ties for more democratic and accountable governments within a vibrant civil 
society89.  
                                                 
89 However, in Grenfell (2009: 28), “the concept of ‘social capital’, as defined by such writers as Putnam and 
Coleman offers a ‘relatively weak’ theoretical foundation […] as the functional view of social capital to imply a 
non-competitive, non-conflictual view of communities, which is not the case in many European situations”. This 
also applies in societies with local environments where actors are divided up by cultural, religious or political views 
as in the case of Tunisia.   
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In this sense, social networks in a community can be characterised by strong, 
weak or absent ties90 (Granovetter, 1973), as well as, latent (Haythornthwaite, 2002) 
or virtual ties (Blanchard & Horan, 1998)91. Putnam also differentiates between 
inclusive or “bridging” and exclusive or “bonding” ties: “the former is better for 
linkage to external assets and information diffusion; while, the latter enhances 
undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity” (Putnam, 2000: 22). 
Interconnected communities might generate inclusive social networks as well as cross-
groups’ social ties to different degrees, depending on types of university-business-
community relationships.  
In the case of absent or latent ties, however, it might not generate social or 
economic benefits at all, associated to negative social-capital. Controversially, in the 
absence or presence of low level of social capital, people might act on a rational, self-
interested calculation of short-term subjective choices as consumers and producers 
against a ‘thicker’ conception of common good92 (Meadowcroft, & Pennington, 2008: 
122). For this, reciprocity between social capital and democracy can actually vary. Van 
Deth and Zmerli (2010) have argued democracy can be negatively affected by what 
they call the “dark side” of social capital depending on members’ homogeneity, 
associations’ non-democratic goals or the possibility that civic participation can 
actually turn people off from politics (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005: 228). 
Furthermore, participation intensity (active vs. passive participation), scope (many vs. 
few affiliations) and type (non-political vs. political purpose) (Wollebaek & Selle, 
                                                 
90 Groups’ ties or connectivity is defined as the “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the 
intimacy and the reciprocal services” (Granovetter, 1973:1361).   
91 According to Blanchard & Horan (1998: 296, 305) ‘dispersed virtual communities may have the potential to 
increase social capital […] but physically based communities might be more likely to increase civic engagement 
[…] linking virtual to physical communities creates new public spaces and increases opportunities for interaction’. 
92 In this sense, Putnam’s “Bowling Alone” metaphor highlights the extent to which associational life can be 
affected by an attitude based on individualist one-off and closed groups’ social participation. 
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2002: 32), can also affect social capital generation, individual identity and 
predisposition to democratic participation. In particular, the relationship between 
individual social trust (bottom-up process) and political trust is crucially mediated by 
the effectiveness of social and political institutions (top-down process) (Newton, 2001: 
211). Political participation and civic engagement are then by-products of the socio-
political context. In fact, social capital can help to create democracy in a non-
democratic country, reducing state oppression and providing a space for opposition, 
promoting tolerance, compromise, participation and debates (Paxton, 2002: 257). 
In modern complex societies, in fact, social capital can foster economic 
advantages, social fulfilment, personal validation or access to information (Lindon et 
al, 2002:17); while higher levels of social status (level of education and wealth) are 
more likely to influence government decisions and collective actions (Larsen et al, 
2004:64). These assumptions, however, support the equation that poorer 
neighbourhood or less connected individuals might lack both the skills and 
organisational capacity to advocate for their interests. Different types and levels of 
social capital then affect trust, participation and civic engagement. In fact, well-
connected individuals in a poorly connected society are not as productive as well-
connected individuals in a well-connected society (Putnam, 2000: 20). At the same 
time, individual, institutional and structural social capital need to be interrelated to 
facilitate trust and cooperation amongst citizens for social cohesion. For this, the 
amount of social capital “in a [democratic] society […] is directly related to the extent 
of internal inequity […] the greater the inequity, the lower the social capital” (Carmon, 
1997 in Larsen et al, 2004: 75).  
In a university context, socio-economic, cultural and political configurations 
determine types of institutional governance, social networks and degrees of university-
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students-community relationships. Social relations can, then, either foster democracy 
and civic participation or in the case of latent or absent ties it can hinder opportunities 
for social trust, cooperation and civic participation. Furthermore, as societies move to 
more intensive technologically-led interactions, internet access can contribute to the 
development of new kinds of bridging and bonding93 ties, wider access to information, 
enhancing contacts beyond territorial boundaries in the light of emergent virtual to 
non-virtual social engagement patterns94. In this sense, social capital offers a 
consistent and valuable theoretical and conceptual tool95 to investigate the 
relationships between social responsibility, democracy and civic engagement. 
However, it also presents some theoretical limitations and empirical challenges. In 
particular, the literature on social capital is grounded mainly on European academic 
scholarship and does not refer to non-western societies characterised by a semi-
democratic system, a different value-system and subaltern modernity.  
For the purpose of this research, the next section explores social capital in the Arab 
region with reference to the specific cultural, religious and socio-economic context. 
The role of social capital for social responsibility in universities is also considered in 
relation to students’ civic engagement. 
  
 
                                                 
93 The use of Facebook, amongst undergraduates showed “positive formation of bridging and maintained social 
capital (to a less extent bonding), as on-line to off-line relationships supports the ‘‘poor get richer’’ hypothesis, 
lowers barriers to participation and provides greater benefits for users experiencing low self-esteem and low life 
satisfaction” (Ellison et al , 2007:1162- 1163).   
94 This is particularly relevant to the Arab Spring wave of contestations (Angrist, 2013; Saleh, 2012). 
95 In this sense, despite academic contributions advancing the understanding of social capital theory, its nature and 
definition, its conceptual coherency and the validity of empirical results (Arrow, 1999; Solow, 1999; Sobel, 2002; 
Grootaert et al, 2004; Portes, 1998; Durlauf, 2002; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Glaeser, 2001; Bowles and Gintis, 2002), 
the concept still “remains under-theorized and …oversimplified unable to grasp a reality of inclusion-exclusion far 
more complicated and multi-layered” (Leonard, 2004: 942). 
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Islamic Social Capital between Differences and Continuity 
 
In the Arab region, Ibn Khaldun96 developed one of the earliest 
conceptualisations of social capital. In his most famous work “Muqaddimah”, he 
identifies ‘asabiyah’: meaning group feeling, solidarity or group consciousness – as 
the main factor explaining the origin, development and falls of Arab civilisations. 
Group feeling represents “the secret divine (factor that) restrains people from splitting 
up and abandoning each other […] the source of unity and agreement, and the 
guarantor of the intentions and laws of Islam” (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 170). People 
cooperate in mutual agreement, trust and solidarity to better achieve common benefits, 
social cohesion, order and the respect of divine laws as such avoiding mistrust, social 
divisions or internal wars. Group feeling is then meant to be stronger in traditional 
Bedouin societies as blood ties generate protection, close contact, unity, affection, 
mutual support and aid (Ibid, 97-99); while in sedentary urban areas ‘group feeling 
disappears as they mingle with common people losing the original nobility of group 
feeling (Ibid, 102, 292). The concept of assabiyah shares many features with Western 
social capital’s conceptualisation in terms of social power struggle, bonding and 
bridging ties, community cohesion, cooperation, reciprocity, loyalty, trust and shared 
norms for economic and non-economic benefits. 
In this sense, Islam also places a strong emphasis on trust and being trustworthy 
as a moral and ethical duty. In particular, in Arabic, the root of the word ‘belief – Iman 
– is the same of trust – Amanah […] for faithfulness to contracts and promises are 
mandatory obligations for a believer’ (Mirakhor, 2007:28). Islam also orders to pursue 
                                                 
96 Born May 27, 1332, Tunis (Tunisia) - March 17, 1406, Cairo (Egypt), one of the greatest Arab historians and 
philosopher.  
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the good and prevent the wrong (al-amr bi’l ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar) 
(Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002: 182-183), promoting social ethical values. 
Furthermore, the notion of maslaha (common good, similar to res publica), and the 
term sadaqa mawqufa (perpetual charity), are essential constituents of the community 
of believers, combining public and private concerns (Salvatore, 2007:140-154). For 
this, in the Arab context, the notion of social capital creation is historically rooted into 
the Islamic system of beliefs and norms shared and reproduced amongst communities 
of believers. For this, a modern definition of Islamic social capital is related to: 
 
 ‘[…] the well-being which is a part of the Islamic social welfare 
system […] developing ties, norms and trust based on universal 
Islamic principles, transferred from conventional social settings 
to Islamic social settings to influence pattern of social 
exchange’ (Farooqi, 2006: 115, 117). 
 
In particular, in pre-modern Arab societies, the institution of zakat97, like 
Christian “caritas”, strengthened vertical social bonds between wealthy patrons and 
their kin or clients; while sadaqa, like “misericordia”, corresponding to giving to a 
community or corporate group (such as a guild, confraternity or town), sustained 
community-wide horizontal bonds98. These two Islamic normative and ethical 
principles ‘were not just products of civil society and social capital but creators and 
drivers of it’ (Terpstra, 2011: 186,187, 192). In particular, privately funded religious 
waqf 99 (charity endowment) delivered services to the community and to the poor 
through zakat and sadaqa. In fact, waqf combined the features of “philanthropy, social 
service agency and, indirectly, political voice […] through informal networks of soup 
                                                 
97 Zakat forms one of the five pillars of Islam, mandatory to all Muslims, consisting in returning a set percentage 
2.5, 5, or 10% in goods or money for religious and social purposes. 
98 Zakat fostered the equitable distribution of wealth for social stability and solidarity while sadaqa was performed 
through voluntary work, in kind contributions, free services or social entrepreneurship and al qurd al Hassan 
(beneficial/benevolent loan, gratuitous loan) aimed at poverty alleviation and project development (Atia, 2012: 1). 
99 It is possible to distinguish three types:’ Charitable’, ‘Family’ and ‘Cash’ waqf (Kuran, 2001).  
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kitchens, hospitals, public fountains, education and other equalising benefits […] 
including housing, commercial facilities and mosques” (Bremer, 2004: 5,10). As 
modern societies became more complex, however, the predominant logic of a single 
donor limited the generation of community-wide social capital and failed to adapt to 
socio-cultural changes. In particular, they failed to address religious, political and 
social corruption and accountability; the rigidity of resources and investment and the 
lack of interconnected waqf’s union (see Bremer, 2004; Kuran, 2001; Kuran, 2013).  
For this, trust, cooperation and inter-communities’ networks resulted 
impoverished, hindering a more dynamic and inter-independent civil society. 
Furthermore, from the waning of the Ottoman Empire to nation-states period100, 
Islamic charitable institutions were replaced with state-run substitutes or closed down 
completely, ending independent Islamic charitable institutions’ role for social bridging 
and justice, often alternative voice to the state (Bremer, 2004: 12, 13). In this sense, 
the development of autonomous Islamic social capital was curtailed and reinvented 
under governments’ direct control to meet national political aims. In the Arab region, 
it is thus possible to identify two types of social capital: a spirit of economic initiative 
and highly sustainable levels of social cohesion. However, national state-led policies 
have crippled that entrepreneurial spirit whereas Washington Consensus policies have 
undermined social cohesion (UNPD, 2011: 2). The advent of modernity and the impact 
of Western colonisation have radically undermined Arab societies’ development, 
shaping the socio-economic re-organisation of society.  
Central government policies of social control and political repression fostered 
lack of trust, disincentives to invest and a need for associations to stay close to centres 
of power to operate freely; while, in parallel, movements based on religious ideology, 
                                                 
100 Civil society organisations were largely restricted in Egypt and in Ben Ali Tunisia and forbidden in Libya. 
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such as the Muslim Brotherhood, began to offer their own style of social services and 
charity, as national public services declined (The American University of Cairo, 2013: 
8). These developments turned out to be crucial in shaping modern Arabic civil 
societies, social capital generation and the resurgence of public and political Islam as 
the only available alternative to the State. In particular, the establishment of a complex 
binary system has determined a tendency to social collision and fragmentation shaping 
the social responsibility and democratic models of participatory citizenship. In 
particular, Islamic activists or Islamists in the Middle East have de facto created “states 
within states”: ‘from political party activities to banking and commercial enterprises 
or associational life via private voluntary organizations (PVOs), such as charities, 
schools, medical clinics, etc. […] applying Islam to the public sphere and engaging in 
political protests with the secular ruling state to support the implementation of an 
Islamic state based on Islamic law (Shari’a)’ (Clarck, 2004: 942- 943).  
The creation of Islamic private welfare services as alternative to public 
services, deepened secular vs. religious cleavages. These aspects of social capital 
generation within a framework of conflicting interests between the Islamic tradition 
and post WWII modern and secular nation-states, seem to be distinctive to modern 
Arab societies. Social capital formation in Arab countries has also determined 
university social responsibility based upon an alternative model for democracy 
building. In the framework, both Islamic and Western social capital theories are 
considered relevant and significant in assessing specifically how universities have 
reproduced patterns of students’ socialisation. 
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Social Capital and Social Responsibility: the case of Tunisia 
 
In the Arab region, the relationships between civil society, social movements 
and social capital remain largely unexplored. Notions of students’ civic engagement, 
volunteering and civil society are emergent concepts of subaltern social realities. As 
such, there is a general absence of comparative data about the voluntary sector and the 
nature, characteristics and socio-economic contributions derived from civic 
engagement; as well as, about the roles of the state, Islamic mutual assistance and civil 
society in promoting and establishing civic service programs (Kandil, 2004: 49). 
Furthermore, according to Li Puma and Koelble (2009: 13):  
‘[…] it is impossible to develop an adequate theory and account 
of social capital in emerging post-colonial democracies 
grounded in a nation-state production-centred political 
economy’. 
  
Individual or groups’ social agency often clashed with central government policies, 
often jeopardising social capital development and active political participation. In 
particular, civil society organisations have tended to act within a conflicting space 
between the government and the private sector in which “civil society shares with 
government a sense of public sphere and general good but unlike government it makes 
no claims to exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion” (Lehning, 1998: 221-223).   
The public sphere is often considered a ‘buffer zone’ where political, socio-
economic and cultural factors determine the emergence of civil society organisations. 
Post-independence Arab states, in fact, established strategies of liberalisation-
repression - between narrow pluralism and brutal suppression - to control civic 
activism, resulting in the failure of civil society to remove autocratic regimes (Yom, 
2005: 15, 23). Restrictions on political engagement and democratic participation 
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resulted in a lack of basic freedoms, undermining social and civic actions while 
favouring movements of clandestine dissidents. Bayat (2002: 3), argues that Middle 
Eastern societies foster a predominant quiet encroachment strategy: 
 ‘[…] characterized by direct actions of individuals and families 
to acquire the basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, 
urban collective consumption, informal jobs and business 
opportunities) in a quiet and unassuming, atomised and illegal 
fashion to achieve social changes.’  
 
As a matter of fact, grassroot social activism in the Arab region has been characterised 
by complex, diverse, conflicting but dynamic movements.  
In Tunisia, the 1959 Constitution guaranteed right of association101 and 
assembly, although the establishment of associations was left to the discretion of the 
Ministry of Interior which could arbitrarily reject applications or hold approval, often 
on the basis of preserving public order. In particular, during Bourguiba, the strict 
control over civil society was enacted by Law on Association (Law 154 of 1959) which 
limited the classification of authorised civil society organisations, excluding those 
pursuing political objectives; whereas, during Ben Ali, tight security control remained 
and the Law of Associations in 1992 forbade any association of a “general character”, 
allowing the RCD party loyalists to infiltrate in NGOs (Lawner, 2012: 177-119). The 
Arab spring, in this sense, had a crucial impact on grassroot associations removing not 
only the limitations on nature, aims and objectives of associations but also unlocking 
tight government control over associations’ freedoms, including activists’ persecution. 
This change has opened up new spaces for wide-ranging associational and political 
engagement, including Islamic ones. In this sense, CSR trends experienced a shift from 
                                                 
101 Tunisian Organic Law on Associations No. 25/1992 classified associations within: women’s groups; sport 
groups; scientific groups; cultural and arts groups; charity, emergency and social groups; development groups; 
amicable groups, public interest groups (American University of Cairo, 2013: 50). 
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traditional philanthropic activities (based on religious commandment of alms giving 
as zakat), toward a more restructured approach in previously sensitive areas such as 
democracy, human rights and the labour market (Avina, 2013: 81-82), including: 
- the rise of locally-driven CSR (including locally-led employee activism);  
- a growing CSR support to societal and democratic transition;  
- a renewed support to key national socio-economic challenges (i.e. employment 
and entrepreneurship).  
 
In Tunisia, prior to the revolution, official data reported that civil society 
organisations were mainly operating in cultural and artistic spheres (62,81%)102; while 
after the revolution103, the sharp increase in the number of associations showed that 
charitable, aid and community groups have made remarkable progress (18%) and 
associations which are active in citizenship, social rights, political rights, economic 
rights and public freedoms or development groups have flourished at the expense of 
sports groups (American University Cairo, 2013:53-55). On the other hand, traditional 
forms of social participation such as urban mass protests, trade unionism, community 
activism, social Islamism, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tended to pursue 
fragmented interests to meet socio-economic needs. Quiet encroachment then allowed 
individuals to improve their quality of life in the absence of state policies with low 
impact on social capital creation or community well-being. In this sense, the state 
either both created and supported civil society (i.e. Kuwait, Syria and Tunisia), or 
controlled it by deciding the content and form of civil society, as in Egypt (Hassan, 
                                                 
102 To the same extent, young people are disillusioned with autocratic regimes that in many ways limit how they 
can explore their identity through art, literature and political expression (CAWTAR 2006 in Chamlou 2013). 
103 In Tunisia, social activism has since then experienced an unprecedented boost fulfilling an important role of 
wider cooperation with the State in the “High Council for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political 
Reforms and Democratic Transition” (Behr & Siitonen, 2013: 15). 
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2010: 69), ensuring an “authoritarian resilience” based on an adaptation strategy within 
a largely state-monopolised civil society (Deane, 2013). In this sense, the State vs. civil 
society paradigm has hampered the creation of social trust, shared norms, 
trustworthiness in the government or democratic attitudes.  
Amaney Jamal’s book “Barriers to democracy: the other side of social capital 
in Palestine and the Arab world”, is the first empirical study investigating social 
capital in MENA region104. In contexts characterised either by centralised and 
clientelistic semi-democratic or authoritarian regime, associational life and social 
capital formation might not support a democratic process. In fact, non-governmental 
organisations have been often central to critically oppose authoritarian regimes 
(Langohr, 2004; Cavatorta, 2006). However, empirical findings in Palestine showed 
that “the relationship between civic engagement (political knowledge, civic 
involvement and community engagement), interpersonal trust and support for 
democratic institutions were not directly related to one another” (Jamal, 2007: 13). 
These dynamics seem then to be in contrast with mainstream Western social capital 
theory which rather assume that a vibrant associational life is linked to community 
social capital’s creation, fostering better democratic systems (i.e. Putnam, 1993, 2000). 
In fact, positive correlation between trust, democracy support and political confidence 
seem to be positive in countries with stronger democratic institutions. In non-
democratic societies, instead, “higher levels of generalized trust are not linked to more 
support for democracy” (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010: 58).  
                                                 
104 Although, it draws from the experience of Palestine, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan (not Tunisia) and only with 
reference to the pre-revolution and not to post-revolution socio-political environments. 
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In particular, associations supporting the regime status-quo, seek government 
funding and protection in clientelistic networks105 and create stronger interpersonal 
trust but lower democratic forms, civic engagement or concerns about one’s 
community; while, associations not linked to the regime will conversely show lower 
levels of interpersonal trust but higher levels of commitment to democracy and civic 
engagement (Jamal, 2007: 13, 77, 87). In this sense, governments by strategically 
replacing, supporting and controlling associations, occupied their space in society and 
reinforced authoritarian rule rather than fostering grassroot social capital, trust, shared 
norms and values. For this, in anti-democratic and paternalist authoritarian settings, 
civic activism has a negative effect on democratisation because governments support 
only pro-regime associations which, in turn, are unwilling to support a democratic 
change in order to guarantee protection and economic gains. Associations advocating 
against the regime, instead, are often banned or under censorship, preventing the 
development of democratic social settings and genuine political participation. 
 In this sense, in Arab countries, if Western funded international NGOs and 
state-supported national NGOs have been under government’s direct control, the role 
of Islamic Social Institutions (ISIs) generated a third alternative to social capital 
generation. In particular, Islamic institutions are grassroot networks of private 
organisation, often voluntary, providing public and social services while expanding 
the role of Islam in the public sphere. In general, ISIs, often perceived as a political 
threat by governments, advocate for an ideological struggle between public-private 
and secular-religious, based on an Islamist identity and the creation of alternative 
                                                 
105 In pre-revolution context, larger corporations developed CSR “often partnered with NGOs under the patronage 
of or otherwise favoured by the ruling elites”. Most companies in Tunisia, (i.e. Tunisiana, the largest 
telecommunications company; Amen Bank; Groupe des Assurances de Tunisie (GAT insurance company); and the 
three major Tunisian labour unions), were encouraged to be in the informal or black market: they did not pay taxes 
as the extended family of the President benefitted from and encouraged the corrupt system  (Avina, 2013:81-83). 
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institutions to challenge state control, repression, co-optation or biased encouragement 
(Clarck, 2004: 945, 948). Nonetheless, in modern Arab nations, according to Cavatorta 
(2006:221): 
 ‘[…] the inclusion and dialogue with Islamist groups, the truly 
popular civil society actors106, becomes a necessity since 
political parties are discredited and co-opted by the regime 
while ‘ secular’ civil society is not yet strong and independent’.  
 
In Islamic associations, however, social capital’s generation is often found to be weak 
since ‘middle-class horizontal ties reinforce vertical patron-client relationships as the 
educated middle-class receives jobs and services while the poor receive mainly 
services that do not eliminate the need to seek additional aid and services from 
elsewhere’ (Ibid, 944, 965). In this sense, these associations might not foster social 
cohesion or social inclusion due to the prevailing middle-class bonding ties and class-
restrained interests, leaving the disenfranchised poor disempowered to social and 
economic participation. Furthermore, either political affiliation or democratic 
participation appears not to be central to ISIs’ agenda, disengaging members from 
civic engagement or political participation, as they rather provide short-term relief. In 
this sense, the relationships between social capital, democracy and civic engagement 
in Arab states seems to be weak and the role of both secular and Islamist CSOs might 
not be functional but rather incompatible with democratic values, social cohesion, 
social trust and political participation. In this sense, in the university context, it is 
relevant to explore if values and norms such as trust, reciprocity and trustworthiness 
facilitate or hinder democratic and civic participation. 
                                                 
106 This aspect relates more openly to countries like Morocco or Egypt while does not apply to Tunisia where 
Islamist social activities were strictly controlled by the State and obliged to go underground. 
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  In this framework, governments, since ‘people cannot associate, volunteer, 
vote or take care of one another without a stable and safe environment107’, support the 
reproduction of social capital via (Fukuyama, 1999: 13-14): 
-  Education108: transmitting human and social capital as social rules and norms. 
-  Religion: as religiously inspired cultural change is a live option in the Islamic 
world (although sectarianism can breed intolerance, hatred and violence)109. 
-  Globalisation: conveying transformational ideas and changes. 
 
 In particular, education is central to government policies to most effectively pursue 
community development110. Education can be crucial to meet local and global 
challenges; to foster inter-religious tolerance and dialogue (inside and outside 
universities); to form present and future leaders; to address effectively CSR and USR 
concerns as well as to guarantee public services’ provision for government’s 
accountability. In this sense, universities are institutional settings where the 
organisational advantage can be conducive to higher levels of social and intellectual 
capital if its structural dimension (network ties, network configuration, appropriable 
organisation), cognitive dimension (shared codes and languages, shared narratives) 
and relational dimension (trust, norms, obligations and identification) (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998: 251), are mutually fostered by networks of knowledge-led 
socialisation.  
                                                 
107 These aspects are key elements in developing social capital. However, this might not be the case in politically, 
culturally, linguistically or religiously fragmented societies. Nonetheless, social capital is also created in these 
specific contexts calling for the development of an alternative framework of analysis, incorporating different 
criteria and lenses able to understand enablers and barriers to context-based social capital development. 
108 Education, in fact, is one of the most important predictors —usually the most important predictor - of 
engagement as rising general levels of education are likely to be accompanied by higher general levels of political, 
social engagement (Helliwell &  Putnam, 2007:1,14; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). 
109 The role of Islam towards democracy will be dealt with in the next section. 
110 In Tunisia, political Islam has been often censored and globalisation impacts are still subaltern. 
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Intra-faculty bonding and extra-university bridging ties can form academically 
related social capital, reinforcing a set of shared norms and values via cultural, political 
or volunteering activities. However, despite emergent considerations on how 
universities’ social responsibility and social capital influence society (Ferman, 2006; 
Carpenter et al, 2010), there is a gap in the literature. In particular, the knowledge gap 
relates to the nature and development of social capital and social ties in Tunisian public 
universities in relation to social networks developed amongst professors, 
administration and students within the local community.  
In this sense, despite the fact that education has the potential to support social 
responsibility and the creation of social capital, opportunities for youth civic 
engagement remain largely limited in the Arab region. A survey conducted in Morocco 
in 2000 showed that, on average, only 15 percent of youth participated in associational 
activities; in Tunisia, only 3.7 percent of young people surveyed in 2000 reported they 
were members of civil society organisations and only 8.6 percent felt they had a social 
role to fill; whereas, a 2009 Population Council survey in Egypt showed that only 3.3 
percent of young males and 1 percent of young females took part in voluntary activities 
(Marseille Conference, 2010: 32-33). Furthermore, in Tunisia, Hamami (2012) argues 
that despite existing civic engagement programs and national regulations111 in primary 
and secondary schools, students’ sense of citizenship and civic responsibility in the 
pursuit of social cohesion is characterised by a gap between theory and practice. Civic 
programmes remain detached from everyday life with limited experience of 
participatory activities and social engagement. In Tunisian public schools, as in higher 
education, participation has long been limited to mainly cultural associations and 
                                                 
111 Law 2002-80, 23 July 2002 on Education and Teaching system (Loi n° 2002-80 du 23 juillet 2002, loi 
d’orientation de l’éducation et de l’enseignement scolaire) and Law 2010-26, 21 May 2010 on Volunteering (Loi 
n° 2010-26 du 21 mai 2010, relative aux activités de volontariat). 
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sports clubs since students ‘were not allowed to engage in debates and the curriculum 
focused on obedience to the state creating submissive students’ (Duncan, 2012: 23).  
On the other hand, according to World Giving Index 2014 (CAF, 2014), 
Tunisia was ranked 120 out of 135 countries in relation to people’s predisposition to 
charity on the following elements: helping other, charitable donation and volunteering. 
In addition to this, Youth Arab report concluded that amongst the main obstacles to 
participation was overall control and authority. In particular, it is stated that ‘authority 
is not confined to government authority but also includes the family, school principal, 
college professor, the boss at work […] as youth rarely confront these figures of 
dominance, hence their unwillingness to participate increases’ (League of Arab States, 
2007: 3). In this sense, Hussainy (2012) also points out how in Jordanian universities, 
security’s intervention in students’ affairs; student clubs’ weakness; limited freedom 
of expression; political partisan actions and violence, are amongst the main reasons 
hindering students’ social role, political awareness and participation. Furthermore, 
Mitchell (2010), exploring112 Syrian students’ engagement, found out that students 
tend to have low-levels of social trust and low-levels of participation in extra-curricular 
activities combined with dissatisfaction expressed towards faculty and administration, 
highlighting existing barriers in terms of opportunities for engagement. To the same 
extent, in Egypt, students are often prevented from engaging in political activities 
outside the classroom as members of clubs as they must get university approval to join 
one (Holmes, 2008: 179).  
In this sense, youth civic engagement in MENA countries113, while lacking 
comparative data on life skills, mobilisation skills and social networks, does not seem 
                                                 
112 Based on a sample of 1050 Syrian University youth. 
113 Data from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait, Algeria, Yemen, Palestine. 
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to contribute positively to greater social capital, political trust, tolerance, respect for 
pluralism and diversity or a sense of shared identity (Mercy Corps, 2012: 4-8). In this 
perspective, a 2008 report on student engagement highlighted how undergraduate 
students lack awareness about civic engagement, confirming a gap between the faculty 
and local community and suggesting the necessity of creating new discourses, culture 
and renewed tradition of service within communities (American University in Cairo, 
2008). In Tunisia, an additional gap in the literature has been identified in relation to 
students’ civic participation, students’ identity, social capital formation and students’ 
social agency in a university context.  
Post-revolution emergent grassroot students’ movements acquired a central 
focus in Arab states in relation to political participation and civic engagement. In a 
wider perspective, exploring how “students experience and find their place in the 
social world determines their self-concept, and this self-concept is intricately linked to 
how they know and engage the world as focusing on identity issues could provide 
richer, more contextual interpretations of how students know and learn or engage” 
(Zaytoun, 2005: 9). In this sense, a deeper understanding and reflection on how 
students perceive and conceptualise their social agency, can highlight barriers and 
enablers for civic engagement in post-revolution Tunisia. In particular, the role of 
Islam and Islamic associations in students’ social capital formation, social 
responsibility and political participation is an important aspect shaping a democracy 
and a contested public sphere.  
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Summary 
 
The main purpose of the present chapter has been to present the literature in 
relation to the following identified themes: democracy building and Islam; university 
and students social responsibility and social capital formation in the context of 
Tunisian public universities. The review of the academic literature has shown that 
university social responsibility is an important emergent issue in higher education at 
an international level. In particular, in the context of post-revolution Tunisia 
characterised by the demise of Ben Ali authoritarian regime and present complex 
democratic transition, the following literature gaps emerged: 
 
1- Democracy and Islam: in the context of the Arab spring, both moderate 
and extremist Islamic parties, as well as civil society organisations have 
played an unprecedented role in the democratic transition in Tunisia. The 
centrality of Islam, then, plays a crucial role in the correlation between 
social responsibility, social capital formation and democratic participation. 
In this perspective, the literature has shown a gap in research on the 
relationship between Islam, civic engagement and democratic values in the 
university context. In particular, the influence of both Islamic values and 
Islamic associations in undergraduate students shaping political and civic 
participation, is an area in need of further investigation. 
2- University social responsibility: despite global emergent trends of 
university-community partnerships, fostering social responsibility for civic 
engagement, university social responsibility (USR) is to-date under-
developed in Arab countries and, to a great extent in Tunisia. In addition to 
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it, the related conceptualisation of student social responsibility (SSR) also, 
both in Western and Arab literature, seem to be an under-researched field 
of investigation. In this sense, both USR and SSR in the Tunisian context 
will be investigated to fill the present gap in literature. 
 
3-   Social capital: the contextual development of social networks, often 
associated with norms of trust, reciprocity and trustworthiness, is an under-
researched area of investigation in the Arab countries and in Tunisia alike, 
as the related concepts of civil society, civic engagement and volunteering 
are. Furthermore, there is a gap in understanding the relationship between 
social capital and university social responsibility exploring the connections 
between the nature and types of social networks in terms of structural, 
cognitive and relational dimensions. Furthermore, there is a need to study 
academic social capital in universities and its impact on students’ identity 
and existing relationships with surrounding communities. 
 
Starting from the above-mentioned research gaps, the present study aims at addressing 
the following research questions: 
-   What is the role of Islam in relation to students’ identity, social capital, 
civic participation and democracy in Tunisian public universities?  
 
- What are the relationships between universities and student social 
responsibility for civic engagement in university contexts? 
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- What is the relationship between social responsibility and social capital in 
Tunisian universities?  
 
The study has the objective of making a contribution to knowledge by exploring the 
relationship between university social responsibility, social capital, Islam and 
democracy in post-revolution Tunisia. The understanding of the nature, characteristics, 
implications and barriers to university social responsibility and students’ engagement 
within an Islamic context will shed a light on the influence exerted by political and 
socio-cultural agents within specific local and national contexts.  
The next chapter presents the methodology used with reference to the study 
population, sampling, research approach, ethical considerations, data collection and 
data analysis methods. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Methodology and Methods 
 
The study aimed at exploring university social responsibility, academic social 
capital and students’ civic engagement in Tunisian public universities in the aftermath 
of the 2011 revolution. The chapter provides information on research problems and 
questions in relation to study design, methodology and the methods used to conduct 
fieldwork’s data collection. In particular, it considers the setting of the study, the 
research design, study participants, the sample, instruments used and data analysis’s 
methods. It also presents methodological implications, ethical issues and limitations 
on research’s methods. 
 
Research problems and research questions  
 
In Tunisia, as in other Arab countries, the 2011 social uprisings established 
new forms of social participation and political consensus. Tensions existing between 
political and social aspirations to establish a more democratic society have engendered 
re-emergent conflicts between secular and Islamic values and social norms. Tunisia 
has since then stood out from other regional realities, managing to pass reforms to 
grant wider basic freedoms and civil rights in a framework of inclusive political 
coexistence despite oppositional political and social forces. This process of 
pacification has allowed resisting pressures from more extremist Islamic social forces, 
the risk of a civil war or the restoration of the pre-revolution dictatorial regime. In this 
sense, education for democracy, civic values and social responsibility are central issues 
defining the future democratic development in Tunisia. University autonomy and 
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academic freedom, however, still remain under-achieved, hindering the realisation of 
university and students’ social responsibility. For these reasons, there is a growing 
need to understand how universities can play an active role in the region amidst 
complex socio-political dynamics.  
The research aimed at exploring the nature of universities and students’ social 
responsibility in terms of academic social capital, civic engagement and democracy. 
In this sense, the study explored connections related to the following research 
questions: 
 
- What is the role of Islam in relation to students’ identity, social capital, 
civic participation and democracy in Tunisian public universities?  
 
- What are the relationships between universities and student social 
responsibility for civic engagement in university contexts? 
 
What is the relationship between social responsibility and social capital in 
Tunisian universities? 
 
The existing relationships and connections define the realisation of social 
responsibility in public universities in the post-revolution Tunisian context. In fact, it 
is important to consider how external factors such as governmental policies, socio-
political and Islamic structures; as well as, individual identity, family and local 
community environments, have been shaping its definition, implementation and 
development.  
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Research Methodology 
 
In the modern research tradition of social sciences’ theories and philosophies, 
it is possible to differentiate ontological, epistemological and methodological 
approaches which reflect specific historical, political and cultural contexts as integral 
elements influencing what knowledge is and how social realities can be investigated. 
In particular, the modernisation of the social sciences mirrored uneven patterns based 
on the diversification and specialisation of intellectual traditions. Existing differences 
between European and US traditions, but also within European nation-states 
themselves, identified cultural adaptations to different contexts characterising ‘the 
state, civil society, national policies and institutional configurations to meet problems 
of industrialising mass societies’ (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007:7). The evolution of 
theoretical models have been often framed by a dominant positivist approach to social 
science and often developed conflicting cultural traditions in tensions with society 
secular or religious embedded values. The evolution from an empirical quantitative 
scientific model based on the objectification of realities towards a more subjective and 
qualitative context-based model, gradually determined the adoption of different 
methodological tools to explore and analyse society. This shift has determined not only 
the definition, generation and understanding of knowledge but it has also enhanced the 
capacity to make use of complementary frames to define the complexity and richness 
of social realities by interconnecting variables beyond a deterministic approach.  
In particular, as shown in table 3, it is possible to articulate a distinction 
amongst three different major paradigms of empirical sociological approaches. In fact, 
social sciences methodologies have evolved in reference to political and mainstream 
cultural context-based systems defining how social theories offered a justification or 
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alternative paradigm to social problems. In this framework, it is possible to consider 
theories in an historical perspective where contributions of individual researchers 
within different schools of thoughts, elucidate how conceptual and methodological 
relativity reflects specific definitions of knowledge and the understanding of reality. 
 
Table 3 - The three practical philosophies of social science, (Mjøset, 2009: 41) 
The philosophy of natural 
sciences: twentieth-
century traditions 
emerging from logical 
positivism, Popper’s 
critical rationalism, 
Lakatos’ research 
programmes, 
Kuhn/Popper debate, 
analytical philosophy 
The philosophy of the 
social sciences: US 
pragmatism, European 
critical theory, 
standpoints 
epistemologies 
The philosophy of the 
humanities, 
phenomenology, 
hermeneutics, structuralism, 
post-structuralism 
The standard attitude The contextualist 
attitude 
The social-philosophical 
attitude 
Mathematical modelling. 
Thought 
experiments/simulation. 
Statistical analysis of 
large data-sets. These 
methods indicate a 
methods community with 
the natural sciences 
Qualitative methods 
implying direct or 
indirect involvement 
with the cases studied; 
ranging from long-term 
participant observation, 
more or less structured 
interviewing and 
comparative work on 
distinct case-histories. 
These are methods that 
are distinct to the social 
sciences 
Interpretative analysis of 
texts: formal linguistic and 
narrative analysis, discourse 
analysis, history of concepts, 
content analysis, less formal 
methods of textual exegesis, 
use of classical texts in 
social theory to build broad 
“philosophy of history” – 
like interpretation of the 
present. These methods 
indicate a methods 
community with the 
humanities 
 
 
In particular, the contextualist approach considers specific contexts or case studies to 
generate ‘general knowledge in denser and broader typologies, concepts and models 
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of social interaction patterns’, using qualitative and quantitative triangulation methods 
(including non-probabilistic quantitative approaches), ‘designed to increase sensitivity 
to cases while considering substantive generalisation and comparative specification’ 
(Mjøset, 2009: 52-53). Contextualisation is then central to exploring local research 
frontiers and providing new and also cumulative knowledge from empirical studies 
which are often problem-oriented, opening new windows for comparative and multi-
disciplinary studies. 
In particular, during the first phase of research development, considerations on 
the type and nature of the study, the research context and the generation of new 
knowledge have been of primary concern as they are considered to be closely 
interconnected with the research methodology underpinning methods used for data 
collection. In fact, the objective to explore the contribution of universities to social 
responsibility, civic engagement and democracy in Tunisia have been considered to 
be: 
1- objectively framed by complex structures and dynamics of social processes 
beyond individual reach; but 
2- also simultaneously and subjectively co-produced by individuals.  
 
In fact, educational researchers engage with the relationship between structure and 
agency embedded in social life as part of participants’ beliefs, intentions and emotions 
(Scott, 2007: 9). In social settings, like universities, with multi-layered power-
relations, diverse socio-cultural determinants and socio-political structures, it is central 
to investigate context-based meanings and existent relationships to estimate social 
dynamics. In this sense, as expressed by Scott (2005: 640): 
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“Social structures pre-exist agential operations and, in turn, 
human beings reflexively monitor the social world, either 
individually or collectively, exerting an influence or changing 
relatively enduring but emergent structures”. 
 
 
In this sense, the revolutionary movements in Tunisia might help to 
reshape the definition of both university and students’ social responsibility, 
reflecting current social dynamics. In a reflexive and relational setting, social 
life is thus defined by interactions with ‘context, interpersonal relations, 
emergent social structures and the stratified constitution of the self’ (Nash, 
2005: 187). As such, existing tensions between the objective and the subjective 
reveal how social forces can be functional to change social structures by 
adopting new ideas, aims and policies. These available or latent social resources 
are context-dependent as they develop within historical-bound socio-cultural 
and economic factors of change.  
Social capital theory has been considered to explore these issues as it 
focuses on how interactions among people within a community can foster a 
higher level of individual, community and institutional trust and shared norms 
and values central to build citizenship, sense of belonging and civic 
participation. In particular, it is relevant to highlight how ‘initial works of 
Bourdieu (1985) and Coleman (1990) conceptualised social capital as an 
attribute of individuals or small groups; whereas, later focused to the level of 
communities, regions or nation states (Evans, 1996 or Putnam 1993, 2000), 
with implications for development theory and practice (Schafft & Brown, 2003: 
329). As table 4 shows, these two methodological approaches have considered 
how social capital can be relevant to understand contexts as a result of 
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individuals’ social or economic interactions based on a constructionist and 
interpretative approach; or based on a objectivist and positivist approach 
measured from an individual level aggregated to the community. 
  
Table 4 – Alternative approaches to social capital research (Grix, 2010: 74) 
Approach Ontology Epistemology Methodology Methods Sources 
‘Putnam 
School’ 
Foundation
alist 
Positivist Choice of 
quantitative 
strategy, using 
multiple cases 
and surveys 
Questionn
aire via 
wide-scale 
survey 
Answers to 
questions in 
questionnaire 
Alternative 
approach 
Anti-
foundation
alist 
Interpretivist Choice of both 
quantitative 
and qualitative 
strategy, 
usually small 
number of in 
depth-cases 
In-depth 
interviews, 
documenta
ry analysis 
Interview 
transcripts 
and 
background 
statistical data 
 
As such, the study focuses on understanding complex realities on how 
agencies and structures are key elements for co-constructing universities and 
students’ social responsibility embedded in specific socio-political 
environments; cultural settings impacting on individual identities; social 
relations and institutional culture for policy implementation. In particular, 
social agency is considered functional of either re-adjusting and changing 
overtime in relation to existing structures; or, adversely, reinforcing and 
crystallising social networks and embedded norms and cultural habits both in 
the short or long-term, hindering or delaying social changes. The interpretivist 
and co-constructivist alternative approach is considered significant to the study 
as it allows for a deeper understanding of existing tensions arising between 
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different levels: the individual, the collective and the external contexts. It 
focuses on how micro-dynamics interact within macro-contexts. In this sense, 
the valorisation of both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods 
were considered  central in the research, as explored in the next section. 
 
Research Methods 
 
The research methods used to collect fieldwork data reflected the research 
methodology and objectives. The development of a multi-dimensional analysis of 
social responsibility and social capital included the exploration of students’ identity, 
values, motivations and expectations. The research was conducted via triangulated 
data collection methods and data sources in order to integrate and interconnect finding 
during data analysis. The purpose was to “offset the weaknesses of one method with 
the strengths of the other” (Creswell, 2003: 217), as qualitative approaches can 
compensate for deficiencies of quantitative ones, and vice versa, in describing reality 
(Scott, 2007: 4). In fact, in addition to quantitative methods (surveys, multiple 
variants), qualitative methods included analysis of semi-structured interviews and 
open-ended questions included in the survey. In this sense, methods used are relevant 
to the research aims as they allowed to consider structural trends in the development 
of social responsibility and social capital in public university settings; while 
considering participants’ subjective accounts, reflecting deeper meanings and 
influences brought in by context and cultural or religious values. These methods are, 
in fact, typically used within social capital theory to explore objective and inter-
subjective structures, dynamics, meanings and values.  
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The present research, in coordination and agreement with my supervisors, was 
conducted using four main instruments to collect data during fieldwork: 
 
1- Questionnaire: composed of both open and close-ended questions, 
questionnaires were used to gain students’ perceptions and attitudes towards 
university and students’ social responsibility in terms of civic engagement and 
social capital formation. 
2- Semi-structured interviews: used to generate qualitative data both from 
students and academics regarding the role of universities and students in 
society in relation to post-revolution democracy building. 
3- Documentary search: analysed to address research themes from an 
institutional and national policy point of view with reference to higher 
education reforms. 
4- Diary notes: collected during fieldwork campus observations with relevant 
information regarding students’ habits, campus environments and local 
surroundings to contextualise students’ agency. 
 
Research Questionnaire 
 
Questionnaires are common tools in social science as they allow for large sample 
data collection, implying the understanding of nature and type of social networks, the 
reproduction of social norms and shared values within a community. Self-completion 
questionnaires are considered valuable for: the lower-cost; quicker tools to distribute 
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and administer; for the convenience to fill questionnaires in at participants’ chosen 
time and pace; as well as, in the presence of the researcher (Bryman, 2004: 133). 
During fieldwork, in particular, the following aspects were observed: 
 It was important to specify that questionnaires had to be filled in from the front 
page and not from the last (since in Arab countries both reading and writing 
goes from right-to-left, exactly the opposite way round to Western tradition), 
  Although participants were asked to tick only the box corresponding to their 
choice, due to a common misinterpretation about how to fill in questionnaires 
(despite given explanations), some of them, instead, ticked all questions and 
left blank the box they had chosen as the correct one (it was possible to clarify 
this method by comparing questionnaires). 
 
On the other hand, questionnaires might also risk to have lower response rate; 
greater risk of missing data; limitations of collecting no more data than survey’s actual 
questions; difficulty to clearly understand the questions; and, in case of researcher’s 
absence, no possibility for participants to ask clarifications (Bryman, 2004: 135). In 
particular, in different sessions, some students asked detailed information and 
clarifications in order to understand how to fill in the questionnaire (i.e. how to 
interpret questions’ scales). Furthermore, in relation to lower response rate, 
participants returned questionnaires at the end of each session, resulting less dispersive 
for participants and more efficient to collect questionnaires in person. In terms of 
limited or restrained data available from questionnaires, the presence of open-ended 
questions and the introduction of an “Other” category in most sections of the survey, 
helped obtaining greater sources of information while allowing students to explore in 
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more detail individual opinions. In addition to it, students’ willingness to take part to 
post-survey interviews also proved successful as both participants and researcher 
could further discuss key issues emerged from the questionnaires.  
As a matter of fact, questionnaires were designed to obtain relevant information on 
university and students’ social responsibility linked to social capital creation in 
Tunisian public universities, which implied the necessity to design a rather long and 
detailed set of questions to cover interconnected topics. However, the experience has 
suggested that the complexity of questions and length of the questionnaire are 
important aspects to consider in order to make readability easier and participants’ 
concentration higher. On the other hand, undergraduate students in Tunisia might not 
be too accustomed to take part in surveys (i.e. there is not a NSSE equivalent or student 
union/university satisfaction survey-led initiatives as in other European countries); 
perhaps, participants’ interests in the survey, might have impacted on the accuracy of 
answers given, limiting the possibility to compare some dataset across the study 
sample (i.e. questionnaire PART C, question number 12). As such, the experience has 
suggested that designing questionnaires is a rather complex but crucial task to reflect 
upon in relation to the specific study context. This can be related to designing simple 
questions; considering survey’s length and time needed for completion; levels of 
participants’ attention; as well as, choice of rating scales used to reduce complexity 
(i.e. avoiding different scales). 
The questionnaire was piloted on two different occasions. Firstly, it was piloted in 
the UK with 20 undergraduate students who volunteered to take part114. The 
provisional draft was then piloted twice in Tunisia with 10 Tunisian students before 
                                                 
114 In this occasion, questionnaires submitted did not include Part A and B, and also did not include all sections 
referring to Islamic values and principles. 
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finalising it115. This was an important procedure to follow as it allowed for further 
simplification and clarification of questions and answers’ options; as well as, internal 
coherency. Furthermore, the use of French and Arabic was also tested to refine the 
translation while improving text comprehension and readability. The process of 
selecting the most appropriate sentences and context-based meanings during the 
translation process was also key. To the same extent, piloting the questionnaire also 
helped in improving the layout and definition of tables for uniformity.  
In designing the questionnaire, the literature, related to university social 
responsibility, social capital and students’ civic engagement, was explored. This 
background task helped to identify previous research methodologies and methods, 
while highlighting key aspects, definitions and design of questions linked to multiple-
choice answers. In fact, the comparison with previous studies conducted in similar 
areas was necessary to identify different models of questionnaires, exploring also 
commonalities and differences. In particular, the following questionnaires were used 
for reference to develop the final survey: 
1- the 2013 NSSE (National Survey of Student Engagement) US and Canadian 
version (in French); 
2- Deep Narayan, Global Social Capital Survey in Uganda (World Bank, 2001); 
3- Riaz Hassan study on Muslim conceptions of Islam and Society (2002). 
 
As a result, the questionnaire was composed of five main sections116: 
                                                 
115 In this occasion, a full and final version questionnaire was submitted to volunteers (translated in French and 
already including Arabic words in the section related to Islamic values).  
116For further information, see Appendix V on research questionnaire (English translated version).   
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- Part A: structured around three open-ended questions on what democracy 
means; what is social responsibility and what does it mean and what is the role 
of students in Tunisia. 
- Part B: centred on students’ social capital in relation to type of 
organisations/associations; characteristics of members; level of community 
impact; social perception of generalised trust (using a Likert scale). 
- Part C: explored students’ identity building, self-awareness and the influence 
of Islamic, social and political values. 
- Part D: considered the development of social responsibility and social capital 
in relation to universities, as institutions, and students, as individual agents. 
- Part E: identified students’ personal information (i.e. age; gender; year and 
field of study; year and place of residence; and parents’ information). 
 
 On the survey’s last page, students were also asked to leave contact details if they 
wished to take part in the second phase of the study with a face-to-face interview. In 
particular, once the first phase was completed (questionnaires’ distribution and 
collection117), the researcher contacted participants in order to verify their availability, 
willingness and interest to conduct interviews.  
 
 
                                                 
117 In this first stage, the researcher proceeded to a preliminary control on the validity of questionnaires before 
contacting participants and inviting them to an interview 
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Semi-structured interviews 
 
 
Interviews are flexible tools to explore specific issues presented in the 
questionnaire, while allowing the emergence of new, interconnected and unexplored 
lines of investigation. This is particularly important in the case of this present study 
where social interrelations are explored with reference to identity building as personal 
attitudes, motivations, habits vary amongst participants. In fact, it is possible to gain 
“insights into peoples’ opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences” (Denscombe, 
2010: 173), to obtain a richer understanding of participant’s personal accounts and also 
to provide details to enrich understanding of complex dynamics. For the purpose of 
the research, exploring students’ perceptions and attitudes towards social 
responsibility and civic engagement, semi-structured interviews were selected to 
complement and explore themes that emerged from the questionnaires (see 
methodology section). In this sense, the interviewer guaranteed flexibility to develop 
relevant ideas and issues uncovered by the interviewee while focusing onto a list of 
main topics to be discussed 118(Ibid, 175).  
Interviews with students were conducted within universities’ premises, inside 
empty rooms available after classes in order to reduce noise affecting recording 
quality, distractions and confusion interfering with the interview process; as well as, 
granting a level of privacy and comfort for participants to express themselves at ease. 
Interviews with academics were conducted directly in their offices at a suitable time, 
as arranged by the interviewees. Interviews were confirmed either by phone or by 
email adapting times and places to participants’ availability and expressed preferences. 
                                                 
118 Three main questions were asked to all participants: What do you think university social responsibility is? Are 
you actively engaged in any activity within the faculty? Are you member of an association/organisation outside the 
faculty? 
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All participants were given the option to conduct the interview with or without a tape-
recorder but they all consented to use it during the interview.  The length of interviews 
ranged from fourteen minutes to fifty minutes, depending on different circumstances 
such as: time availability, depth of participants’ answers and personal interest. 
Interviews were considered a very important instrument to meet research objectives as 
they contributed to  discuss thematic with richer details and exposing a framework for 
analysis to better understand the extent to which students’ social responsibility 
interfaces with universities’ role in society within existing socio-political and cultural 
environments. Interviewees’ personal accounts and direct experiences largely 
contributed to the researcher’s understanding of campus dynamics and understanding 
of university social responsibility in reference to post-revolution changing contexts.   
Interviews were conducted with one participant at a time. On only one occasion, 
there was a joint interview as one participant requested to be assisted by another 
colleague, when necessary, in some translation from Arabic to French to better express 
his opinions. In particular, the interviewer proved to be able to understand and 
communicate in French throughout the duration, reflecting that this was more a 
personal worry then a real need. However, appropriate measures were taken to comfort 
and reassure the interviewee. For this, despite the fact that education in Tunisia is 
mainly taught in French in schools and universities (being French commonly used in 
daily life and national media); this single experience has prompted the researcher to 
underline the importance of taking fully into consideration the extent to which the use 
of native language can be necessary to express own thoughts, feelings or emotions. In 
particular, the linguistic support throughout the interview to step in if necessary, 
proved to be essential as it would have otherwise partially jeopardised the quality of 
information and limited the participant to express fully notions and ideas. During the 
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transcription of the dialogues in Arabic between two participants and the translation 
into English, the support of the Arabic native speaker was required to confirm 
accuracy. As such, it is considered central in context where the main language is not 
the one used for questionnaires or interviews to make sure that the chosen language 
does not become a barrier either for the participants or the researcher to conduct 
fieldwork. 
 
Documentary search 
 
Official governmental documents and national statistics were used as a secondary 
source of information, as these are previously collected, presented or analysed. In 
particular, documents related to higher education national laws, public university 
regulations and HEI statistics, including institutional official websites, were used to 
complement relevant information related to universities’ missions and students’ role. 
In fact, documents are an “invaluable methodological tool” of qualitative data 
collection and they can be of various kinds: library-based; computer-based; work-
based; policy-focused or historical archival evidences (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2010: 
186). National higher education reforms were presented and analysed in chapter 2 and 
chapter 6 to understand the overall framework within which universities have been 
framed to derive their missions in society. To the same extent, it also defines how 
students have been considered and included as key partners in universities.  
In order to develop the analysis of institutional and national policy, a thematic 
framework was structured around two specific research themes: Tunisian public 
universities’ role and its social dimension; students’ role in public universities and 
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their social dimension. In the first stage, after completing questionnaires’ analysis with 
SPSS software and semi-structured interviews with Nvivo software, it was possible to 
recognise emerging themes or issues in the data set. These emerging themes were 
mainly related to university social responsibility; social and civic engagement; the role 
of Islam and Islamic values; the relationships between politics, education and 
democracy. In this sense, these concepts and themes expressed by the participants, as 
well as, main themes arisen from the literature review formed the framework used to 
filter and to analyse official documents. For this, official documents and national 
policies further addressed insights into existing meaning, relevance and importance of 
issues, and foremost existing implicit connections between the literature, the data set 
and the socio-political context within which university and students’ social 
responsibility is framed in Tunisian public higher education. 
They have provided significant information in relation to universities’ changing 
role within different national historical contexts, adapting to government’s main 
national discourses and thus considering socio-cultural impacts. National statistics are 
also presented in the background chapter, while government policies are discussed at 
the beginning of each data analysis (chapter 5 and 6). Furthermore, comparison 
between official documents, national statistics and research data collected via 
questionnaires and interviews have highlighted existing contradictions in relation to 
universities’ role in society, suggesting priorities and divergences for future higher 
education reforms in Tunisia. 
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Diary notes 
 
Diary notes were gradually collected during fieldwork to gather useful 
information derived from the research context. In particular, this might include 
“personal shorthand, long narratives, short notes, prose, questions, venting or quotes” 
(Pillow, 2010: 276). The researcher acquired useful notes from campus and students’ 
observations; discussions with students out of the class in public areas; at the cafe or 
at the campus canteen over lunch time. In particular, in order to understand how social 
networks develop within and outside the campus, field observations and shared 
information with students were also key to the study. Short notes were often taken 
during the day in the presence of students while longer reflections were carried out at 
night. In this sense, diary notes helped the researcher to have a deeper understanding 
of the context: university campus and available facilities; students’ habits; students-
professors relationships; student use of spaces (i.e. open squares, classes, library, 
canteen, study rooms, etc.). It also has, as a result, fostered context-based reflections 
upon the relationship between theory and data collected. Furthermore, the process of 
contextualising meanings, habits, symbols, limits and constraints helped to strengthen 
the researcher’s objectivity and neutrality in reflecting participants’ opinions. In 
particular, although reflexivity “cannot solve problems of voice, power and 
representation” (Pillow, 2010: 277), it consistently raised critical questions on the role 
and perspectives of the researcher in relation to the research and participants in terms 
of values, principles, expectations and perceptions. Furthermore, observations were 
significant as the researcher, external to the research context, was able to obtain useful 
information relative to students’ daily life experiences, become familiar with campus 
life and better understand existing dynamics. 
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Setting of Study and Fieldwork Access 
 
As explored in the literature review, Tunisian public universities’ role in 
promoting students’ civic engagement and democratic participatory attitudes was 
reported as being fragmented and underdeveloped, restrained by social habits and 
controlled by political governing power. Universities’ social responsibility in Tunisia 
has been considered to assess the role of education in relation to present transition to 
democracy, social cohesion and dialogue promotion. Furthermore, contested power-
relations and divergent interests amongst central government, universities and civil 
society organisations have defined social responsibility’s nature, scope and present 
development. However, despite unpredictable long-term impacts on society, the 
outcome of the revolution, amidst social tensions and security concerns, seemed to 
have favoured a climate for building a more open democratic system via free multi-
party system elections, gradual press liberalisation subject to freedom of speech, 
association and manifestation. 
In order to conduct fieldwork data collection, the researcher obtained 
preliminary access to the field and permission to conduct the study by presenting a 
letter119 to the hosting university international office, from the University of 
Nottingham first supervisor, Professor Simon McGrath120. The rector’s secretary 
organised, upon the researcher’s arrival, a first meeting with the Dean121 of Human 
Science’s faculty in order to introduce and present research aims, objectives and 
methods’ procedures. The Dean, after an initial introduction, asked to read both the 
introductory letter from the supervisor and discussed it thoroughly once more. He 
                                                 
119 See Appendix I related to research cover letter. 
120 Accompanied by an information sheet explaining the research project, aims and objectives. 
121 Both deans were asked if they were willing to volunteer for an interview but no interest was manifested. 
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further asked to read the questionnaire prior to giving permission to distribute the 
questionnaire and conduct interviews in campus. At the end of the meeting, the Dean 
called a member of the student union to visit the campus facilities and introduce the 
researcher to other members of the student union. In this way, the researcher was able 
to begin data collection. 
In this research context, however, fieldwork access was granted via a 
hierarchical and bureaucratic process, highlighting related issues of freedom in terms 
of restricted access to participants, resources and information. The selective and top-
down approach framed by the faculty administration has potentially biased the 
researcher’s initial ability to meet participants or using available students’ database 
information. As such, the Dean called in only members of the more progressive/leftist 
student union, excluding the newly founded religious oriented one122. This might also 
identify an underlying sense of mistrust, a low degree of integration and fragmented 
campus life organisation across members of the two unions. In fact, the researcher’s 
decision to adopt a different strategy granted access to new gatekeepers (i.e. professors 
and other students) and also opened contacts to members of the religious-oriented 
students’ union. Questions of control, power relations, campus fragmentation and low 
level of cooperation are all embedded barriers which characterised the research context 
and implied a necessity to reframe approach to context and knowledge; as well as, the 
strategy to approach participants and overcome initial access and information 
restrictions.  
In particular, after permission was obtained, it was still not clear where and 
how to approach students, as no direct access was given to students data from the 
                                                 
122 As highlighted, despite initial contacts and access to students, the researcher approached on several occasions, 
students and members of more conservative and religious linked unions without success to either submit 
questionnaires or conduct an interview. 
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administration, nor was it possible to define how to organise questionnaire distribution 
and further recollection. In fact, at the beginning, the researcher decided to contact 
students who would gather in common areas (i.e. study rooms, the cafeteria and faculty 
outdoor squares). However, campus environments were rather dispersive and busy 
with students attending courses for most of the day, preparing for exams, revising 
classes in the library and occasionally gathering outside classrooms.  
In fact, this initial approach proved to be complicated on different occasions, 
time-consuming; lacking appropriate access and place for questionnaires submission 
and recollection. Furthermore, it also resulted in very limited questionnaires return 
rate. As a consequence, at first instance, there was a need to gain access to students in 
classrooms as this was not initially an available option. As such, at the second stage, 
the researcher asked members of the student union to meet directly professors in order 
to present the study and discuss with them the possibility to meet students at the end 
of their classes. As a result, some professors agreed and class access was granted with 
the possibility to: 
- interact with a larger number of students at the same time; 
- provide more attention in explaining research objectives; 
- use an environment more appropriate where to fill in the questionnaire.  
 
On the other hand, it was also possible to provide clarification, as well as collect 
questionnaires just after completion. This strategy proved to be successful in terms of 
access and questionnaires’ return rate, despite limited sample population mainly due 
to access, resources and time.  
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Once questionnaires’ collection at Humanities faculty was completed, due to 
some institutional delays, no initial meeting was still possible at the Engineering 
faculty. At this stage in order to continue scheduled fieldwork data collection and 
overcome bureaucratic delays, it was possible to liaise with a professor in the 
Humanities faculty who could introduce me to a student at the Engineering faculty. As 
a result, a meeting was then organised directly with faculty secretary. The researcher 
then presented the supervisor’s letter on study aims and objectives. Questionnaire 
sample was also presented in detail but the Dean did not ask to read it, manifesting a 
less authoritative approach. Once permission was granted, a similar strategy was 
adopted in order to submit questionnaires to students at the end of classes as no access 
to faculty database was available.   
 
 
Population and Study Sample 
 
The possibility and opportunity to investigate the entire population dataset was 
limited due mainly to time, resources’ constraints; as well as, access to students’ 
information from the administration. To the other extent, the unstable post-revolution 
socio-political circumstances restrained the opportunity to extend the period for data 
collection. In particular, the universe of existing units, from which a representative 
sample can be selected for investigation, corresponds to the research population 
(Bryman, 2004: 87). The population was selected from one public university, as a case 
study. The choice was determined due its involvement in the American University of 
Georgia civic engagement and capacity building’s partnership (as explored in chapter 
3) and, as such, considered a public institution previously committed to developing a 
framework for university social responsibility. Secondly, the university is located in a 
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coastal city in central Tunisia, operating as an important hub connecting Southern and 
Western internal regions to the capital Tunis, as such selected as being more inclusive 
and representative of Tunisian students at large. The study sample was then limited to 
one public university, excluding other private, Islamic or virtual universities. As an 
explorative study, it does not offer a comparison between different national 
universities.  
The selection of two faculties (Engineering and Humanities) within the same 
university in agreement with the supervisors, was pre-designed to identify a specific 
type of participants’ profiles (students and professors) from two different fields of 
study (humanistic and scientific). To the same extent, differences were considered to 
be related to: campus environments and contexts; families’ socio-economic 
background; types and nature of social relations; degree’s different value and related 
employability opportunities; individual identity, values and habits. In this sense, it was 
expected that different campus environments, degree disciplines, family background 
and students’ profiles might reveal different attitudes and types of engagement 
interconnected to social responsibility and civic engagement within each faculty.  
On the other hand, the process of sampling aims at identifying and selecting one 
or more sub-groups, people or social phenomena to be studied, from the larger 
‘universe’ to which they belong and can be either non-representative (based on 
convenience choice of a particular illustrative case) or representative (based on 
probability theory more typical of the universe from which they have been selected) 
(Payne & Payne, 2004: 209)123. In particular, the sample was selected amongst: 
1. students at the Engineering and Humanities Faculty (survey and interview); 
                                                 
123 For further specification, see (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2010: 170). 
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2. students and members of the NGO124 (survey and interview);  
3. professors at the Engineering and Humanities Faculty (only interview); 
 
In particular, the sample was selected from available students attending classes. The 
researcher was introduced by the professors at the end of the class, giving time and 
space for students to submit the questionnaire. At the end of the questionnaire, students 
were also asked if they were willing to take part in the second part of the study, 
consisting of oral semi-structured interviews to further discuss the main themes 
presented in the questionnaire. Students were contacted and only ten volunteered to 
take part to the interviews, composed of: four engineering students, three humanities 
and three students and members of the NGO.  
As Table 5 shows, undergraduate students were selected as they generally 
represent the majority of HE students’ population.  
 
Table 5 – General higher education institutions study population distribution125 
Student Body 
Foundational  BA/BSc  Master degree PhD Other Tot 
37408 231075 46838 19376 4922 339619126 
  11% 68% 14% 6% 1% 100% 
  Professor Lecturer Junior Lecturer Teaching  Other Tot 
Academic Staff 
3316 885 6204 8042 3963 22410 
15% 4% 28% 36% 17% 100% 
                                                 
124 The NGO was founded by university students only few months after the revolution, in the field of civic 
engagement, democracy building and participation, recruiting its members only in university contexts.  
125République Tunisienne - Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique: 
L’enseignement supérieur en chiffres - Année universitaire 2011/2012.  Bureau des Etudes, de la Planification et 
de la Programmation (www.universites.tn). 
126 Sixty-one per cent of which are female students. 
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In fact, as explored in the literature review, university social responsibility is directly 
linked to students’ social responsibility and as such, university third missions are 
mainly implemented in relation to or in cooperation with students as primary 
beneficiaries. To the same extent, the second population of students, also members of 
a student-run NGO founded after the Jasmine revolution,  have been specifically 
selected in order to have a deeper understanding of associational life engaged in 
relation to post-revolution political and civil rights. This decision reflected the research 
objective to understand and explore the extent to which the end of the Ben Ali regime 
impacted upon basic freedoms, allowing students to develop social responsibility, 
civic engagement and democracy. Finally, the third population of faculty academics 
was identified since professors also have a significant role in higher education in 
relation to teaching, researching and supervising students during their degree and, 
potentially, professional careers. Furthermore, professors hold a key role in developing 
students’ civic skills and supporting academic social capital in connection with the 
administration, industry, community leaders and policy makers.  
On this basis, during fieldwork, the researcher personally distributed 140 
questionnaires on-campus, targeting 70 students per each faculty. In relation to 
humanity faculty, 56 questionnaires were returned but only 29 validated (due to 
missing data in the questionnaire or because students did not complete the survey 
correctly). In the engineering faculty, 29 questionnaires were returned and 26 
validated. The overall return rate, amongst the two faculties, was 61%, however, the 
validated rate was equal to 40%. In relation to the second population of students, 12 
questionnaires were distributed amongst students (also members of the NGO) but only 
5 were returned and all 5 were validated, with an overall rate of 42% questionnaires 
returned. In this sense, data analysis of sixty questionnaires allowed the development 
146 
 
of an explorative approach, as this research is considered being the first study in the 
specific context of Tunisia (see chapter 3). In particular, a smaller-scale surveys – 
usually between 30 and 250 participants – as using non-probability sampling 
techniques for a representative sample can “produce data that are sufficiently accurate 
for the purpose of the research” (Denscombe, 2010: 46).  
As figures 3 and 4 show, the sample average age was between 22 and 23 years old. 
The majority of participants (around 60%) were attending their second or third year of 
university degree127.  
Figure 3– Sample age composition. 
 
 
Figure 4– Sample level of study specification: Humanity, Engineering students, 
including NGO members. 
 
                                                 
127NGO members who volunteered to take part to the study was composed by: 5 Master students, 1 PhD student. 
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Gender composition of the sample was formed by 22 male (37%) and 38 female 
students (63%). However, female students represented 75% of total participants in the 
Humanities faculty. Furthermore, the predominance of female students also reflects 
general trends in Tunisian public universities in relation to gender ratio (see chapter 
2), especially in Humanities degrees. These data reflect research’s aim to survey 
students still attending university with the intention to explore personal experiences in 
transition between the pre and post-revolution period. The opportunity to gain insights 
from students who have been directly witnessing a political change in the post-
revolution period helped developing a comparative lens to explore universities’ role in 
society, social capital and civic engagement. Furthermore, individual identity can also 
change and readapt to post-revolutionary socio-political and on-campus 
transformations.  
Furthermore, the information gathered from parents’ town of origin helped 
understanding the level of heterogeneity within the sample.  
 
Figure 5– Parents’ town of origin. 
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The analysis showed that the sample was mainly representative of the centre-north part 
of Tunisia as both students or their parents came from 19 different cities, including 
from inland regions as it is shown in figure 5. For this reason, as suggested earlier, data 
collected benefited from a considerable richness due to underlying differences in 
family background, life experiences, social settings and styles of life, considered also 
more representative of Tunisian population at large.   
To the same extent, the population sample showed that the majority of students 
were both born in and residents in the city where they attend university or living in a 
nearby town (see chapter 6). Residence can be considered an important factor in 
students’ engagement within the local community due to higher degrees of social 
integration in the community and higher availability of time (differently from students 
commuting every day). Furthermore, some participants were born and lived in other 
cities and decided to move from their family hometown specifically for study reasons, 
confirming how these factors are also representative of a diversified set of individual 
circumstances, influencing individual values, motivations and attitudes.   
The third population, academic professors were selected to conduct semi-
structured interviews with a double objective to:  
1- understand differences and commonalities between students and academic 
staff;  
2- explore the extent to which professors perceive university social responsibility, 
education to democracy and civic engagement as important aspects in higher 
education.  
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The researcher initially considered selecting eight academics, four each per faculty. 
However, only three agreed to take part in the interviews (two from the Faculty of 
Engineering and one from Humanities). The final sample was then composed of:  
- 29 humanity undergraduate students;  
- 26 engineering undergraduate students; 
- 5 students also members of an NGO; 
- 3 academics from both humanity and engineering faculties. 
 
As previously highlighted, the researcher faced difficulties in obtaining direct 
access to students’ data from the administration referring to the whole population of 
students from both faculties in order to use a random sampling technique to identify 
participants. Furthermore, questions of time, economic resources and country socio-
political situations, also impacted upon the researcher’s decision to implement a 
convenience technique to select sample population. In particular, although this 
sampling strategy does not allow for a generalisation of findings due to the sample’s 
size and the fact that it might not be representative of the studied population, it could 
provide interesting finding for further research or suggesting associations and 
considerations in relation to existing findings in the area (Bryman, 2004: 100). To the 
same extent, non-probability sampling reflects the decision to produce an exploratory 
sample which could still retain the aim of generating a representative sample 
(Denscombe, 2010: 25).  
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Data Analysis methods 
 
At the end of fieldwork, in consultation with supervisors and consistently with 
related methodology books, statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) was used to 
conduct quantitative data analysis; while the software NVIVO was purposeful to 
qualitatively categorise and investigate open-ended questions presented in the 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. At first, it was necessary to validate 
questionnaires depending on missing data, errors or non-readability of answers 
provided. All data from validated questionnaires were inserted and coded in SPSS and 
variables were regrouped into specific categories. During statistical analysis, 
frequencies, means, mode scores, standard deviation and the T-test technique were 
used. T-test was used in the analysis to explore existing differences in relation to the 
two faculties (Engineering and Humanities), reflecting participants’ different family 
background. These were considered important in exploring the extent to which 
students from two different faculties and family backgrounds, develop identity, 
attitudes and skills for social responsibility and civic engagement. In fact, three 
different T-tests were run in relation to participants’ answers on three themes: Islamic 
values, Tunisian universities socio-economic third mission and personal identity (see 
Appendix VI, tables 20, 21, 22). In particular, simple ‘descriptive’ statistics can offer 
straightforward yet rigorous tools to (Denscombe, 2010: 241): 
- organise data; 
- summarise findings; 
- display evidence; 
- describe distribution; 
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- explore data correlation and association. 
 
In relation to type and depth of data analysis, it was considered important for further 
research to use more advanced SPSS data analysis to include variance, correlation and 
regression analysis to provide a more comprehensive and more complex explanatory 
and multi-dimensional factors analysis. 
To the same extent, interviews and open-ended questions from questionnaires were 
transcribed and then translated from French or, in one case some sentences from 
Arabic to English. One interview was also conducted fully in English, as proposed by 
the interviewee. Interviews were transcribed and translated from French to English by 
the researcher with specific attention to students’ accounts, focusing on contextual 
meaning and wording used by students. The analytical use of software NVIVO 
allowed the researcher to organise data in categories and sub-units, to code data, to 
classify and interlink contents and construct memos, in order to develop a conceptual 
framework of analysis. In particular, three main analytic codes were identified relevant 
to address the research questions: Islam, social responsibility, democracy and students 
role, extracted from participants’ definitions, insights, references and reflexive 
conclusions (see Appendix VII). Furthermore, the analysis was conducted in order to 
identify themes, to highlight similarities and connections, as well as, to consider 
existing relationships. Text search query and word frequency helped defining the 
analytic framework to identify inductive coding from the data-set.  In this sense, codes 
were used for the interpretation of data-set, allowing connections with SPSS analysis 
and the themes that emerged from the literature review. In this sense, the analysis of 
findings in chapters 5 and 6 identified major themes and sub-themes, regrouped and 
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presented to provide a richer understanding of the research topic. In particular, extracts 
from transcripts were used in the form of quotes exploring the relationships amongst 
Islam, social responsibility, democracy and civic engagement. 
In this sense, words can be analysed as background assumptions (what they imply 
or presume) or to underlie social structures or interactions (how they produce or 
construct things) (Denscombe, 2010: 279). For this, interviews offered a valuable tool 
to connect quantitative data with more context-based evidences and assumptions 
constructed by participants from direct experiences to provide a better understanding 
of individual-subjective elements in relation to structural-objective determinants. 
Qualitative and quantitative data were regrouped in common themes according to 
their cross-relevance where, most often, qualitative analysis and narratives were used 
to reinforce or enrich findings from quantitative ones. In particular, qualitative data 
have largely contributed to provide critical information regarding students’ identity 
development; associational life; university third missions and university-community 
partnerships; as well as, socio-cultural and political contexts. In this sense, both 
methods are considered complementary in providing relevant information and cross-
reference data in order to identify within specific research context, elements acting as 
enablers or barriers in the development of individual and university social 
responsibility and existing frames of agency.   
 
Research Ethics 
 
In relation to study design and fieldwork data collection, the following research 
ethical aspects were taken into consideration. For this, particular attention was devoted 
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to safeguard both researcher and participants’ safety and security both physical and 
emotional while undertaking the research due to the unstable social and political 
context of post-revolution Tunisia. In fact, accounts and insights linked to sensitive 
issues and personal experiences linked to Ben Ali regime and/or post-revolutionary 
events, could have emerged during fieldwork. As Elliot (2005:134) clarifies, ethical 
issues depend on the specific settings of conducted research: 
“[…] ethical is used to describe those issues that relate to the 
relationship between the researcher and the research subjects or 
participants, and the impact the research process on those 
individuals directly involved in the research, while the term 
‘political’ is used to describe the broader implications of 
research in terms of the impact it may have on society or on the 
specific subgroup within society”. 
 
In this sense, the researcher firstly obtained the ethical approval from the University 
of Nottingham Ethics Committee of the School of Education. The research ethics 
proposal, consisting of a Statement of Research Ethics form with a brief introduction 
and description about research aims and access to research participants; as well as, the 
information sheet and consent form for participants, were submitted and approved (see 
Appendix II - Confirmation and Consent Form).  
On the other hand, while submitting questionnaires, the following aspects were 
taken into consideration and delivered to participants in order to clearly understand the 
nature, aims, contents and objectives of the study, : 
- a brief introduction of the researcher (in Arabic); 
- an explanation of the study (in French);  
- an explanation of participants’ right of refusal to take part and the right to 
withdraw at any time without any consequence (in French); 
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- an explanation of the nature of confidentiality and anonymity related to 
participation (in French); 
- a Q&A session to clarify doubts or possible worries manifested by participants;  
- the questionnaire submission to participant (in French); 
- an informed consent form to be signed and returned (in Arabic); 
- the collection of questionnaire on the same day just after completion;  
- the arrangement of interviews with students and academic staff thereafter. 
 
These steps were carefully taken in order to guarantee informed consent was clearly 
presented, involving participants’ permission, awareness of research purpose and 
implications of taking part; confidentiality issues were also discussed, allowing 
participants to talk with confidence, including the refusal to publish the material; 
finally, implications of anonymity were also approached, offering participants a degree 
of privacy or avoiding any harm from disclosing participants’ identity (Piper & 
Simons, 2011: 26). To the same extent, personal viewpoints, cultural and religious 
values were all treated with additional attention in order to safeguard participants, 
while caring for participants’ thoughts and feelings without interfering. 
 From the other side, as highlighted in relation to fieldwork access, the presence 
of a hierarchical, bureaucratic and top-down system to access the fieldwork, also 
reflected embedded cultural habits based on control, authority and formal procedures 
to give power to different people/gatekeepers within the same hierarchical structure. 
In particular, it consisted of several levels of negotiations and renegotiations of access 
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to participants from Rectorate’s secretary, to Dean of Faculty and finally to professors 
and students, which it has implied the undertaking of complex and delicate tasks in an 
environment new to the researcher. In particular, access was negotiated within a pre-
established framework of power-relations, often exposing the researcher to secure 
access with political and personal interests involved within the university without 
jeopardising research integrity. From an ethical point of view, the Dean’s approval to 
conduct the research raised prospective issues of conflict of interests in relation to 
research objectives. To the same extent, faculty cultural and administrative context 
could have potentially restricted access or, as highlighted earlier on, initially biased 
access with an impact on study fieldwork.  
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the methodological approach and methods used in 
conducting fieldwork data collection in one public university in Tunisia in relation to 
the three interrelated themes: social responsibility, social capital and democracy. The 
present research is believed to have offered data collection and analysis from an 
accurate and significant sample of the population to meet research objectives and 
findings’ investigation to provide an explorative approach to under-researched topics, 
satisfying study field access, participants’ availability and the willingness to 
participate in the study. Research’s population and sample have been also presented 
identifying study participants in relation to research setting and related implications. 
Data collection instruments and analysis are also explored in relation to methods’ 
relevance to study aims: semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, diary notes and 
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documents. In the next chapter, data analysis and findings are discussed to further 
explore themes emerged from the literature review, highlighting an interconnected 
theoretical and conceptual framework. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Islam: Politics and Identity in Public 
University 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the relationship between Islam, social responsibility, 
social capital and democracy. Religion conveys values, social habits and a collective 
sense of belonging through inter-personal relationships, influencing personal 
motivations, behaviour and attitudes. In post-revolution Tunisia, Islamic-oriented 
political parties and associations have exerted a prominent public role, including in 
universities. In the context of public universities, it is relevant to understand existing 
dynamics and implications on the role of Islamic values and Islamic political parties 
or associations in relation to social capital and social responsibility in the present 
democratic transition process. The role of Islam in society, the impact on students’ 
identity and attitudes relevant to social responsibility, civic and political engagement, 
are further explored. It aims at exploring the extent to which religious and non-
religious value-systems are functional to identity building for social responsibility. 
Furthermore, it investigates Islam’s contribution to academic social capital and 
students’ democratic attitudes and civic engagement.  
 
Islam and Democracy in Modern Society 
 
Islam since the 7th century A.D. has been the main driver of moral, social and 
cultural development rooted in and interconnected to local political contexts. In 
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Tunisia, however, during the French protectorate and thereafter the 1956 
independence, Islam, despite being the state religion under constitutional law, has been 
increasingly confined to the private sphere. The central government adopted strategies 
of repression and control over mosque management and public activities. Islam was 
either perceived as a threat to the status quo or by modernists - the secular elite - as a 
brake to modernity, leading to a contentious cohabitation of a widely religious society 
within a secular state. The Jasmine revolution, in particular, took place despite the Ben 
Ali regime’s long-lasting support from Western powers, well-performing national 
economy and internal social stability (see chapter 2). The popular out-cry against 
socio-political authoritarianism and economic inequalities advocated for democracy, 
freedoms, human dignity and social justice. At first, the revolutionary movements did 
not see Islamic parties or associations playing any distinctive role. However, Ben Ali’s 
escape led, from one side, to a political balkanisation process with the foundation of 
over one hundred political parties; and, from the other, to the legitimisation of 
previously outlawed religious-based parties.  
In this new scenario, the emergence of Islam as a renewed political narrative 
has characterised Tunisian post-revolution’s political and cultural democratisation 
process. To further explore it, students then were asked “what democracy is” 128 to 
understand how revolutionary aspirations for a more democratic and inclusive society 
in defence of human rights and social justice, have influenced religious tolerance and 
social cohesion. Participants’ answers129 mainly showed that democracy was 
associated with: freedoms, citizens’ rights, rule of law, respect, dignity, tolerance or 
power to people. However, a contextual analysis revealed three distinctive students’ 
                                                 
128 From questionnaires’ open question section, including answers from not validated questionnaires. 
129 Coded and analysed using Nvivo software. 
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profiles130. The first one was identified as positivist/idealist. This group conceived 
democracy in more theoretical and abstract terms, showing overall trust and adherence 
to the democratic project and related value-system. The majority131of students, in fact, 
seem to have a clear understanding of modern democratic principles linked to the 
centrality of human rights, political duties and fundamental freedoms. For instance, 
one student and member of the NGO, commented: 
I do not have an exact definition of democracy but it is the fact 
of building a nation-state where all citizens can live together, 
free, in solidarity, mutual respect while respecting the laws 
organising the state itself. Democracy is to properly 
acknowledge rights and duties (AS4, from survey Part A).  
 
Democracy is a recurrent concept to some extent embedded in students’ identity and 
consciousness. As such, it represents a model of reference when it comes to political 
participation, citizenship and national sense of belonging. It also involves a shared 
culture and collective awareness to build and preserve it. Another student, in fact, 
expressed: 
 
Democracy means freedom limited by the rule of law and 
others' rights. Democracy is free thinking without harming 
others. Democracy is vital rights and it needs to be protected 
and also properly understood. Democracy needs to be linked to 
awareness (S7, from survey Part A). 
 
                                                 
130 The three profiles (positivist/idealist; negativist/idealist; realist/pioneering) emerged from the analysis of the 
questionnaire open-ended questions, Part A (see Chapter 4, p. 132 and Appendix V, p. 366). In particular, they can 
be considered as ‘data-driven’ rather than ‘theory-driven’, as a result of an inductive analysis of codes using Nvivo 
software, deriving from participants’ answers. As such, they reflect the research context in relation to specific 
historical events and political factors but also participants’ economic, cultural and social circumstances. 
131 In regards to eighty seven answers analysed, seventy two per cent (63 answers) have a reference to the modern-
Western set of principles.  
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The second group was identified as negativist/idealist132. In particular, 
democracy is considered with scepticism towards political institutions, highlighting a 
sense of powerlessness, disillusionment and mistrust. Lower trust in government and 
public institutions in the Arab region is associated with restricted civil and political 
freedoms in autocratic regime (see chapter 2 and 3). This consciousness seems to 
endure also during the post-revolution period, as revolution’s demands and aspirations 
remained unfulfilled reflecting youth’s low political and civic participation. A student 
clearly expressed:  
[Democracy is] a political system which, theoretically, has to 
ensure the rights of each citizens, but, actually, it is a system 
through which the government acts freely without worrying 
about rights and freedoms of everyone (E 22, from survey Part 
A). 
 
The contrast between real vs. theoretical democracy as a frame of understanding 
points out a sense of disappointment and opposition towards governmental reforms 
and policies. Furthermore, opposition to democracy was also associated to post-
colonial interference with the development of spontaneous democratic movements in 
Tunisia. As reported in the extracts below, a sense of frustration emerged:  
 
[Democracy] is violence of great countries like US. It is 
intolerance, racism hidden behind the word democracy (S20, 
from survey PART A);  
 
[…] democracy, for me, is the way that developed countries use 
to manipulate the Arab nations. This term has lost its meaning 
when those countries use to control the world system (E4, from 
survey PART A). 
 
                                                 
132 This group was composed of 18 respondents equal to around twenty one per cent of total participants.   
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 Finally, the third one regroups the realist/pioneering. This group133 replaces 
the sense of detachment from reality of the first group and the disillusionment of the 
second one, with new concepts of personal awareness and commitment to redefine 
government-citizens relations. In particular, there is a tendency to re-frame the idea of 
citizenship, civic participation and political representation. Furthermore, freedom of 
expression supports higher degree of shared responsibility after the revolution. A 
student, in fact, commented: 
Democracy for us Tunisians is still new generally speaking. I 
see it means inclusion of people with their point of view in all 
areas: political, economic and administrative (E14, from survey 
Part A).   
 
 
Students seem then to be aware of what democracy entails and existing implications 
on reforming government-citizens relationships. In this sense, as expressed by another 
student: 
Democracy needs to guarantee human rights, human dignity 
and social participation (S29, from survey Part A). 
 
 
The post-revolution scenario, in fact, has favoured wider opportunities for political 
participation, despite growing constraints to social cohesion and civic engagement. A 
critical approach and awareness to democracy confirms how acknowledging limits of 
present democratic processes in Tunisia are crucial to re-evaluate the centrality of 
social participation. In fact, a student also highlighted: 
 To be democrat is to be open and to position between religion 
and the state (S56, from survey Part A).     
 
                                                 
133 This group was composed of 6 respondents equal to around seven per cent of total participants.   
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Personal and collective participatory experience increased awareness to citizenship 
and pro-active forms of social actions. On the other hand, students’ awareness of 
deepened political cleavages along secular-religious lines confirms growing concerns 
for democratic dialogue and social fragmentation.  
In these terms, findings seem to confirm how democracy is a contentious key 
concept, potentially supportive of social capital creation and civic engagement. In 
Tunisia, a neo-liberal representative political system, as a by-product of modern 
Western civilisation, was gradually adapted in the national context. In fact, as findings 
suggest, it implied the interaction with alternative narratives, defining value systems 
and people’s attitudes along the adherence vs. rejection democratic continuum134.  
Figure 6– Western Democracies’ Integrative Linear Model.                                                              
                                                        
 
 
                                                 
134 For example, Socialism, Communism or religious-based theocracy represent alternative and often clashing 
narratives exploring the cohabitation of ideological power struggles, enriching and challenging democracy, but also 
essential to the definition and development of modern nation-states.  
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As the designed figure 6 shows, in advanced democracies - often associated with 
Western countries - political, social and human rights are guaranteed and protected by 
law. For this reason, democratic systems are more likely to foster political participatory 
attitudes (i.e. elections, public debates, political membership, etc.) and active civic 
engagement (i.e. volunteering, associational membership, religious worship, etc.). 
Consensus is reached via dialogue and compromise amongst a plurality of actors: 
government, universities, civil society and the industrial sector. Government top-down 
decision-making is also supportive and integrative of private bottom-up initiatives. 
Secular vs. religious values systems are not overtly conflicting but rather 
accommodating, reaching inclusive agreements of mutual consensus, respect and 
cooperation. In these settings, democratic practices foster open socio-political 
environments where, more often, social engagement is functional to social capital 
creation and collective community well-being within a framework of rule of law 
functional to civic and political freedoms (pp.100-102). 
However, in semi-democratic political systems, like Tunisia – often non-
Western countries associated with dictatorial or semi-dictatorial regimes - political, 
social and human rights tend to be either restricted or infringed, affecting civil liberties, 
trust in political and judiciary institutions and democratic practices of citizenship. 
Democratic participation, social capital for social responsibility and civic engagement 
are not self-reinforcing and might actually reinforce social inequalities, low political 
participation, social trust and non-democratic practices such as corruption and 
clientelism to pursue individual interests. Central governments tend to control national 
economy, the industrial sector, civil society organisations and public institutions via a 
coercive system. 
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Figure 7– Authoritarian Semi-democratic Non- Integrative Model. 
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political stability and public security (p. 66, 67). In this period, society witnessed an 
unprecedented flourishing of religious-based activities. Faith-based political parties 
regained legitimacy, while social, educational and economic activities thrived, 
including the re-establishment of vibrant mosques’ activities; the foundation of 
Quranic schools; public sit-in and demonstration; new Islamic retail shops; as well as, 
violent clashes with national police, culminating in the recent terroristic attacks. As a 
result, new windows for social engagement, public voice and political activism 
introduced parallel and often conflicting narratives.  
In this sense, revolutionary demands for democracy, equality, dignity and 
employments were reconsidered within a new framework based on discourses of 
private vs. public Islam in a shift from a secular to a more religious dominated public 
sphere. In particular, a student observed:  
 […] regarding the religious political party, it is important to 
understand its roots, since during the Ben Ali (regime), they 
were really oppressed so it was a kind of revolting against it and 
feel free to show themselves, like being on TV, etc.  
I think the main problem happening now, is that people are 
either for the religious party or completely against it. We are 
moderate! There are already many clichés on each side, they do 
not make effort to understand (Interview F1, E). 
 
If the end of religious repression allowed for the reintegration of marginalised groups 
in society as a result of a democratic process, the anticipation of an “endangered public 
and political sphere” has fostered a sense of social mistrust or cultural threat (as the 
new approved 2015 anti-terrorism law might suggest).  
 The post-revolution political vacuum and cultural shift presented a question 
related to what extent “good politics” need religion and to what degree Islam needs to 
play a political role. The awareness of conflicting interests behind the new Islamic 
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rhetoric also suggests a lack of political transparency and generalised trust. For this, a 
student and member of the NGO, commented: 
  […] religion first of all, is not something new to Tunisian 
society […] the problem is the new perspective that is used now. 
If religion interferes with politics, this is like making a fiasco 
and making a mess […] interests are mixed together, people are 
honestly not trusting anymore politicians who are covering their 
political interests with religion. Politics is politics and religion 
is religion because religion, it was not invented by a political 
party […] people have to understand it and to make the 
difference between what is political and what is religious 
(Interview F1, N). 
 
If Islam holds spiritual, ethical, cultural and social foundations, the participation of 
Islamic political parties in the transitional government did not translate into political 
unity or social pacification. On the contrary, their public image turned to discredit its 
role in society in terms of authority, integrity and trustworthiness. Furthermore, the 
political conflicts between moderate and radical wings, ranging from religious ultra-
conservatives to anarchical leftist, have further hindered political dialogue and social 
cohesion with a detrimental effect on the democratic transition. In particular, one 
student expressed a rather radical position with reference to the post-revolution 
situation by defining democracy as: 
[…] the effort to build a nation and kick out all the betrayers as 
Ennahda now and the religion fascist and work to build a 
healthy national economy and kick out foreign investments 
(S35: BC, from survey Part A). 
 
 The public and social use of Islam has increased open confrontations, social 
resentment and disillusionment affecting both the understanding of Islam and its role 
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in politics135. In this sense, the implementation of political reforms for a new social 
agenda is a central aspect to advance a new political framework, integrating all parts 
of society beyond present conflicting tensions. In this perspective, religious discourses, 
as advocated by either moderate or radical Islamic political parties, have been 
nurturing emergent socio-political and cultural cleavages. In this sense, a student 
described this substantial change: 
 […] conflicts have started since the religious political party in 
power is trying to create parallel institutions to the existing 
ones: left and Islamist student union; and also at judiciary level 
began a conflict. I think this will aim at great disputes and 
rupture in the following years […] they created two parallel 
institutions of representation, really negative to society and 
social cohesion. It is not leading to dialogue but complexities 
and disputes (Interview F2, N). 
 
Post-revolution power struggles increased between religious moderate, secular and 
leftist political parties to form a national coalition government (p. 65, 66, 68), resulting 
in extremist Salafi groups becoming politically relevant and socially unchallenged, 
especially amongst the youth. As exposed by a student:  
The problem is nor Islam or religion but the radical Islamist who 
are using religion for other projects and personal needs. This is 
the problem (Interview F1, H). 
 
 
In this sense, students seem to acknowledge existing complex relationships 
between democracy, Islam, society and politics. The democratic project supported by 
the Islamic moderate political is currently under the threat of radical Islamist 
minorities, as the secular vs. religious divide might also unsettle democratic dialogue. 
                                                 
135 This process seems to suggest a different path from post-World War II European experience of Catholic political 
parties in Italy or Germany, supported by US against the menace of Communist rule during the Cold-War era. 
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The growing awareness and distress regarding religious influence on national politics 
is expressed by a sceptical group of students, confirming further disaffection of youths 
to democracy, calling into question their engagement in the democratic process. The 
presence of a forward-thinking minority shows, instead, how the revolution has 
gradually offered new windows for democratic expression and social participation. 
The combination of both regime authoritative rule and post-revolution political 
conflicts are key determinants, explaining low trust in political institutions and the 
under-utilisation of political and civic participation.  
In particular, the 2014 national parliamentary and presidential election won by 
the secular party Nidaa Tounes, highlighted socio-political and economic weaknesses 
expressed by the moderate Islamist party Ennahda. The unaccomplished democratic 
agenda might also intensify the alarming global Jihadi movements towards ISIL 
territories in Syria and Iraq136 or national terrorism. In this framework, universities 
emerge as key actors calling for a more integrative role in developing socio-political 
dialogue, engaging students via courses and community projects on democracy and 
civic engagement to address student’s role and commitment to democracy. 
Furthermore, social disengagement and cultural mistrust towards political institutions 
and Islamist parties also need to be assessed in order to build preconditions to foster 
academic social capital for social responsibility. In particular, crucial questions, still 
unresolved, are: what role then should Islam play in Tunisia? What role does Islam 
play in defining students’ identity, social responsibility and civic engagement patterns?  
 
                                                 
136 Tunisia is the country where more Jihadists moved to join the civil war in Syria and Iraq 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29043331 - 08/11/2014).  
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Islam and Identity 
 
Religion can often play a significant role in identity formation, individual 
behaviour and personal socio-cultural and political worldview. Historically, religious 
beliefs, values and social practices have often fostered a shared sense of belonging, 
social awareness and commitment to society (p. 68-69). In particular, for research 
purposes, Islam was analysed in terms of its: 
1. impact on students’ personal trust; 
2. influence on students’ decision making; 
3. provision of an ethical and moral value system; 
 
In particular, values embedded within family, education or religious institutions form 
an inclusive and complex system influencing individual identities and life choices. In 
Tunisia, in particular, Islam frames the development of everyday life occurrences (i.e. 
daily call to prayer; Fridays’ community-wide prayers; Ramadan as fasting month, 
etc.); it conveys social and cultural symbols (i.e. wearing scarfs; holding a prayer 
necklace, known as mesbhe or wearing typical Arabic tunics); it determines daily and 
colloquial verbal expression (i.e. Inshallah, referring to God’s will or God grace) and 
it also defines social habits and national celebrations (i.e. visiting relatives during 
Islamic holidays - i.e. Aid El-Addha, Aid El-Fitr). In modern societies, Islam still plays 
a central role, identified with family background, personal religiosity and degree of 
identification.  
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 In particular, interpersonal relationships are also determined by discourses of 
identity and religion. As such, a student highlighted: 
[…] I grew up in a simple family. They pray but they are not 
wearing the veil. I am praying, I am respecting all pillars of 
Islam but I am not putting the veil […] I am feeling free with 
my religion, seeing it with my own perception […] and maybe 
some of these are becoming like habits, something inborn in me 
that is growing with me. For example, I learned how to be 
tolerant, how to help others influencing my relationship with 
others (Interview F1, N).  
 
 
Islamic culture and Islamic values form the foundational framework shaping personal 
consciousness and social relationships based on shared common beliefs. Islam can 
determine structural, relational and cognitive social capital which are central to identity 
building and social behaviours. In this sense, it can also represent a lens to filter, 
evaluate and analyse the complexity of reality and our perception of it. In particular, a 
student considered: 
   […] religion I think is universal and gathers all human 
values. Even in all human right declarations, dignity and 
freedoms are all in the Qur’an, in our religion but You […] the 
foreign people, they have a false idea of our religion, about the 
Muslim with beards […] they are a minority, they do not 
express religion because Islam is universal. I think that any 
constitution has the values of our religion (Interview F2, H). 
 
In this reference, the tripartite identification of us (i.e. being a moderate Muslim), with 
you (i.e. the other non-Muslims as foreigners/Westerners), and the other us (i.e. 
religious extremists, identified with beards different from moderate Muslims), 
designates post-revolution awareness of identity cleavages and religious anxieties.  
 Post-revolution divisions might evolve around an often conflicting 
understanding and socio-cultural labelling of Islam from:  
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1.  a personal point of view (individual/subjective Islam); 
2.  a Western point of view (external/the non-Muslim stands); 
3.  a radical point of view vs, universal Islam (the other Islam, Salafi).  
 
These three different but interrelated sources of interpretation are a thread explaining 
coexisting narratives related to identity building. The simultaneous co-habitation in 
the public sphere, is also dictating social engagement and the formation of political 
discourses in Tunisia. In fact, this complex individual/collective value system within 
which Islam operates, also implies the presence of a subaltern and alternative Western 
value-system.  
From a subjective point of view, personal life experiences define the level of 
adherence or rejection to a pre-determined set of values, often linked to trust, sense of 
belonging and trustworthiness. As shown in table 6, over 90 per cent of respondents 
confirmed that family represents the most trusted group in society. Families are central 
to support students’ personal decision-making, ethics, education and identity building. 
Furthermore, families’ socio-cultural and economic background can often affect: 
-  traditional vs. modern transitional processes; 
- social attitudes and engagement; 
- religious beliefs, value systems and practices;  
- level of trust in public institutions.  
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Table 6 - Most trusted group in a situation of difficulty137. 
  
All 
Sample 
N 
Engineering Humanity 
Most trusted 
group Family 94,4% 
51 
96,2% 96,4% 
 
Friends 3,7% 2 3,8% 3,6% 
       
2nd trusted group Friends 62,5% 30 73,3% 50% 
  
Mosque/Religious 
associations 27,1% 
13 
26,7% 21,4% 
Government/Associations 4,2% 2 0,00% 7,1% 
 
3rd trusted group Associations 46,8% 22 40% 32,1% 
  
Friends 25,5% 12 20% 25% 
Mosque/Religious 
associations  17% 
8 
13,3% 21,4% 
Government 10,6% 5 26,7% 3,6% 
 
 
Friends, on the other hand, with over 60 per cent of preferences, were identified as the 
second most important group and as the most important group across the whole data-
set. For this, friendship is key to social capital formation, social responsibility and civic 
engagement. Students experience patterns of socialisation at university, as friends can 
produce emotional and social bonds developing trust and counter-balancing family 
influence on identity formation. Friends often become the new reference for personal 
needs in both academic and private life.  
                                                 
137 Five categories: family, friends, associations, government and mosque/religious associations (see Appendix V 
on research questionnaire (English version).  Data values refer to valid percentage only (excluding missing entries). 
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Furthermore, around half of participants rated associations as the third most 
important group, suggesting civil associations might play an important role in 
developing trust, civic engagement and democratic participation in post-revolution 
Tunisia. On the other hand, religious associations/mosques were rated second as the 
second most important group with 27% of preferences, confirming a less relevant 
contribution to social life138, providing not only spiritual reference but also collective 
trustworthiness and social trust139. On the other hand, the low level of trust in 
government institutions, rated also around 27% as third most important group but only 
by engineering students140, suggests a significant trend in post-revolution Tunisia, as 
government institutions face the crucial task to rebuild democracy, citizens’ trust and 
political participation.  
Identity formation is also connected to influential factors, shaping individual 
opinion-making. Findings141, as shown in table 8, confirm how family is once more 
the most influential actor, followed by the internet and to a lesser extent, friends and 
religious associations. In Tunisia, this might suggest the development of a family-
centred and less individualistic type of society. Students might consider families the 
most trusted and influential group economically, emotionally and culturally, 
potentially undermining other forms of socialisation. Social media, as expected, are 
increasingly the predominant means of engagement for younger generations, 
influencing students’ opinion-making and contributing to virtual-to-real social capital 
generation. The internet, in fact, favours access to a broader, multiple and more 
                                                 
138 However, engineering high score of mosque/religious associations trust seem to be contradicting previous 
findings in which, mainly humanities students rated participation to religious associations relatively high, if 
compared to engineering, as most important group of belonging (see chapter 6). 
139 Often acting as alternative economic relief to families in need, equivalent to historical role of the Church in 
Western countries. 
140 Nonetheless, engineering students seemed to be less politically engaged (see chapter 6). 
141 Most influential factors from a list of 13 items (see Appendix V on research questionnaire - English translated 
version).   
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complex source of information. Students might access the internet for personal 
interest, hobby or curiosity opening new spaces of communication, entertainment and 
creativity, such as: music, national/international news, history, university materials, 
religious-related contents and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, etc.  
 
Figure 8– What influence your opinion the most? 
 
 
On the other hand, newspaper reading, radio and television are rated rather low.  
In non-democratic settings, often media tend to be censored, biased and controlled by 
the government, mirroring a lower level of generalised trust and marginal exposure to 
traditional media. Furthermore, government institutions, once more, are almost absent 
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across data142. University professors, despite their significant role in students’ 
formation, have an overall score of only 8 per cent, confirming low density of student-
professor’s social capital ties and lower trust within a conflicting framework 
(confirming findings in chapter 6). Finally, both religious institutions, (alternatively 
19 in engineering and 14.3 per cent in humanities students), and to less extent 
associations are rated comparatively low, highlighting how religious values/beliefs 
and social engagement culture, have a minimal influence on students’ opinion-making. 
In a micro-level context, this can be possibly linked to students’ daily life and family 
culture (p. 85, 105, 116, 168); and, at a macro-structural level, to the marginal role 
played by associations in Tunisian society, as public life was mainly controlled by the 
State (pp. 108-111).  
To the same extent, students were also asked to rate the extent to which they 
identify themselves with Islamic values. In fact, despite lower level of trust towards 
religious institutions and their influence to students’ opinion-making, levels of 
religiosity are considered in relation to religious observance and adherence to Islamic 
values. As table 7 shows, students generally identify with the Islamic foundational 
pillars143 to a medium-to-high degree with no scores over 80% of compliance to the 
foundational tenets, despite officially 98% of Tunisian are Muslims. For instance, 
Zakat (compulsory giving) is rated only by half of participants. However, since Zakat 
is also the most significant indicator characterising Islamic social capital, low 
identification with charity, as individual contribution to community poverty and social 
                                                 
142Humanity students scored high in political party and student union engagement - most likely, confirming low 
level of government trust and transparency – in relation to students’ political activism often in opposition to 
autocratic regime (See chapter 5).  
143 To the same extent, an overall score of 77,4% identification with Qur’an (the Holy book). Shahada (Islamic 
creed vow) scored 79% and Sauf (fasting) an overall 70% (humanities students scoring as low as 65%); while Salat 
(prayer, 5 times a day), 68% of preferences. However, Hajj (holy pilgrimage to Mecca) was rated as low as around 
30%, probably reflecting respondents’ age and life plans. 
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inequalities’ alleviation, might indicate a non-linear correlation between social 
engagement and Islamic values. 
 
Table 7 - Which of the following notions do you identify yourself with144? 
  
All Sample Engineering Humanity 
YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Shahada (Islamic creed vow) 79,2% 20,8% 79,2% 20,8% 79,3% 20,7% 
Sauf (fasting) 71,7% 28,3% 79,2% 20,8% 65,5% 34,5% 
Salat (prayer) 67,9% 32,1% 66,7% 33,3% 69% 31% 
 Zakat (religious giving) 50,9% 49,1% 50% 50% 51,7% 48,3% 
Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) 30,2% 69,8% 29,2% 70,8% 31% 69% 
Adal (justice) 56,6% 43,4% 66,7% 33,3% 48,3% 51,7% 
Sadaqa (community social contribution) 56,6% 43,4% 66,7% 70,8% 48,3% 51,7% 
Maslah (public good) 49,1% 50,9% 62,5% 37,5% 37,9% 62,1% 
Tatawa (volunteering) 35,8% 64,2% 41,7% 58,3% 31% 69% 
Romdhan (fasting month) 47,2%  52,8%  66,7%  33,3% 31%  69% 
Ummah (Islamic community/brotherhood) 24,5% 75,5% 29,2% 70,8% 20,7% 79,3% 
Hijab (women scarf) 22,6% 77,4% 12,5% 87,5% 31% 69% 
Quran (Islamic holy book) 77,4% 22,6% 75% 25% 79,3% 20,7% 
 Sunna (Mohammed PBUH preaching) 41,5% 58,5% 45,8% 54,2% 37,9% 62,1% 
Sharia (Islamic law) 20,8% 79,2% 25% 75% 17,2% 82,8% 
                                                 
144Valid percentage (excluding missing entries). T-test showed no statistical significance difference amongst two 
populations (see Appendix VI – T-test, Table 20). 
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In turn, as half of the sample did not consider Zakat being a significant element of their 
identity, this might also reinforce the hypothesis that Islamic values might not be the 
main ethical reference for Tunisian students, fostering social responsibility and civic 
engagement.  
Furthermore, in relation to what could be defined as “Islamic social and civic 
values” (social justice, public good, volunteering and community engagement)145, data 
show an overall average score of around 50%, except for volunteering (as low as 36%). 
Findings show how the promotion and reproduction of Islamic values linked to civic 
engagement and volunteering have not been anchored in society as students do not 
seem to identify with relevant Islamic principles. In this sense, government control 
over Islamic associations restricted their social, cultural and civic activities, explaining 
lower influence of social Islamic values in opposition to secular/modern value-system 
embedded in post-independence national project. In terms of responses’ variance 
between the two faculties, engineering students constantly show higher levels of 
personal awareness and identification to Islamic civic values for civic engagement, 
than humanities students. This might suggest a potential divergence between religious 
observances, social consciousness and personal identity, as humanities students 
confirmed higher level of participation in mosques/religious association but lower 
adherence or identification to Islamic social values (p. 175).  
On the other hand, findings also show low levels of socio-cultural approval of 
the Hijab (the precept of wearing a scarf for women), as only 22% of students 
considered it important, showing how modernisation/globalisation trends have had 
important impacts towards a more conservative influence of Islamic institutions. 
                                                 
145 Closely corresponding to Western conceptualisations. 
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Furthermore, the majority of students also seem to reject both the archetypical notion 
of the Ummah (Islamic community/brotherhood) with only 24% of preferences; as 
well as, the application of Shariaa law (21%)146, in opposition to the agenda supported 
by ultra-conservative groups. In this sense, students tend to adhere to a more moderate 
rather than radical interpretation of a politicised Islam. Islamic values, in fact, only in 
some measure occupy a central role in students’ identity formation and as such, they 
cannot be directly regarded neither the sole nor the primary source of influence with 
significant implications for the development and promotion of civic engagement in the 
Tunisian context. For this, despite students’ medium-to-high level of religious 
observance, the presence of an alternative value system (i.e. Western/secular) might 
suggest the development of a hybrid model, supportive of the tradition-to-modernity 
conflictual relationship (pp. 23-26, 42, 107). 
In this sense, students were also asked to rate the most important values drawn 
from a secular/Western or liberal-democratic set147 to further understand what might 
contribute to their identity formation. As table 8 shows, freedom of expression, 
tolerance (i.e. religious, gender, ethnic, race, etc.), human dignity and human rights 
constitute values which students identify the most with. In particular, the identification 
with freedom of expression can be understood as one of the main achievement of the 
revolution but also as a reaction against the regime’s restrictions. On the other hand, 
the significance of tolerance confirms the awareness of existing socio-political and 
religious tensions affecting public safety and social dialogue. 
 
                                                 
146 On the other hand, it is important to highlight how these concepts might have different conceptualisations 
whether if considered more closely related to a private rather than public context.  
147List of 12 items in addition to the Other category (see Appendix V on research questionnaire - English translated 
version). 
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Table 8 – What are the most important values in your daily life? 
  All 
Sample Engineering Humanity 
Most Important value 
Freedom of 
Expression  22,6% 20% 25% 
Tolerance 18,9% 20% 17,9% 
Human Rights 17% 16% 17,9% 
  
Human dignity 13,2% 12% 14,3% 
Nationalism 7,5% 0% 14,3% 
 
Second most important 
Human dignity 17% 8% 25% 
Tolerance 17% 20% 14,3% 
Respect 13,2% 20% 7,1% 
  
Equality  
11,3%
% 8% 14,3% 
Human rights 9,4% 8% 10,7% 
Nationalism 7,5% 12% 3,6% 
Third most important 
 
Tolerance 13,5% 12% 14,8% 
Democracy 13,5% 8% 18,5% 
  
Equality 11,5% 8% 14,8% 
Nationalism 11,5% 4% 18,5% 
Social participation 9,6% 12% 7,4% 
 
 
Furthermore, the reference to human rights and human dignity suggests how students 
tend to evaluate modern principles such as the rule of law, civil rights and respect for 
every citizen. Democracy, however, was only rated as high as 13.5 per cent as third 
most important value (18.5 per cent in humanities students). In the Tunisian context, 
this might either confirm students’ passive adaptation to the ideals of democracy or de 
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facto expressing frustration and detachment as part of the pre-revolution regime 
legacy.  
Nationalism and political rights do not seem to represent key values, suggesting 
a direct relationship between low levels of trust in the government and political 
participation. To the same extent, freedom of association and social participation are 
not scored high, suggesting once more how civic engagement and social activism are 
not so prominent to students’ identity, reflecting overall low levels of a shared social 
responsibility culture (see chapter 6). In particular, regime police control over 
associations has long restricted basic rights including social manifestation (i.e. labour 
strikes), confirming the presence of disincentives and constrains to social participation, 
fostering civic engagement under-development. 
In this framework, the Western value-system seems to address students’ 
concerns related to individual political, civic and social rights in line with the model 
of modern citizenship. On the other hand, Islamic values seem instead to foster 
personal identification with ethical and spiritual aspects. Furthermore, Western values 
also focus on the individual personal choice to respect rights and duties to the nation 
in reference to democratic principles. Islamic values, instead, might consider 
believers’ relation to God with a less tangible relevance to social commitment in 
modern Tunisia. Overall, however, both value-systems are coexistent and potentially 
complementary in supporting social responsibility, cooperation, trust, tolerance, 
equality and social justice. As such, the socially and politically constructed and 
conflicting interplay between Islamic and secular socio-political value-systems might 
have favoured the under-utilisation of Islamic social capital; as restricted opportunities 
to civic engagement within a predominantly secular agenda, have also limited Islamic 
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associations to further contribute to the development of a shared framework for social 
responsibility. 
The next section further explores the role of Islam in the university context in order to 
explore existing connections with academic social capital and social responsibility 
development.  
 
Islam in University Context 
 
Universities are, like any other institutions, based on complex decision-making 
and power struggle dynamics. In Tunisia, politics has long played a crucial role in 
higher education. From Bourguiba to Ben Ali, universities were founded to be secular 
institutions, inspired by the French model and framed within the separation between a 
private vs. public role of Islam (pp. 35-40, 58)148. As such, university campus life, 
students’ welfare and curriculum development were shaped around post-independence 
modernisation and nationalisation ideals. In particular, the 2008 higher education 
reform149 emphasised in Art 2, universities have the mission to:  
- foster citizenship and values of modernity; to endorse national identity, its 
cultural enrichment and its interactions with other cultures;  
- contribute to Arabic and Islamic cultural enrichment and its interactions with 
other cultures; 
                                                 
148 Government policies allowed systemic use of legal or illegal pre-empting actions against religious activism 
going from extended exclusion to direct control or repression. 
149 National Law : Loi n° 2008-19 du 25 février 2008, relative à l’enseignement supérieur Journal Officiel de la 
République Tunisienne 4 mars 2008, n° 19, pp. 845-850. 
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- consolidate the use of the Arabic language and other foreign languages to relate 
to universal progress and the development of intellectual exchanges. 
 
In this framework, the Arabic and Islamic culture has been arguably placed at the 
centre of government’s educational priorities. However, references to modernity, 
national identity, citizenship and interaction with other cultures and other languages, 
confirms an underlying and recurrent accommodating policy between the respect of 
the Islamic-Arabic tradition and the implementation of a mainstream modern-Western-
secular model, structuring a bi-polar and contradictory educational system.  
 In public universities, Islamic culture and values are not central to contribute 
to the public mission or institutional ethos. However, Islam still needs to be considered 
in relation to campus life, students’ identity and associational life. In fact, students 
were asked to express personal perceptions on what role Islam and Islamic culture play 
or should play in public universities. In this perspective, a student commented: 
 
 According to me not at all. Universities remain always 
scientific and not religious since we have tried to let religion 
enter universities but it did not work at all. There is 
confrontation; there is misunderstanding in university, even a 
war in brackets. I prefer university to be scientific and a place 
for studying (Interview F3, H).  
 
Universities are here identified as scientific places where religion does not have to play 
any role at the institutional level. The distinct role between scientific knowledge and 
religion also highlights a positivistic conception of education, possibly confirming the 
founding secular ethos embedded in public universities. On another level, post-
revolution confrontations between the police and radical Islamist groups in universities 
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(p. 67) have also raised concerns of co-habitation. In particular, three elements of 
conflicts have been identified from data analysis: 
- personal security and safety; 
- curriculum and teaching contents; 
- the ethical role. 
 
  The anticipation of rising tensions and conflicts are perceived as detrimental to 
the campus environment, interpersonal trust and dialogue or cooperation amongst 
students, professors and administrative staff. As a student pointed out:  
University, I think, if it takes a neutral stand concerning the 
question of religion, it can also protect all rights and it can give 
a level of security as the problem of niqab150[…] I think this 
would be better not to be involved in religious matters 
(Interview F2, H). 
 
 
 
Universities are often understood to be places of intercultural and inter-faith tolerance 
and mutual understanding. However, they can become political arena where 
individual/group’s grievances are advocated and violence fuelled, affecting personal 
safety and campus security. In this sense, a professor, from the humanities faculty, 
expressed concerns on the role Islam could play in Tunisia, confirming: 
No role! No matter which perspective you look at. What are 
they going to bring…improving education? They are persona 
no grata! Myself, personally, I would defend with my nails a 
secular university […] No words to say in relation to university 
reforms, pedagogy, research…what will they do? I am 
astonished and I am against all scientific and technological 
universities turning ultra-religious, what does it mean? Why 
                                                 
150A niqab (Arabic: باِقن niqāb, "veil" or "mask", also called a ruband) is a cloth which covers the face as a part of 
sartorial hijab (Wikepedia, accessed 24/10/2014 at 11:22). 
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would you like to go backward? Universities are already 
suffering, religion will pull them downward (Interview F4, H).   
 
From this point of view, the opposition to ultra-conservative religious confirms an 
existing understanding of Islam as a barrier to education modernisation, in favour of 
an exclusively secular and foremost scientific institution. Furthermore, it calls into 
discussion how Islam might even affect knowledge generation, potentially 
compromising research, teaching, and curriculum reforms. Radicalisation of debates 
upon the future role of universities in Tunisia, however, cannot be restrictive in 
representing and evaluating society at large. In fact, their public missions and social 
responsibilities could be compromised in the long-term to the detriment of social 
dialogue and cohesiveness, limiting the positive relationship between religion, 
democracy and society.  
 In particular, after the revolution, a new student union (Ugte), affiliated to the 
moderate Islamic political party, was legally founded, pursuing a religious socio-
political agenda inside universities. In particular, if its democratic legitimisation has 
been welcome as a contribution to social pacification; however, it has also 
compromised the cooperation with left-wing student union (Uget). In particular, 
dialogue, respect and mutual understanding are decisive to foster a healthy campus 
environment. In fact, a student, from the engineering faculty, commented: 
[…] there is a parliament and they are all part of it (Uget, Ugte, 
all kind of students)… inside the parliament we are all students, 
we forget everything [...] today there is an event organised for 
students by the Uget generally of the left wing…but, at the same 
time, there is the opening of the mosque in our faculty. Do you 
see what I mean? Here, it is great and if we continue in such a 
way there will never be violence or other problems. Everyone 
agrees with it. The political or religious thoughts remain outside 
university doors. Once we are inside, our aim is to improve the 
faculty and students’ conditions (Interview with M1, E).  
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Cohabitation is possible if shared objectives to address conflicts are set above 
differences, as tolerance and respect are set above personal differences. A common 
platform for communication, as represented by a student union parliament, represents 
a constructive strategy to foster dialogue, mutual confrontation, reciprocity and social 
networks amongst students. Meetings to discuss faculty and students’ welfare are basic 
democratic practices; whereas leaving aside personal beliefs or emotional aspects, 
enhance trust and shared norms for mutual understanding, creating a positive 
environment for reconciliation.  
 On the other hand, however, tensions have been experienced in the humanities 
faculty, suggesting conflicting developments. In fact, a student responded: 
I think they have no role especially at University since, for me, 
they are [religious based] anonymous unions, they arrived just 
after the revolution and this is it! It is not a question of space or 
not space, it is a question of working well, of enriching the 
University and they have clearly no role (Interview F3, H). 
 
To the same extent, during fieldwork, the researcher approached in three different 
occasions, at both humanities and engineering faculties, five students who could have 
been identified as representative of a more conservative Islamic background151. On 
these occasions, a linguistic barrier prevented the possibility of a direct dialogue in 
French, as it was possible to approach them thanks to an intermediary student, 
translating my questions from French to Arabic. In general, they did not show interest 
in the survey, which limited the possibility to gather insights, personal experiences and 
views either by taking part in interviews or filling in questionnaires. One student152 
                                                 
151 Wearing traditional cloths and showing the symbolic long beard shape and sandals. 
48One of the five students approached, was actually wearing jeans and t-shirt, which could have been hypothetically 
understood as a sign of being less traditionalist. 
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initially accepted to fill in the questionnaire but, in the following weeks, he did not get 
in touch in order to return it. The attitudes perceived were different from other students 
who have previously shown interest in the study and, to some extent, curiosity towards 
the researcher as an individual. The importance of exchanging ideas, expressing and 
communicating personal accounts and feelings is a central element to foster dialogue, 
inclusion, acceptance and recognition in order to avoid the dominance of a non-
inclusive and often biased attitude. In general, this specific experience has highlighted 
the need of understanding, evaluating and welcoming views to improve social dialogue 
in university contexts to sustain social capital development by removing existing 
barriers. 
 
 
Summary 
 
  Islamic values and culture undoubtedly have an important role in Tunisia’s 
post-revolution political, social and cultural reconfigurations, being a valuable source 
of individual and collective identity formation. However, findings highlighted how 
Islamic values linked to social responsibility and civic engagement do not form a 
predominant framework structuring students’ identity, reflecting the development of a 
hybrid and conflicting role in universities and society alike. At the same time, campus 
environments and government policies are key elements that can either foster or hinder 
cohesion and social capital formation. In fact, growing tensions and safety concerns 
can also exacerbate secular-religious divides due to lack of trust and shared objectives 
or values, as well as reciprocal recognition. Students have raised concerns on the role 
of Islamic-affiliated student unions in the university and impacts of the moderate 
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religious party to meet students’ educational needs, further destabilised by existing 
challenges from ultra-conservative religious groups.  
 Post-revolution Islamic influence in the political arena has raised critical 
concerns of freedom, tolerance and democracy’s sustainability. In the university 
context, in fact, findings suggest how the social and political agenda supported by the 
Islamic student union can enter in conflict with the more secular union, fuelling a 
conflicting coexistence potentially deteriorating campus-life. Universities regarded as 
secular places for scientific knowledge generation, are also called in to acknowledge, 
integrate and support religious tolerance and dialogue. At present, Islam, as conveyed 
in political and public domains, brought to the fore transversal confrontational 
elements. These can potentially limit academic social capital formation and also 
unsettle the development of an institutional coherent framework for social 
responsibility and students’ democratic participation. 
The next chapter presents university third mission and it considers challenges 
and implications of social capital’s formation in Tunisian public universities. Findings 
contributions are presented in reference to universities and students social 
responsibility, civic engagement and academic social capital development.  
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CHAPTER 6 – Universities Social Responsibility and 
Academic Social Capital. 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents data findings in relation to universities and students’ 
social responsibility. It also explores the relationship between academic social capital 
and civic engagement. In particular, it aims to explore the relationships between 
university and student social responsibility, their respective role in society and the type 
of social capital promoted. In the university’s context, faculties develop social 
networks to connect to local communities, as students engage in society to develop a 
sense of belonging, social trust and social capital in different contexts. In particular, 
this chapter explores drivers and barriers in the development of university third 
missions in relation to: 
- public universities’ role in Tunisia; 
- universities and students’ social responsibility; 
- academic social capital formation. 
 
Academic social capital is then explored to highlight the extent to which public 
universities foster social capital for social responsibility. To the same extent, the 
chapter further considers universities’ contributions to education for democratic and 
civic engagement as part of their third missions.  
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University Missions and the Social Dimension 
 
 The research focused on the relationship between social responsibility and 
students’ civic engagement. Universities are cultural and intellectual “public spaces” 
open to society, hypothetically providing both professional formation to access the job 
market and civic engagement programs to enhance students’ human and social capital. 
In fact, worldwide they have been increasingly responsive to society challenges, 
expanding institutional strategies to achieve wider economic and social impacts, often 
referred to as university third mission. In particular, the role, objectives and missions, 
universities endorse in society, are often deep-rooted in specific cultural, historical and 
socio-political contexts153. In Tunisia, public universities are regulated by national law 
and the government have so far retained control over their management and 
governance, affecting academic freedom and autonomy. The 2008 reform154 
emphasised in Art. 2 and 12 that higher education is free and its founding missions are 
to: 
- answer national needs of education, knowledge and skills transfer; 
- reinforce graduates’ employability in partnership with economic and socio-
cultural surroundings;  
- create, develop and organise scientific research; improve education quality, 
contribute to technological innovations and individual/collective creativity;  
                                                 
153 Universities are shaped by complex power dynamics. Students, professors, administrative staff, rectors or even 
the Minister of Higher education, all contribute to define what a university is or should be. 
154 National Law : Loi n° 2008-19 du 25 février 2008, relative à l’enseignement supérieur Journal Officiel de la 
République Tunisienne 4 mars 2008, n° 19, pp. 845-850. 
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- contribute to national development; educate students for project development 
and economic entrepreneurship;  
- improve the use of new technologies, scientific knowledge and progress;  
- offer long-life educational opportunities and encourage cultural, sport and 
social activities;  
- foster citizenship values, the values of modernity, to endorse national identity, 
cultural enrichment and interactions with other cultures;  
- establish international cooperation and partnerships; exchange good practices 
and expertise according to set priorities. 
 
In particular, a major emphasis is placed on sustaining a technologically-led 
knowledge economy, placing HEIs at the centre of national development and economic 
growth. Education is intended to advance scientific and technological progress via 
knowledge creation and transfer, supporting students’ employability and 
entrepreneurial skills. In this sense, Tunisian national policy seems to consider 
universities within a triple-helix model where education is a synonym of human 
capital, return on investment, employability based on principles of economic 
development and market-led internationalisation strategies (p. 77, 92). On the other 
hand, university social responsibility appears not accounted for, reflecting a marginal 
role in the government agenda. The national law only partially makes reference to: 
long-life learning (in line with European Bologna process); fostering citizenship (that 
is, citizenship rights but in a pseudo-democratic system); cultural enrichment (ART. 
2) or cultural, sport and social activities (ART. 12); whereas, no explicit reference is 
191 
 
made to universities social responsibility in terms of civic and democratic education 
or the promotion of community engagement projects, suggesting a counter-trend to 
global developments (p. 95, 96). 
In order to explore connections between governmental policies and what role 
universities play or ought to play in society, the survey explored students’ opinions in 
relation to universities’ most important missions. As table 9 shows, free higher 
education is rated the most important mission (although not the most important across 
the data-set)155.  
  Table 9 – University’s most important missions156.  
 N    Category Tot N 
All 
Sample  Eng. Hum  
Most important  
  1st Free Education 22 40.7% 28.0% 51.7% 
54 2nd Excellence in Teaching 11 20.4% 16.0% 24.1% 
  
  3rd Student Employability  4 7.4% 8.0% 6.9% 
 
2nd  most important 
  1st Student Employability 11 20.4% 8.0% 31.8% 
54 2nd Professional Internship 7 13.0% 20.0% 6.9% 
  
  3rd Excellence in Teaching  6 11.1% 12.0% 10.3% 
    Civic & Moral Behaviour  6 11.1% 12.0% 10.3% 
  
 
3rd  most important 
  1st Excellence in Teaching 9 17.3% 17.4% 17.2% 
52 2nd Professional Internship 7 13.5% 13.0% 13.8% 
  
  3rd Civic engagement courses 6 11.5% 17.4% 6.9% 
 
4th  most Important 
  1st 
Civic engagement 
courses 8 15.1% 4.2% 24.1% 
53 2nd Excellence in Research 7 13.2% 25.0% 3.4% 
  
  3rd Social Inclusion 5 9.4% 4.2% 13.8% 
    Excellence in Teaching 5 9.4% 4.2% 13.8% 
 
                                                 
155 In Tunisia, free higher education has been a central tenet and the tacit binding social contract between 
government and citizens since post-independence nationalisation and modernisation process, grating social 
mobility in exchange of political support. 
156 Choices were rated from 1 to 4 in order of importance from a list of 16 items (see Appendix V on research 
questionnaire - English version). 
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However, around fifty per cent of humanities but only less than a third of engineering 
students consider free education as a public good, to be provided by the government. 
This difference might reflect a distinction between the two faculties. Engineering 
faculty considered more as elite faculty based on high grade admittance and often 
mirroring family wealthier economic background; whereas, humanities faculty having 
a lower status, reflecting lower school grade entry requirement and families with less 
favourable economic situation or social position. 
On the other hand, teaching quality/excellence was rated as the second most 
important mission and also aggregate most important mission across all preferences. 
Humanities students, however, scored it higher than engineering, suggesting possibly 
a higher degree of disappointment or unmet expectations towards teaching quality in 
their faculty. In fact, teaching can be either related to pedagogies used, course content 
and delivery, exam assessment methods; but also, in a wider sense, to student-
professor relationships; students’ learning experience including university facilities 
(i.e. library, computer and internet rooms); teaching materials; ICT and free Wi-Fi 
connection (field observations confirmed free Wi-Fi only at engineering faculty). In 
fact, a student, member of the NGO, commented:  
We had a clear problem linked to formation; what we wanted 
when we were at university it was to have a good education and 
that’s what we did not have. Starting from this main problem, 
we might have forgotten that there was also another role that we 
could have inside university and also maybe another role 
university should play in relation to students and society 
(Interview M1, N). 
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Universities primarily provide for students’ formation via knowledge transfers as 
teaching is often regarded a key mission157. However, poor teaching performance 
actually undermines education quality, impacting also on students’ skills and 
competences.  
Furthermore, as exposed, problems related to teaching quality might hinder 
students and institutional commitment to other missions, including its social 
dimension. As another student pointed out: 
It is true that we say it is not good that students are passive but 
what if a student does not find a good education system, nor the 
hall of residence, nor food at the canteen… (Interview F1, H). 
 
 
 
Improving students’ learning experience requires specific welfare and educational 
quality, being both at heart of students’ expectations. The lack or low quality of 
services provided to students can raise barriers to their learning experience as well as 
raising grievances and distress which is also detrimental to study progress and personal 
development.  
 Employability and professional internships were considered third most 
important missions and the most important across the dataset. Employability skills, in 
particular, are linked to teaching content and knowledge transfer; while professional 
internship refers to acquiring specific skills via external public-private partnerships, as 
university’s third mission. In this sense, 20 per cent engineering against only 7 per cent 
of humanities students consider professional internship important while 32 per cent 
humanities against 8 per cent of engineering students, prefer students’ employability. 
                                                 
157 Excellence in research, often identified as universities second mission (see chapter 3), is only rated second in 
the fourth most important mission, most likely due to participants not being involved yet in academic research. 
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Findings, in fact, highlight an important divergence between humanities and 
engineering students: the former inclined to consider a face-to-face course-related 
approach rather than a more market-oriented one, the latter. This dichotomous passive 
vs active or theoretical vs. practical attitude probably reflects embedded scientific vs. 
humanities culture linked to type of study and students’ objectives. In fact, an 
engineering professor referred to university mission as being: 
[…] mainly to prepare and train students for the job market […] 
I would say this is our primary mission (Interview M2, E). 
 
 
In Tunisia, however, increasing competition in the job market amid worsening 
political and economic circumstances have deteriorated graduates’ employment 
opportunities. This aspect clearly reflects both pre and post-revolution economic 
decline and economic insecurity. To the same extent, two engineering students 
commented: 
At present, university for me is nothing: nor education, political 
or associational. It hurts! University is to have a degree and 
nothing more! Each trimester or semester, students work just to 
pass exams (Interview M4, E); and 
 
 
[…] we do not really have equipment. We do not have enough 
to work properly. This is why we concentrate at theoretical level 
which does not really have a relation with the job since after the 
degree, we will know only what we learn theoretically 
(Interview M3, E). 
 
In this sense, job opportunity after graduation can be defined as students’ main worry 
and critical priority, confirming personal expectations of economic returns from 
investment on education. Nonetheless, the lack of faculty infrastructural support 
(including laboratories) and integrated external partnerships, might jeopardise 
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students’ personal and professional achievements, as the theoretical knowledge and 
practical skills acquired at the university do not match the job market. Furthermore, a 
professor from humanities faculty also underlined:  
Can any person study humanity or languages? This also impacts 
and influences students as they feel themselves demotivated 
[…] they linger on since they know at the end of it, they will be 
unemployed. We are an industry for unemployment […] I meet 
students again either as cashier in supermarket; fruits seller at 
the market or waiter […] they are everywhere apart in a teaching 
position. Our faculty is a complete loss for the State (Interview 
F4, H). 
 
 
In fact, despite government’s158 priority focusing on employability skills and 
entrepreneurship, the gap between students’ competences and job’s opportunities still 
persists. In this sense, curriculum reform and universities’ commitment to offer 
professional internships are key to the creation of new opportunities, especially in 
under-demanded or over-offered professions.  
In this framework, the implementation of university third missions in 
partnerships with local business and public institutions or civic associations could 
enhance internships’ opportunities in line with market demands. In this sense, 
according to a student in the humanities faculty: 
University never tries to make any connection with the external 
society, nor helping us. Even in our projects, for students of 
applied research, they always are in need of internship and have 
some sort of connection with the external world, for those 
studying geography or art, university never helps them 
(Interview F1, H). 
 
                                                 
158 Public institutions are gradually losing capacity of being main national job providers, especially of young 
graduates, partially due to World Bank and IMF privatisation policies (p. 42, 87). 
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Critically, universities’ autonomy, market saturation and limited economic dynamism 
resulted in an asymmetrical development of a technology-centred triple-helix model 
favouring the under-achievement of social innovation and entrepreneurship. In fact, 
the failure of government policies, unable to promote a wider socio-economic agenda 
in public universities, has gradually impoverished and marginalised available 
professional resources (i.e. humanities graduates with higher level of unemployment 
and lower market demands) into under-qualified and often unrelated market sectors.  
On the other hand, university social responsibility, addressing social and 
democratic education via civic engagement courses or volunteering and community-
based projects, was rated as the fourth most important mission with nearly half of 
participants’ preferences. In general, students believe universities have to be reflective 
in relation to society and more active in promoting civic behaviour and civic 
engagement courses and volunteering. In particular a student, member of NGO, also 
highlighted how universities should be more effective in developing community 
projects, as: 
Students are members of a society and should be able to take 
part to a social change and not only economic. Universities need 
to make a contribution in the formation of an attitude and an 
understanding/awareness of social problems […] it is not just 
finding a job and be excellent in the exercise of a profession but 
also to integrate a network, being able to share with others 
(Interview F2, N).    
 
 
In this sense, government authoritative decision-making system, lack of on-campus 
student unions’ activities and limited university autonomy in defining curricular, extra-
curricular courses, might explain the weak institutional social commitment. However, 
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table 10 (extracted from table 9), reports students’ preferences in relation only to 
university social responsibility.  
Table 10 – University most important mission: mapping social responsibility. 
 N  Category All N All valid %  Eng % Hum % 
Most important  
  Civic & Moral Behaviour 2 3.7% 8.0% 0% 
54 Social Inclusion 2 3.7% 0% 6.9% 
  
  Fund Ngo cooperation 2 3.7% 8.0% 0% 
  Civic engagement courses 2 3.7% 4.0% 3.4% 
  Political debates 2 3.7% 4.0% 3.4% 
  
Improve personal 
consciousness 1 1.9% 4.0% 3.4% 
  Volunteering 1 1.9% 4.0% 0% 
  TOT 12 22.3% 32% 17.1% 
 
2nd most 
important 
  Civic & Moral Behaviour 6 11.1% 12.0% 10.3% 
54 Volunteering 5 9.3% 12.0% 6.9% 
  Defend student rights 5 9.3% 8.0% 10.3% 
  Fund Ngo cooperation 2 3.7% 0% 6.9% 
  
  Community project 1 1.9% 4.0% 0% 
  Social Inclusion 1 1.9% 4.0% 0% 
  TOT 20 37.2% 40% 34.4% 
  
 
3rd most 
important 
  Civic engagement courses 6 11.5% 17.4% 6.9% 
52 Volunteering 5 9.6% 13.0% 6.9% 
  Defend student rights 5 9.6% 4.3% 13.8% 
  Civic & Moral Behaviour 2 3.8% 0% 6.9% 
  
  Community project 2 3.8% 4.3% 3.4% 
  Political debates 2 3.8% 0% 6.9% 
  Social Inclusion 2 3.8% 0% 6.9% 
  Ecology in campus 1 1.9% 4.3% 0% 
  Fund Ngo cooperation 1 1.9% 4.3% 0% 
  TOT 26 49.7% 47.6% 51,70% 
 
4th most 
Important  
  Civic engagement courses 8 15.1% 4.2% 24.1% 
53 Social Inclusion 5 9.4% 4.2% 13.8% 
  Fund Ngo cooperation 3 5.7% 8.3% 3.4% 
  Civic & Moral Behaviour 2 3.8% 4.2% 3.4% 
  
  Ecology in campus 2 3.8% 8.3% 0% 
  Volunteering 2 3.8% 4.2% 3.4% 
  Political debates 2 3.8% 0% 6.9% 
  Defend students’ rights 2 3.8% 0% 6.9% 
  TOT 26 49.2% 33.4% 61.9% 
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Students confirmed personal interest and commitment towards democracy, social 
justice and civic engagement as being integral to their academic experience, in line 
with post-revolution aspirations but, as explored, rather in contrast with national 
policies. In fact, for instance, university social responsibility increases from 22 to 
nearly 50 per cent of students’ aggregate preferences, as the fourth most important 
mission. In this sense, university social dimension actually acquires a central relevance 
as students do value their contribution to society.  
Furthermore, as considered in table 11, when comparing students’ expectations 
towards economic and social returns on education, student employability and 
professional internships are perceived as key university prerogatives.   
 
Table 11- Tunisian Universities Socio-economic Third Mission engagement159.  
  
All Sample Engineering Humanity 
YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Student employability  86,85% 13,15% 88% 12% 85,70% 14,30% 
Professional internship 85,15% 14,85% 84,60% 15,40% 85,70% 14,30% 
Honest, civic and moral behaviour 83,25% 16,75% 80,80% 19,20% 85,70% 14,30% 
Courses on social and civic participation 81,30% 18,70% 76,90% 23,10% 85,70% 14,30% 
Social inclusion for marginalised students 79,95% 20,05% 88,50% 11,50% 71,40% 28,60% 
Volunteering and social engagement 78,20% 21,80% 88,50% 11,50% 67,90% 32,10% 
Student socio-political & economic right 69,50% 30,50% 64% 36% 75% 25% 
Project for public and community utility 66,25% 33,75% 76,90% 23,10% 55,60% 44,40% 
Promote ecology in-campus 67,20% 32,80% 80,80% 19,20% 53,60% 46,40% 
Funding civil society organisations 51,90% 48,10% 53,80% 46,20% 50,00% 50,00% 
Promote political participation  40,50% 59,50% 34,60% 65,40% 46,40% 53,60% 
Engage directly on political debates 29,85% 70,15% 24% 76% 35,70% 64,30% 
Promote religious activities 26,90% 73,10% 26,90% 73,10% 26,90% 73,10% 
 
                                                 
159 Data includes valid entry only for percentage aggregate (excluding missing entries).  
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However, over 80 per cent of students believe Tunisian public universities should also 
promote more civic and moral behaviour, volunteering, social engagement and social 
inclusion. If humanities students rated higher courses on social and civic engagement, 
engineering students, instead, considered more important volunteering and civic 
engagement activities. This variance seems to reconfirm an underlying trend, 
grounded on the theoretical vs. practical divide, characterising humanities vs. 
engineering students’ attitude (see also next section on social capital). In particular, 
this could be also linked to different aspects as: level of self-awareness, personal 
commitment to social engagement and family background influence. T-test showed no 
statistical significance difference between the two populations (see Appendix VI – T-
test, Table 21). 
In particular, students can experience an active civic culture within their own 
families and/or close friends. Pre-existing family social networks also support and 
inspire personal development. In particular, an engineering student confirmed: 
Nowadays I am taking part to some activities with the student 
union. I am participating to a charity organisation […] actually 
I have been introduced by my mum to charity activities because 
she is member since 10 years ago in an association taking care 
of orphans (we collect dresses, toys and fundraising) (Interview 
F1, E). 
 
To the same extent, faculty environments and embedded culture also play a crucial 
role. For instance, 53 per cent humanities against 80 per cent of engineering students 
thinks that universities should promote ecology on-campus. From diary notes, in fact, 
only the faculty of engineering had a system of differentiated waste bins around 
campus, promoting a suitable environment and active education to shape students’ 
experience and awareness.  
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In line with research findings, political and associational activities are not 
perceived as central to university-community partnerships. Investment on community 
projects was rated only by two thirds of students; whereas, around half of participants 
believe universities should engage and fund civil society organisations. During the Ben 
Ali regime, associations were controlled or censored, affecting public awareness and 
limiting their participation in society. These dynamics seem to have also shaped 
university-community partnership adversely. In fact, despite post-revolution widening 
associational freedom, associations have not yet developed and established a 
framework for partnership160 with universities, opening questions on how current 
socio-political settings could impact upon campus culture and university social 
responsibility. Seemingly, students seem to reject the idea of a politicised university 
in terms of opportunities for political participation or political debates as a form of 
civic engagement (respectively 40 and 30 per cent). This could confirm generalised 
disenchantment toward politics linked to corruption and lack of transparency in public 
institutions but also due to post-revolution political instability and violent 
confrontations in universities (pp. 63, 64, 67).  
Universities’ role in promoting religious activities was also largely dismissed 
with 73 per cent of preferences. Sample bias could entail higher proportion of secular 
students, however, it could also suggest: 
1- the acceptance of public universities’ secular ethos;  
2- the rejection of radical Islamists, intended as revolution by-product; 
3- the presence of a parallel binary value system secular vs. religious; 
                                                 
160 Field observation confirmed the absence of a university civic engagement office in either faculty. 
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4- the retrenchment of religion into private rather than public domain. 
 
 As already explored, if in the engineering faculty, a sense of tolerance, respect and 
attention to build dialogue was predominant161; from diary notes, humanities students 
reported lack of communication with the religious-affiliated student union and absence 
of joint activities on-campus162. As such, in determined university contexts, civic 
engagement, political participation and involvement in religious associations might 
not contribute to democracy, reflecting politically fragmented and culturally diverse 
social contexts. 
 Finally, students’ socio-political and economic rights’ protection was 
considered important by 70 per cent of respondents. This factor can be related to how, 
in the past, students’ rights have tended to be disregarded or even abused as university 
police undermined students’ social, political and civic engagement, affecting also trust, 
respect and dialogue in students-administration and students-professors relationships. 
As a student observed: 
 It is true there is no more police as a person wearing a uniform 
but there is still those who control us: where we are going, what 
we do, what we say and it is the old who continues […] there is 
not difference between no manifestation and yes you can 
manifest but we risk to be beaten up or menaced (Interview F1, 
H).  
 
The use of university police by the regime was intended to control and censor students’ 
activities. As such, social responsibility and civic engagement cannot flourish if basic 
                                                 
161 From diary notes, in engineering faculty while left-wing student gathered for a political public speech in the 
main square; a call for prayer reminded students to gather in the prayer room (absent in humanities faculty). 
162 As noted in diary notes, in humanities faculty, communications between left-wing and Islamic union is 
developed via intermediary students with moderate stands, thus able to directly interact with both. 
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freedoms and generalised trust is absent or fragmented, as often the case in Arab 
countries. Findings show that in the post-revolution transition period, embedded habits 
might still endure although under different forms. In fact, a student explained: 
 At university level, there is always a control but not as before 
[the revolution]. It is true but there is always […] some kind of 
students they express their opinion but they also act with 
violence […] security does not exist anymore because before 
none could say anything but nowadays, everyone can say what  
they want (Interview M3, E). 
 
 
 
Cooperation, trust, dialogue and tolerance are complex socio-cultural determinants 
that, if missing, can fuel tensions. However, if post-revolution democratic process has 
initially fostered citizens’ freedoms and public institutions’ accountability, university-
students and university-society relationships have not experienced a structural change 
in line with the aspirations of the revolution. In fact, students’ lack of empowerment, 
civic associations’ marginal role in society, religious conflicts and absence of 
cooperation with the administration are main factors limiting the implementation of a 
different social agenda. 
To the same extent, 2008 higher education reform was implemented during the 
pre-revolution in socio-political and economic circumstances openly contested 
thereafter. In fact, despite post-revolution changes in university governance (for the 
first time, rectors and deans have been elected and not appointed by the government), 
no national reform followed to address universities’ managerial, structural and 
organisational framework. A professor, from humanities faculty, also commented: 
The role of university has not changed since Ben Ali because 
no serious reforms have been ever proposed. We are forced to 
suffer the fall of Ben Ali system in the sense that they have 
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imposed on us the LMD reform […] already agreed even before 
any consultation […] I think this will depend on the future 
political scenario (Interview F4, H). 
 
Reforms advocated under the spirit of the revolution seem, have been halted due to the 
unsettled political situation, as post-revolution democratic expectations still remain 
overestimated. As a result, the promotion of dialogue and cooperation amongst 
students, professors and administration staff also seem to be under-achieved. In this 
sense, a humanities student commented: 
[…] for the students and the LMD system that we always are 
against […] we try always to change this system, we refuse the 
LMD but we do not see any change, they are not interested in 
our problems (Interview F1, H). 
 
Considerations on HE reform imply also the development of an on-campus common 
platform which is vital to students-to-students and students-to-professors networking, 
developing academic social capital through channels of communication for 
information sharing.  
 In this framework, findings have suggested that university autonomy is a key 
aspect for higher education institutions to implement locally-driven strategies to 
address undergraduates’ employability, teaching quality and universities’ social 
dimension. Current circumstances hold the potential to impact on how professors and 
students cooperate on the basis of common grounds and objectives. In fact, an 
engineering professor underlined: 
 
We want to amend the new LMD system that has been 
established. The reform did not give more autonomy; we are 
always under the ministry hold, always a centralised system. I 
think the common point [between students and academic staff] 
is the higher education system reform. This is the point 
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regrouping us. We would like to reform the LMD system as 
there are impacts both on students and teachers. Reforms could 
range from working hours, to run more projects, etc. […] 
because our objective is that courses are well assimilated […] 
transferred to students […] for this, I think both unions can 
gather, work together and find solutions, avoiding each one 
being on his world, as this would not lead to a good reform 
(Interview F2, E).  
 
 
In fact, the 2008 LMD reform has left unresolved questions of university 
decentralisation; coastal vs. interior’s uneven development; institutional 
accountability, autonomy and governability; education quality; curriculum reform; 
structural issues related to students’ employability, university social responsibility and 
education to democracy. In this sense, inter-faculty social capital ties can be considered 
crucial to empower professors and students whose concerns and voices are often 
under-estimated within a top-down hierarchical decision-making framework.  
 In the post-revolution transition context, the idea itself of university can be 
reconsidered fostering a new social and political consensus, inclusive of bottom-up 
emancipatory initiatives. If national policies supported an almost-free higher education 
system within a logic of knowledge transfer and students’ employability, structural 
underachievement and socio-economic deficiencies are still present. In fact, findings 
suggest that Tunisian higher education should be free, providing for high standard 
quality teaching, transferring employability skills and contributing to a wider array of 
public-private networking for professional internship, democratic and civic 
engagement education or volunteering programs. At present, however, universities 
seem not to have incorporated third mission activities for social responsibility and 
wider cooperation with external stakeholders, despite growing social concerns, 
democratic deficit and economic backlash. Implications of a HE system reform might 
entail a renewed national dialogue amongst all stakeholder government-university-
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industry-civil society in order to reconsider what role universities ought to play to 
pursue economic growth, social cohesion and democracy for present and future 
generations.   
The next section further explores university social responsibility in Tunisia, focusing 
on the main factors influencing present developments and future implications.  
 
University Social Responsibility  
 
In recent decades, universities’ have witnessed a gradual revitalisation in 
organising cultural events (i.e. hosting theatre plays, art exhibitions or concerts); 
supporting students’ curricular and extra-curricular opportunities (i.e. professional 
internship and/or volunteering programmes); deepening economic and cultural 
interactions with local communities. Tunisian public universities, however, are 
currently in turmoil, confronted with complex political, economic and cultural 
uncertainties. The post-independence nationalist’s project favoured governments’ 
control over social, cultural and political activities, fostering habits of public dis-trust, 
fears and cultural dis-engagement. However, recent revolutionary social movements 
opened up opportunities for social participation that could potentially lower cultural, 
social and political barriers. In Tunisia, as the regime restricted political and civic 
freedoms, a student, member of the Ngo, commented:  
First of all, it is the attitude in need to be developed. Before we 
did not have this idea of volunteering and thanks to networks of 
associations, I think this attitude has grown. It is evident that 
associations are changing the face of society through creating 
new attitudes, responsibilities but at university level I am not 
really sure if associations have their place because universities 
remain a bit backward if compared to NGOs (Interview F2, N). 
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Universities are de facto best placed to develop students’ academic social capital 
because they can enable external partnerships. However, they can implement policies 
that could either promote or hinder civic engagement programs. In fact, students are 
drivers of change although the lack of institutional commitment to support a thriving 
social environment inside or outside the campus can limit their actions and available 
resources. The lack of universities’ support and acknowledgment of post-revolution 
civil society revival, free from regime repressions, might actually disregard students 
and associations’ agency. In this sense, another student, member of the Ngo, 
highlighted: 
Students’ mentality is changing […] they are more opened to 
civil society, they are active and they are participating. If this is 
not coming from university itself, it will come from students 
and they will influence universities to make the change. […] 
When the administration cannot fulfil its role, when the 
government cannot fulfil its role, it is time for civil society to 
intervene and fill the gap that is left (Interview F1, N). 
 
 
The revolution has thus facilitated a bottom-up and grassroot social and 
political awakening to respond to issues unmet by the government. For this, 
universities need to be intended as central hubs attracting both professional and civic 
associations to engage in constructive partnerships. Furthermore, a student, member 
of the Ngo, also commented: 
 
I think [university] should be more open towards civil society 
by encouraging, for example, extra-curricular activities, by 
founding more clubs for cultural, associational, charity 
networks, considering a time each day specifically devoted to 
these activities. Generally speaking, students say we do not 
have time in order to be active. For this, it is to universities to 
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find the right allocation of time to give motivation and to be part 
of social activities (Interview F2, N). 
Students who actually have changed attitudes towards their commitment to society 
reconsider universities’ institutional change central in establishing a civic 
engagement/external partnership office; focusing on administration training to change 
cultural habits; promoting on-campus social events; enhancing  students’ participation; 
deepening collaboration and joint programs with the community or drafting a 
university and students social responsibility charter (pp. 80-82).  
To the same extent, universities can support and enable students to be active 
participants in the decision-making process on priorities such as teaching and 
curriculum; student welfare, services and facilities; finance; students’ behaviour and 
campus safety; contribution to charity and community engagement. In Tunisia at 
present a different situation still prevails, as a student, member of the Ngo, observed:  
Our Ngo when we were launching the recruitment campaign, 
we found many problems with universities, going into the yard 
to ask students to join us, it was a problem starting from the 
administration. They needed many papers to be filled in and 
they were suspicious, not really trusting what we were doing 
[…] some universities refused us! The only universities with 
easy access were the one we studied in or where members of the 
NGO are still students as they know the administration, they 
know people there, they trust them otherwise it was very 
difficult to go into other universities (Interview F1, N). 
 
 
Findings highlight how lack of trust, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and the 
administration’s attitude are the main barriers affecting academic social capital 
formation and social responsibility. In general, universities seem not to be committed 
in developing cooperation with external partners; nor do they seem equipped, in terms 
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of autonomy, economic resources or managerial culture to do so. However, the present 
critical phase of changing socio-cultural and political environments, is already 
defining the extent to which universities will need to readapt their role in society.  
In this sense, students clubs, prior to the revolution, could not develop a wide 
range of socio-cultural or political activities since university police exerted vigilant 
control and censorship by accessing list of participants and program events. Campus 
life was defined by regime’s approved cultural clubs (i.e. theatre, music, language, 
etc.) or sport clubs; while prohibiting political activities, considered a threat to the 
status quo163. This legacy impacted clubs’ role, ethos, autonomy and financing, 
undermining also students’ social capital for social responsibility. A professor from 
humanities faculty commented: 
Once I asked students: are there any clubs? Do you take part in 
any clubs? The answer: “The desert”. They are not connected to 
politics, rarely some of them are, not connected to cultural 
activities. The faculty never encourages them. There is a theatre 
recently founded and sport clubs well developed. Overall, there 
is a hiatus between education in the faculty and cultural life 
(Interview F4, H).  
 
 
 
Lack of institutional incentives, organisational infrastructure and limited dialogue can 
further hinder students’ participation. Latent or fragmented academic networks 
between professors, academic staff and students reinforce under-utilisation and under-
development of a shared culture for social engagement. In fact, external environments 
can have a negative impact on individual identity and personal attitudes to civic 
engagement, limiting the imaginary and the scope for initiatives.  
                                                 
163 For example, at Nottingham University over 500 clubs exist to provide students with a platform to express their 
opinions and their identity via sport, linguistic, social, cultural or political interests. 
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Contextually, professors are often seen as inspirational or leading personalities, 
contributing to students’ awareness and social commitment. In particular, a humanities 
student critically articulated:   
[…] universities need to play a major role between faculty and 
society, also at level of cultural clubs to improve level of 
students’ education, to help students being aware of what is 
happening outside the faculty because if we attend class and we 
go back home, we travel back and forth only for teaching 
purposes […] it will teach us to be passive! Professors need to 
pass the message, they need to teach students, they are an 
important part of society who needs to fight and say yes or no; 
who need to take part to the decision-making process (Interview 
F1, H). 
 
If education is considered rigorously in terms of human capital and knowledge 
transfer, students’ learning experience remains restrained and limited to it. In Tunisia, 
HEIs ought to promote a more dynamic educational paradigm connecting course 
material to students’ everyday life, fostering social projects that is foundational to SR 
and professor-student and student-community academic social capital. At the faculty 
of engineering, a student also expressed similar expectations: 
[Professors] they come, they work, they leave […] I have to take 
care about research, give classes, I mark […] and I do not care 
about the rest. You have to work it out yourself! Other 
professors they supervise us, they listen to us and they stay 
longer after working hours. They give consultations, 
appointments, counselling. Our department director is the secret 
of good functioning […] he is the leader, he works very well 
[…] he is a source of inspiration (Interview M1, E). 
 
In this perspective, professors-students relations can also define the extent to which 
students are engaged either with their study or, if motivated and supported, with 
society. Professor curricular and co-curricular led activities, if embedded in campus 
culture, hold the potential to enrich students’ formation. In fact, social responsibility 
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is often a combination of driving factors that if missing, can eventually disconnect 
students. As a humanities student confirmed, professor-students-society networks can 
also favour: 
[…] connection between cultural level and teaching because our 
faculty is trying always to engage us with society. In March we 
took part to “Jean Giono164” day at the French cultural Institute, 
in order to know a different culture and to deepen our 
knowledge. We also took part in activities with the municipal 
theatre (Interview F3, H). 
 
 
In this sense, findings from the humanities faculty revealed a mixed picture 
with fragmented institutional commitment and lower individual exposure to social 
responsibility. In the faculty of engineering, instead, students seemed to acknowledge 
a more proactive institutional framework in promoting opportunities. In particular, 
from diary notes, students also commented that the newly appointed Rector and 
administrative staff are positively contributing and supporting activities/projects 
proposed by students. In particular, during field observation, a student recalled how in 
conjunction with the International Women day, the Rector allowed students to 
commemorate the event by painting an external wall with coloured hand-prints. 
Students not only find support to build their identities but also develop a sense of 
belonging and embedded culture for next generations. Furthermore, an engineering 
student also commented:  
Last year a professor, who is part of an international network, 
asked us to film a short-movie to highlight what is the role of an 
engineer in society […] the majority of our events are always 
open, advertisement and launching are done outside the 
university […] we also develop social entrepreneurship […] 
trying to train students or young people no matters where from, 
                                                 
164 Twentieth century French novelist. 
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in order to help them develop and work on their own projects 
(Interview F1, E).  
   
Professors are important actors in supporting social responsibility by raising students’ 
awareness, organising events involving external stakeholders and the local 
community.  
Engineering students165 seem also to show a comprehensive sense of personal 
responsibility, mirroring campus culture. In this sense, another engineering student 
described his personal experiences: 
I am member of the student organisation “Junior Enterprise” 
and Eureka and I took part to IE3 project […] I am also part of 
a music club. I was also parliament commissioner for 
mechatronic department […] at the faculty, in fact, there are 
also 6 associations (Junior Enterprise [scientific and 
professional training association], Eureka [cultural and artistic 
association], Oxilion [newly founded scientific association], 
I3E student branch, the Adeniso (alumni association) as it is 
always necessary to build a bridge between the faculty and 
industry and they are helping us a lot. They also offer trainings 
in order to support students to better understand classes. Then 
there is mechatronic club, club Tecnocar… (Interview M1, E). 
 
The engineering faculty seems to have an active key role in developing students’ 
networks, clubs’ and societies encompassing different aspects of student life from 
career development, to socio-cultural or political groups (i.e. a student-led parliament, 
not present in the humanities faculty). As from field observations, during data 
collection, the engineering faculty organised a three day event with conferences, 
commercial stands, live concerts, exhibition and live showrooms. University social 
                                                 
165It is important to highlight that while engineering faculty has around 700 students, humanity faculty counts over 
5000 students, allegedly having an impact on projects’ development, networking and proximity, as well as, a less 
cumbersome bureaucratic structure, governance, economic resources to promote external relationships. 
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responsibility then implies a progressive change in attitudes and habits to support a 
vibrant educational and social life.  
 As findings show, students are rather aware of what social responsibility is, 
their role and how they would like universities to be. However, “old regime habits” 
have crystallised and endured in the post-revolution political settings, playing a crucial 
role in university-students dynamics. Universities, in fact, seem still unable to enact 
any long-term autonomous changes. However, as the engineering faculty showed, 
faculty environments and embedded shared culture can foster USR. In the humanities 
faculty, instead, lack of planning, resources, channels of communication and campus 
life showed cleavages between faculty and students’ priorities. On the other hand, 
students and civil society organisations can sustain social innovation, being committed 
to fulfil revolution’s expectations; whereas universities have not yet institutionalised 
their role to address social problems. In the future, however, events leading to the 
democratic transition will be crucial to see if these two forces will eventually converge 
and how universities will engage actively with society.  
The next section explores how underdevelopment of university social responsibility 
has impacted upon students’ identity, limiting their engagement in society.  
 
Student Social Responsibility 
 
Student social responsibility is often directly linked to university SR. At a macro-
level, political, academic or social-cultural contexts can intensify the under-
development of university-community relationships (see Chapter 3, p. 82). On the 
other hand, at a micro-level, students’ family backgrounds, personal experiences and 
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self-awareness contribute to identity building and individual commitment to society 
(see Chapter 3, pp. 83, 84). In Tunisia, the 2008 HE reform states in Art. 3 that 
“students are at the centre of the higher education system and they have the right to”: 
- acquiring knowledge and attending teaching classes ;  
- professors’ supervision;  
- participate in courses according to study  plan;  
- access and information to different curricular specialisation, courses, programs 
and professional perspectives; 
- respect teaching staff, administrative staff, building facilities […] and higher 
education institutions according to the present law.  
 
For this, students are framed within a traditional and considerably static definition, 
centred on university teaching mission, pre-set learning objectives and courses for 
students’ knowledge acquisition as potential gateway to the job market. This paradigm 
mirrors a restricted definition constructed around the notion of human capital and an 
instrumentalist role of education, despite the importance to develop students as socio-
economic entrepreneurs of their future (UNESCO, 2009). In fact, the national law does 
not acknowledge students as autonomous and key socio-economic actors in society. 
Universities then do not prioritise internship, civic engagement activities or education 
for democracy, engaging students with society.  
In this framework, students were asked what social responsibility is and what role 
students ought to play in Tunisia. In particular, the term social responsibility was 
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associated to 14 different categories166, clustered into the following themes: social 
justice, respect of others, citizenship and social awareness/consciousness. These were 
mainly linked to post-revolution renewed sense of social and political engagement, 
implying: 
- a revival of citizens’ freedoms, rights and duties towards society;  
- an open confrontation for social justice, social inclusion and human dignity; 
-  a commitment to citizens’ well-being, community and society at large;  
- the shared respect for others opinions, beliefs and behaviours.  
 
The revolution was a significant first-hand experience for all students. Individual and 
collective social awareness are considerably preconditions for change to address 
political and social challenges. As commented by a student, social responsibility:  
 
 […] is the engagement of a person and groups to societal 
problems looking for solutions. Social responsibility is an 
attitude to be developed, a feeling which can be natural or 
caused by an event (AS1). 
 
 
Social responsibility is then defined as a feeling, an attitude, a duty, a shared culture, 
an identity and it consists of solving problems, engaging and acting in a common social 
space. Furthermore, social responsibility is also associated with active participation in 
terms of volunteering activities and democracy development. These two elements are 
                                                 
166 Categories were defined and analysed with Nvivo software. 
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also considered key in social capital development. As highlighted in the following 
extracts:  
 
- Social responsibility is to be engaged in volunteering action 
towards society (E8); and also: 
 
- […] a student in Tunisia needs to have social responsibility in order 
to achieve a democratic system (E3). 
 
To the same extent, students’ academic/intellectual contribution is also linked 
to academic social capital and social responsibility. In fact, the development of a 
complex identity as students but also as citizens favours what can be defined as 
academic social responsibility. In fact, this extract defines specifically that: 
[Student social responsibility] is to be an intellectual ready to 
engage into society. A student needs to play a political, social 
and technical role (S9). 
 
The reference to students’ technical and professional contribution to national 
development can also be understood in terms of impact on community social and 
economic wider benefit. Students need to be integrated in society sharing their 
knowledge and making a contribution to societal problems, implying a complex and 
articulated political, social and intellectual commitment towards society. However, 
government HE policies, framed around students’ marginal roles in society, might act 
against students’ own awareness limiting the nature of agency itself. To the same 
extent, this extract identifies how to be a student: 
[…] is to improve intellectually, to have a knowledge and 
awareness of problems predominant in the country, to improve 
dysfunctions (E7).   
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In Tunisia, however, opportunities to channel opinions and to become socially engaged 
are still exceptional to most students. In particular, it is critical how to enhance this 
social awareness; how to create environments/conditions functional to social 
engagement and how universities and students can be actors-partners in social 
responsibility. 
Political and socio-cultural settings are interconnected main determinants for 
social responsibility development. Lack of civil and political rights affects freedoms 
of expression, association and political participation. For civic participation cannot 
flourish if curtailed, pre-emptied or neutralised. In fact, after the revolution, according 
to a student and member of the Ngo, what has changed the most, is undoubtedly: 
Freedom of speech. Students can express themselves, they 
organise manifestation but at the level of system […] we have 
not reached yet the level we need. There are always aspects that 
remain in the shadow and there is no real control of our future. 
Before there was not hope, no freedom of expression, nor 
means. Nowadays, we still do not have the means but hope and 
freedom of expression (Interview F2, N). 
 
Freedom of expression is a basic right to achieve a political democratic transition. 
Social participation can flourish if existing conditions allow for collective actions, 
shifting individual awareness to public actions, crucial also to student social 
responsibility. In Tunisia, however, the specific socio/political system was based on 
the reproduction of regime’s own propaganda. To the same extent, political coercion 
and bureaucratic control over associational activities hindered any developments both 
at the institutional and individual level. In fact, after the revolution, a student 
confirmed that: 
There is a radical change because before we were really limited 
even, for example, in the budget we could use. We were always 
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obliged to hang and show Ben Ali’s portrait (as the merit of it 
came from him…) […] Before, in order to open an association, 
it was really an headache, a puzzle as it was required to go 
through the municipality, the province and Ministry’s 
authorisation [ …] Nowadays, on the contrary,  there is not only 
a myriad of all kind of associations in any possible fields with a 
greater choice but also in our activities, we are a lot freer than 
before (Interview, F1, E). 
 
 
 On the other hand, in universities, this democratic shift has also implied 
unanticipated confrontations as the abuse of personal freedoms can subjectively foster 
conflicts. In particular, as a professor at the humanities faculty explained, after the 
revolution: 
[…] what really changed, I think, are certain teachers-students’ 
relationships. I mean, before the revolution, given that there was 
a dictatorship, an authority, a university police […] students 
have been framed within it […] a relation of authority and 
respect. Last year, some students were on strike to ask marks’ 
revision. They criticised our evaluation system with a slogan 
“passing exams is a right”. They also swore against us (the 
teachers). Never this would have happened prior the revolution 
(Interview F4, H). 
 
  
  
Students were controlled under a system of authority and contextual threats, dictating 
also students-professors relationships. A reverential respect to authority has long 
limited freedom of expression that is key to democracy. However, the contestation 
passing exams is a right, is rather problematic and alarming. In fact, it relates to a 
deeper level of resentment and denunciation against the HE evaluation system, 
university academic standard and academic staff professionalism. In this sense, a 
humanities student also confirmed disaffection with faculty management: 
[…] there are some problems with exams, teaching issues, also 
the halls of residence […] and it is not related only to the 
faculty, we always try to see what are the other problems of 
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society […] we try always to change this system (Interview F1, 
H). 
 
 
In fact, post-revolution freedom of speech allowed students to raise issues closer to 
their interests and expectations in relation to exams’ evaluation, teaching quality or 
feedback, compromising their formation and welfare. Furthermore, teaching quality 
and professors’ level of qualification, was also highlighted by an engineering student: 
A student in Tunisia is someone pushed to learn by heart classes 
and exercises from professors often poorly qualified in order to 
pass the academic year (E15). 
 
To the same extent, during field observations in the humanities faculty, it has 
been noticed that a professor called in a group of students into an empty class to hand 
in marked examinations. The professor started calling out students by name in order 
to return the exams and if a student was not present, the paper would have been passed 
to someone in contact with him/her, resulting in one person collecting up to 4 or 5 
exams. Lack of privacy, poor feedback on exams and poor academic standards might 
also mirror students’ disaffection towards their learning experience. In addition, when 
students tried to approach the issue of having received unjustly a low mark, trying to 
“bargain” for higher evaluation, the feedback was often: “read it back! That is what 
you deserve”. The existence of an antagonistic relationship can exacerbate faculty-
wide cooperation, mutual respect and trust upon which social responsibility and 
academic social capital are developed. In fact, students’ academic, professional and 
personal development is also determined by the type and level of education.  
In particular, generational change is a continuous process. In present-day 
Tunisia, students could be the determining factor of social change, contributing to 
cultural innovation, economic development and democratic participation. However, 
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this cannot happen in a void. Universities need to intervene in sustaining both human 
and social capital development. In fact, a student highlighted: 
Faculty has to support an education to form responsible, active 
and aware students. However, the education system is not able 
to provide for students' needs. For this, student's role has to 
change from receiving to participate in order to make correction 
to the system with a cultural, political, social participation: 
student/student; student/university; student/society (S28). 
 
Several factors then act as preconditions to students’ social participation: identity; 
family background; campus environment; students-professor-administration 
relationships; as well as, socio-cultural and political environments (pp. 82, 83). 
Universities and student unions are in control of a social agenda. However, the 
presence of existing barriers such as government censorship, campus-life 
fragmentation, society-wide lack of civic culture and personal motivation can hinder 
participation. As such, students’ awareness and motivation might face different 
constraints affecting identity building and decision-making processes, including: 
1. University barrier: focus/pressure on class or exams; lack of social activities. 
2. Political barrier: lack incentives or initiatives; censorship; lack of safety.  
3. Generational barrier: no support; passive example from previous generation. 
4. Cultural barrier: adaptation and conformism to status quo. 
5. Personal barrier: lack of motivation, power and means; sense of resignation. 
 
In particular, a student and member of the NGO, recalled how during the pre-
revolutionary period:    
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[…] there were two factors influencing my engagement: myself 
and the system in general. Before maybe I was a bit more 
focused on my study, my professional career more than doing 
social activities. Moreover, even if, sometimes you have some 
desire to do something, there was a hurdle in the idea of “we 
cannot make a change” and “that’s the way it is!” We did not 
have power and we also had the influence of previous 
generations […] they were passive and we had this image in 
front of us. 
 
[…] before the revolution I had many ideas but the problem was 
also at cultural level. In my town there was no cinema, theatre 
or public spaces for cultural activities or conservatories. For 
this, I wanted to create those spaces in my town […] but I could 
not see any means except trying to get hold of a political 
institution, the mayor or a person in charge but it was something 
unthinkable (Interview M1, N). 
 
Personal aspirations can flourish in a supportive cultural environment. Social networks 
favours social engagement but they can also turn it into an “unthinkable mission”. In 
particular, in a non-Western and semi-democratic system like Tunisia, findings 
revealed that a major constraint to students’ social responsibility development was 
linked to the socio-political system. In fact, as expressed by a student:  
The problem is also that many students say “I do not care” “this 
is not my business”. They do not do anything, they stay passive 
and they behave as spectators. But there are also many students 
who are aware of, those students who during Ben Ali were 
blocked because they feared, nowadays they react better, they 
talk, they say: “this is good and this is not”. Even if there is still 
the feeling of fear, they are passing the message (Interview F1, 
H). 
 
A system based on potential repercussions or tangible threats was in place for decades, 
shaping students’ identities and freedom of consciousness. It was not merely a question 
of being passive, it was a relationship based on defined boundaries of what is allowed 
and what is not. Furthermore, universities have been largely controlled in relation to 
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their active role in society, resulting in decades of impoverished associational life and 
democratic stagnation. In this sense, a student critically commented: 
 
[…] being a student in a transition period and after a revolution 
it is a bit difficult. You can feel a whole generation is abandoned 
and it is looking for its identity and many of them are engaged 
in associative life and express their opinions (AS5). 
 
 
Students played a central role during the 2011 uprisings, taking to the streets to 
protest in defence of citizens’ rights, freedom of speech and association restrained by 
regime censorship, generating resignation, passive adaptation and underground 
dissents (pp. 58, 59, 108-112). The revolution slowly exposed complex habits of direct 
repression which have long prejudiced individual and community associational and 
political attitudes. According to a student, prior to the revolution:  
There were two types of students: those who are considered 
"passive", they do not express themselves. Others have decided 
to make a choice of expressing themselves and to employ their 
time in the student union, criticising the government. After the 
revolution, young people have changed a lot. It is possible to 
realise a greater interest in the associative and social life. It is 
also important to realise that those who were passive, they were 
so because they did not have the occasion to express themselves 
through associations (AS4). 
 
Political and social change can thus consolidate participation. A thriving associational 
life enhances personal awareness and self-confidence as opportunities become more 
available. As explored earlier, the regime’s demise determined new windows of 
dialogue but also new emergent political, cultural and social confrontations. As a 
student commented: 
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Before [the revolution], there was no reference to NGO […] 
everything was under the stream of the regime. Now that the 
opportunities are open for everybody, it is a release for many 
people to express themselves […] although there are some 
transgression of limits […] but all in all it is a beneficial change 
[…] so there is motivation and they are mobilised to do 
something for the good of the community […] Students have to 
find a part in civil society and society in university […] they 
have to be prepared to face society (Interview F1, N). 
 
 
 
In fact, associations were often linked to the regime and not free to pursue their own 
independent agenda. As a result, opportunities and motivation for social engagement 
were regarded deficient, creating a gap between universities, students and society. 
After the revolution, social agency reshaped the boundaries of an increasingly 
contested public arena that affected also students’ identity formation and universities’ 
civic and democratic role. A present, participation then conveys alternative meaning 
for students to question their role in society, as latent civic networks facilitate more 
democratic and cohesive environments.  
Findings showed how students have comprehensive knowledge, understanding 
and interest in being socially engaged.  They also outline self-awareness on their role 
as citizens and duties towards society. However, social capital has been long under-
realised and social networking under-utilised to support students’ engagement. Social 
and public activities were often deterred with menaces and repercussions, widespread 
government control, political corruption and social clientelism (pp. 115, 116). This 
complex and structured system has ultimately created what I define as “the under-
utilisation of academic social capital for social responsibility”. In Tunisia, social 
engagement was not hindered by the absence of social awareness, students’ identity 
building or sense of responsibility but mainly by the socio-cultural and political 
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settings restraining the nature and scope for participation and limiting social networks’ 
development. The shadowed presence of a pro-regime agenda limited means and 
channels for social communication. At present, however, the gradual recognition of 
basic freedoms and rights can favour the development of a “normalised society” where 
citizens are able to express opinions more openly and, foremost, where personal 
awareness can be translated into actions to reverse habits of passivity, underground 
dissents, acceptance and resignation.  
The next section deals with social capital development in Tunisia, exploring how 
university social responsibility can also be functional to students’ social capital 
creation and identity building. 
 
 
 
Social Capital, Society and Student Identity-Building 
 
Identity is often a fundamental element framing the realisation of individual 
civic engagement. Social networking fosters social capital and context-based civic 
knowledge in different socio-political and cultural settings (p. 83). Social awareness 
and sense of belonging are also normally rooted and developed via spatial, emotional 
and intellectual connections to city environments. The proximity to a determined 
environment helps to develop awareness as a result of a gradual process of personal 
commitment, interpersonal trust and social networks’ building. In this sense, findings 
show 23% of participants were born in the city of residence, 11,5% lived for over 
three years; whereas 42% had been living there between two and three years. For this 
reason, it is possible to consider participants to have a low-to-medium level of 
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community belonging, often linked to the development of interconnected social 
networks.  
Figure 9– Student period of residence167. 
 
 
In this sense, family and neighbourhood settings are also important sources of social 
capital. However, if students need to adapt to new environments, this might delay 
civic participation as social trust tend to be lower and friendship ties weaker. For this, 
active participation is a dialogic action-reaction dynamic towards the community 
people live in. 
In the context of post-revolution Tunisia, however, interpersonal social trust 
tends to be lower. Personal and family protection becomes a priority and social 
cohesion can be negatively affected, constraining social capital creation (see chapter 
3). Table 12 indicates that more than half of students perceive others as helpful168. 
However, only around 20 per cent as trustful/highly trustful, whereas 22 per cent of 
                                                 
167 Students could choose amongst a list of 11 items with the addition of an Other category (see Appendix V on 
research questionnaire - English version).   
168 In particular, 57% of engineering against 46% of humanity students rated others as helpful; while 25% of 
humanities’ students against only 7% of engineering as trustful, suggesting engineering students more inclined to 
value team-work or cooperation with others whereas humanities students have higher inclination to social capital 
as nearly one out of three would trust others, potentially suggesting a rational vs. emotional attitude. 
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them have a neutral stance rating others neither helpful nor trustful and only less than 
4 per cent think others egoist. 
Table 12 – Personal Trust in other people. 
 All Sample Engineering Humanity 
Highly Helpful 1,90% 3,80% 0% 
Helpful 52,05% 57,70% 46,40% 
Highly Trustful 3,70% 3,80% 3,60% 
Trustful 16,35% 7,70% 25% 
Nor Helpful nor 
Trustful 
22,25% 23,10% 21,40% 
Egoist 3,70% 3,80% 3,60% 
 
 
In this sense, findings show a general sense of confidence and positive expectations 
for social cooperation but only moderate level of generalised trust. In particular, levels 
of trust highlight from one side, Tunisia’s relatively peaceful transition to democracy 
if compared to other Arab countries169; and, from the other, a positive tendency to 
social capital formation and constructive social interrelationships as a by-product of 
revolutionary grassroot movements. In particular, students identified as main reasons 
of civic and social engagement: improving quality of life, dialogue, ease social 
tensions and making new friends170. In fact, around half of respondents defined quality 
of life as the most important reason. Quality of life, despite being a broad category, 
often refers to personal and collective well-being including health, happiness and 
satisfaction in life, showing commitment to personal and community socio-cultural 
improvement. Most likely, however, in the context of post-revolution economic 
                                                 
169 Contrary to revolutionary movements protracted into civil wars like in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Egypt or Syria.  
170 As noted above, data confirm that sense of community belonging, was always rated as low as only 9%.  
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recession in Tunisia, economic improvement might also be perceived as an indicator 
of life quality at a personal and national level.  
Table 13 - Most important reasons for student participation in 
group/association171 
  All Sample Engen. Human. 
Most important 
reason  
  
Improve quality of life 47,75% 41,70% 53,80% 
Improve dialogue/ease social  tensions 10,25% 16,70% 3,80% 
  
  
Make new friends  9,90%  8,30%  11,50% 
Change community social/political 
participation 
6,25% 12,50% 0% 
2nd most important 
  
  
Make new friends  15,9% 16,70% 15,10% 
Address community problems  14%  16,70% 11,30% 
Improve quality of life  13,8%  12,50% 15,10% 
  
  
Change community social/political 
participation 
11,9% 12,50% 11,30% 
Economic development 10,75% 8,30% 13,20% 
3rd most important 
  
  
Make new friends 25,45% 29,20% 21,70% 
Improve dialogue/ease social  tensions 14,85% 16,70% 13% 
Respect religious values  10,6% 12,50% 8,70% 
 
 
Furthermore, the reference to community social and political participation in 
the post-revolution period also highlights a higher subjective perception with reference 
to civic engagement and political participation to address community problems and 
improve social tensions. On the other hand, making new friends is the most relevant 
preference across the dataset. In university environments, meeting new people, sharing 
similar ideals and projects or having fun are considered the main determinants and 
primary forms of socialisation, characterising students’ social capital inside and 
outside the classroom combining both academic and social networking.  
                                                 
171 Data values refer to valid percentage only (excluding missing entries). 
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In particular, university colleagues and close friends can actually play an 
important role in supporting social capital for civic engagement, as reported by a 
student: 
… [We] some students from Law faculty and other from my 
neighbourhood, we just help poor people but it is not political 
(Interview F2, H). 
 
Students tend to be more motivated if they feel part of a group where they find support, 
their voices can be heard, values and ideas shared, as well as, activities/projects 
developed. Friendship further represents an important value for social capital 
generation fostering trust, confidence and respect. The preference towards social rather 
than political participation seems also to be very relevant to the Tunisian context. 
Commitment to social responsibility can also be disjointed from politics. In fact, social 
awareness to relief conditions of more marginalised members of society might be more 
relevant than political participation due to low levels of trust in the government (see 
chapter 6). This element can also confirm how students positively evaluate their social 
agency. 
Furthermore, awareness is also connected to individual identity characterised 
by a complex set of determinants defining personal habits, likes or dislikes and 
interests, which, in turn, define the type of social capital, a person develop. Figure 10 
shows a significant difference between the two faculties. In fact, engineering students 
identify more distinctly with civic/social activities (i.e. local communities activities; 
volunteering; human rights promotion; charity); while humanities students considered 
political activities as the main channel for identity development (voting; party 
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activism; manifestation against unjust law)172. In this sense, taking into consideration 
sample size and potential bias, humanities students seem to indicate how being 
politically active can be an effective and most suitable option to respond to unmet 
expectations, like faculty disaffection or personal frustrations (possibly linked to 
personal socio-cultural or economic difficulties).  
Figure 10– Personal identity most important characteristics173.  
 
 
Personal engagement and involvement in society for humanities students seem to be 
rather associated with on-campus traditional forms of political protests, manifestation, 
active dissents or criticism towards government policies, often leading to open 
                                                 
172The nuance between social/civic and political activities is used as a broad category which does not exclude the 
very fact that often cultural and social activities have a political agenda; as well as, often political activities have 
socio-cultural impacts, determining nature, implementation and scope of actions.  
173 List of 18 items, including a Other category (see Appendix V on research questionnaire - English version). T-
test showed no statistical significance difference amongst two populations (see Appendix VI – T-test, Table 22). 
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confrontations. On the other hand, engineering students consider non-traditional forms 
of engagement within the university context such as charity, community engagement, 
volunteering, social networking and manifestation for social or global concerns, linked 
to an alternative identity building and social awareness. 
Findings then seem to suggest some underlying trends and prospective 
interconnections between types of degree, campus embedded culture, students’ 
identity (including family economic and cultural background) with social awareness, 
social capital and civic engagement. In particular, traditional channels of political self-
expression consider individual agency as antagonist-confrontational towards the 
system, whereas non-traditional ones imply a shift towards a constructive-cooperative 
paradigm for community well-being and social commitment. In terms of identity 
building, despite regime censorship, findings confirm how political and social 
participation are very significant in students’ identity definition.  
On the other hand, civic engagement, community volunteering, as well as, 
engagement in Islamic-linked activities, are not rated as the most significant. In 
particular, low commitment to both social activities linked to mosque and Islamic 
associations, as well as, civil associations, has restrained social capital development in 
Arab countries contributing to the democratic deficit. In addition to this, voting and 
newspaper reading - all defined key social capital indicators in Western contexts - are 
also rated very low, suggesting the necessity to redefine analytical categories, existing 
inter-relationships and contextual dynamics peculiar to the Arab region. In semi-
democratic systems like Tunisia, “government propaganda” embedded a political 
paradigm undermining generalised trust and social networks. Information access and 
reliability, also foundational to social capital, were, before the revolution, biased to 
portray a “fictional Tunisia”. As a student highlighted: 
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Before there was an overall supervision from the old regime to 
limit internet access. There were some bloggers who used to 
fight to show realities in Tunisia but there were always some 
control to stop websites. So it was not so easy and I was not 
aware that there were so many problems, crises, fighting within 
the country […] after everything exploded, information began 
to be more accessible […] from that point, myself and other 
people, we felt the need and necessity to make a move, trying 
to spread the information as much as possible (Interview F2, N). 
 
Control and censorship over information limited students’ awareness, social trust 
amongst members and across different groups. In non-democratic settings, information 
access and available resources are scarce, often bypassed via clientelistic channels and 
thus undermining democratic practices.  
In Tunisia, however, the gradual political openness to basic freedoms and 
citizens’ civic rights has impacted on information transparency and media reliability174 
affecting students’ motivation to participate in society while enabling pre-existing 
latent social capital ties (pp. 26, 27, 64, 65, 110). In fact, as a student confirmed: 
I got involved in a social activity in September 2011 after the 
revolution. Maybe after the revolution I had the need of doing 
something, to take action and to influence it since I could see 
that there was a need coming from society (Interview M1, N). 
 
In these terms, participation can be absent, conformist, subversive or marginal when 
existing circumstances do not enable and promote social commitment. In particular, 
academic social capital holds the potential to foster students’ involvement to (see 
Chapter 3, pp. 82-86): 
1. be socially engaged and motivate each other to participate; 
                                                 
174During Ben Ali regime, politics was almost a social taboo and national politics was a subject to avoid in public 
discussions (criticism to the regime or the President, if reported to authority, would have led to repercussions).  
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2. build social awareness and self-confidence by contributing to social well-being; 
3. promote associational life to produce positive change.  
 
After the revolution, socio-political taboos and religious or cultural preconceptions 
tended to overshadow self-expression and social participation. As a student confirmed:  
[…] before the revolution it was frustrating. I was afraid 
because there was a censorship, because I wear the scarf. There 
were always menaces, there were always policemen or armed 
people. I was afraid but after the revolution it is something 
different. I am really free, there is more freedom and enjoyment: 
it is becoming a way to have fun. It is helping me to make a 
change in my personality, to have more self-confidence, to have 
new relationships with people, to be more open, sociable 
(Interview F3, H).   
 
 Public settings can often exert pressure on people’s trust, personal security and self-
confidence. In such circumstances, barriers to social participation tend to redefine 
opportunities to fulfil personal expectations as social trust and self-esteem are 
foundational elements to motivate participation.  
In this sense, as table 14 shows, over two thirds of respondents believe they 
can positively change and improve life conditions175.  
Table 14 – Do you think your engagement can change/improve people lives? 
 All 
Sample 
Engineering Humanities 
Yes 70,70% 76% 65,40% 
I do not know 27,4% 24% 30,80% 
No 1,90% 0% 3,80% 
                                                 
175 Engineering students show a higher perception of social change with 76% positive responses. 
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Social networks then are means to enhance students’ voice and empowerment. 
Students seem confident that civic engagement can generate suitable circumstances to 
improve society. Local communities can then make use of universities’ rich and 
available resources to make a considerable impact. This critical change was also 
reported by another student member of the NGO: 
Before, we did not have enough freedom or motivation to do no 
matter what. After the revolution, there are plenty of 
associations that have been founded and, as consequence, 
everybody can join them, willing to change something in the 
present context (Interview F1, N). 
 
 
To the same extent, as shown in table 15, around half of respondents believe group 
activities can largely impact the community they live in. In this sense, if engineering 
students confirmed higher awareness of individual impact on community (see table 
14); humanities students consider groups to be more effective when it comes to make 
a change in the community (around seventy per cent against forty per cent engineering 
students)176. 
Table 15 – Community Impact: most important group of belonging. 
 All Sample Engineering Humanities 
Very large extent 17,3% 16% 18,50% 
Large extent 32,7% 24% 40,70% 
Neither large or small extent 44,2% 48% 40,70% 
Small Extent 1,9% 4% 0% 
Very small extent 3,8% 8% 0% 
 
                                                 
176 These considerations can, however, depend upon period of time they have joined an association; type of 
activities developed within the group; personal expectations; individual perceptions of impacts on community 
improvements. 
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Humanities students seem then to embrace more specifically an 
optimistic/ideological approach linked to group engagement but a lower level of 
individual self-consciousness. However, this can reflect research findings showing 
how humanities students are less involved in volunteering or community projects. 
Engineering students, instead, who are more involved in social participation and 
volunteering might have a higher self-awareness but also a more realistic/moderate 
position on the extent to which groups can effectively impact local communities.  
In this sense, the revolution and the fall of a dictatorial regime, allowed new 
opportunities for democratic and social participation through associations and social 
networks (including social media once banned or restricted during the regime) to 
support the creation of social capital for social responsibility. Findings confirm that 
context fosters identity building and personal motivation. Furthermore, friendship and 
social trust but not religious or associational life appeared to be key factors for social 
and political participation. The civic vs. political engagement divide between 
engineering-humanities faculty seems to confirm different students’ identity building 
related also to faculty embedded culture, practical vs. theoretical approach to real-life 
problems and different level of social awareness. 
The next section considers social capital for social responsibility in the university 
context, exploring implications for students’ civic engagement.  
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University and Students’ Academic Social Capital 
 
Academic social capital refers to social networks and social interactions based on 
knowledge sharing and linked to volunteering and civic engagement developed within 
universities by students, professors and administrative staff in connection with society. 
In particular, it refers to individual and institutional cultural capital linked to human 
capital intended as education, skills, knowledge and academic credentials, which 
defines and forms available social and economic resources. Nonetheless, it is often 
difficult to understand which conditions allow for its realisation; what type of social 
networks are required and how universities develop platforms functional to it. 
Students, in particular, can form their identity and generate social capital for civic 
engagement through: 
- peer experience based on sharing knowledge, information and opinions; 
- educational, cultural and professional development with other students, 
academic staff and external actors; 
- social responsibility activities in cooperation with local communities and the 
faculty administration. 
In this framework, students initially indicated177 what role students ought to have 
in Tunisian society in order to explore connections between academic and professional 
social capital associated and conducive to civic engagement. In this sense, one student 
commented:   
Students in Tunisia should build themselves in society. They 
should be active in society either through student participation 
or through sharing their opinions. To be a student means that 
                                                 
177 From questionnaire open-ended questions, processed with Nvivo software. 
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you should be a human being belonging to humanity in active, 
practical, mental and thinking terms (S7). 
 
Academic social networks if developed in line with strategies underpinning university 
social responsibility, can be functional to civic engagement, as students share a 
common space, cultural proximity, educational prospects, similar interests and needs. 
Another student also highlighted: 
 
 […] it is to be academically and socially prepared in order to 
participate in the development of society and to have a role in 
the progress of future generation (S28). 
 
 
Students seem to generally acknowledge their active role in society linking their 
educational experience to participation in society as both being an individual and 
collective duty. In this framework, universities are ideal places to foster social 
knowledge and community projects. Furthermore, students ought to be:   
 […] responsible towards the country in all aspects and to be 
well educated at political and intellectual level […] and, 
secondly, to improve intellectually, to have a knowledge and 
awareness of problems predominant in the country, from which 
to correct dysfunctions (E7). 
  
To the same extent, social responsibility articulates a sense of belonging and 
participatory attitudes that can be passed onto future generations. Universities can 
become a platform where both resources and means can be available to foster 
engagement. As table 16 shows, around half of respondents confirmed that their social, 
political or cultural engagement was also linked to the university context. However, 
68% of engineering against 30% of humanities students confirmed their engagement 
linked to the university, reinforcing previous findings on how the two faculties can 
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have different impacts on fostering academic social capital and students’ social 
responsibility.  
Table 16 - Student engagement linked to university. 
  All Sample Engineering Humanities 
Is your social/political engagement linked to 
University? 
YES 49% 68% 30,80% 
NO 51% 32% 69,20% 
 
 
In particular, it is central to consider how both membership and group 
homogeneity178 are important elements to define nature and type of social relations. In 
fact, if social capital is embedded in closed groups - such as family, tribe, religious 
sect, same gender groups, etc. - this can foster intra-group bonding ties, negatively 
affecting cross-groups bridging social connections (p. 101). Findings show that two 
thirds of students belong to a group with a low level of homogeneity while around a 
third to a group/association with a medium-high level of homogeneity. This can 
suggest that academic social capital formation in Tunisian public universities is mainly 
characterised by looser bonding and more bridging ties as students might come from 
different cities, different socio-economic, political, religious and cultural backgrounds, 
but still sharing a wide-range of similar interests, needs and habits. In  
                                                 
178 Group homogeneity included seven indicators: Community; Family; Sex; Religion; Education; Economic status; 
Clan (see Appendix V on research questionnaire - English version). Levels of homogeneity reflect cluster of 
participants’ answer related to group characteristics. In particular, low level refers to groups characterised by only 
1 or 2 indicators (out of the 7 above-mentioned); medium-high corresponds to a group sharing 3 to 4 indicators; 
whereas, high level of homogeneity consists of group with over 4 indicators. These indicators were used as 
previously identified and used during a World Bank project presented in the paper” A Dimensional Approach to 
Measuring Social Capital: Development and Validation of a Social Capital Inventory” by Deepa Narayan and 
Michael F.Cassidy (2001), to assess the relevance of heterogeneity in group membership positively associated to 
social capital development in local communities in Uganda. 
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this sense, creating bridging ties amongst students and across groups can foster social 
cohesiveness beyond potential dividing lines and also it can reduce confrontations, 
supporting dialogue and inclusiveness that is functional to positive “social capital” (pp. 
99, 100).  
Table 17 - Most important group level of homogeneity. 
 Tot N Valid Percent 
None 1 1,80% 
Low level (1-2) 37 66,10% 
Medium-High level (3-4) 16 28,60% 
High level (> 4) 2 3,60% 
 
On the other hand, as shown in table 18, internet/social media networks and 
socio-cultural associations are the most important groups of belonging179. In this sense, 
findings indicate a prospective generational shift in social capital creation from pre-
revolution regime controlled traditional socio-cultural participation channels180 to 
post-revolution non-traditional internet-related engagement (especially with reference 
to younger generations). In particular, the low or latent development of social 
responsibility third missions in public universities, might reflect students’ low level of 
volunteering and civic participation. Engineering students expressed higher 
involvement in socio-cultural, internet and volunteering activities, but lower 
participation to religious/Islamic associations. As explored earlier, humanities 
students, instead, tended to be equally involved in religious/Islamic and student 
                                                 
179Removal of regime censorship on internet-based social media also granted freer use in the post-revolution period. 
Social media, during the Arab spring, have played a crucial role to obtain visibility internationally and, to facilitate 
social networking and access to reliable and up-to-date information on occurring events during the revolution, 
forming a stable platform to social capital creation. 
180 Regime policies banned any political activities overtly challenging the government, limiting student clubs linked 
mainly to socio-cultural activities, as in other Arab counties (see chapter 3). 
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union/political related activities181, whereas volunteering is still rather marginal. In 
fact, 22% of humanities against only 4% of engineering students are active members 
of the student union; whereas 30% humanities against none of engineering in political 
organisations182. 
Table 18 – Most important group of belonging. 
  N Tot All 
Sample 
Engineering Humanities 
Most important group 
Internet/social media  12 23,5% 29,2% 18,5% 
Socio-cultural 10 19,6% 29,2% 11,1% 
Religious 8 15,7% 4,2% 25,9% 
  
Student Union 7 13,7% 4,2% 22,2% 
Volunteering  5 9,8% 16,7% 3,7% 
      Second most 
important 
Socio-cultural 13 29,5% 33,30% 25% 
Political  6 13,6% 0% 30% 
  
Sport  6 13,6% 16,70% 10% 
Internet/Social media 5 11,4% 12,50% 10% 
Religious  4 9,1% 8,3% 10% 
Professional Union 4 9,1% 16,7% 0% 
      Third most important 
  
Internet/Social media 13 32,5% 27,3% 38,9% 
Social action 6 15% 13,6% 16,7% 
Volunteering 5 12,5% 9,1% 16,7% 
  
  
  
Professional Union 4 10% 18,2% 0% 
Socio-cultural 3 7,55% 9,1% 5,6% 
Religious 3 7,5% 9,10% 5,60% 
 
To the same extent, engineering students rated volunteering as the third most important 
group with around 17 per cent of preferences; while humanities only as the fifth most 
important group, highlighting a recurrent trend between the two faculties. On the other 
hand, the overall lower rate of engagement in volunteering activities might be linked 
to pre-revolution censored associational activities which, if persisted, might also affect 
the consolidation of civil society and university-community partnership in the long 
term (pp. 106-112). 
                                                 
181Although, results could also be influenced by size and sample. 
182 As emerged in previous analysis, bias in students sample might affect this trend. 
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In relation to social capital, social responsibility and democracy, a lower 
participation in political parties or student union might confirm a general level of youth 
disenchantment to politics and/or sense of mistrust towards governmental institutions, 
despite personal awareness and commitment to social and political change. 
Participation in religious associations/groups is also rated relatively low, around 10% 
across the dataset, suggesting a low impact on students’ engagement, although 
generally a positive indicator of civic engagement and social capital creation183 (pp. 
68, 69). The control exerted by the regime over public and socio-political religious-
based activities might once more explain the politicised impact on Islamic 
associational role in Tunisia. However, 26% humanity students rated religious 
association or religious-related activities as the most important group of belonging, 
relatively high if compared to around 4 per cent of engineering. This can be linked to 
the previously explored on-campus secular-religious polarised environments in the 
humanities faculty between Islamic-affiliated and left wing student unions (contrary 
to engineering faculty).  
To the same extent, difference in students’ family socio-cultural background 
and non-scientific vs. scientific specialisation might be further considered. The 
contentious role played by Islamic political parties and the Islamic-affiliated student 
union, side-lined by the growing public presence of ultra-conservative Salafi groups, 
might show growing interest in joining Islamic associations amongst undergraduates, 
despite the 2014 parliamentary election results184. In this sense, existing civic-
political-religious factors might develop an alternative paradigm in the Tunisian 
                                                 
183 Overall, low students’ commitment might suggest students can find alternative sources to interact with social 
networks and identify alternative personal motivation to engage. 
184Last October 2014 parliamentary election, won by secularist party Nidaa Tounes (39%) and followed by Islamist 
Ennahda party (31%), has changed the results of 2011 election which, at that time, granted the Islamic Ennahda 
party to govern the coalition in the three year-long ad-interim government with over 40%.  
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context, combining and reconnecting Islamic values, religious activities and political 
or social engagement. In this sense, the undergoing process for national political 
pacification might ease increasing tensions in highly polarised faculties.  
  Furthermore, from field observations, campus environments and educational 
facilities in terms of classrooms, technological infrastructures, libraries and campus 
cultural and social life organisations, can explain types and nature of opportunities for 
civic engagement and social networking. As highlighted earlier, the engineering 
faculty organised events with professional companies and open-door socio-cultural 
events fostering a wider sense of on-campus community belonging, whereas this has 
not been noticed in humanities faculty where mainly academic conferences were 
advertised. Universities’ academic social capital and local networking are key to 
support services to the community via volunteering and community projects but also 
to engage students within the democratic and civic life. In Tunisia, interactions 
amongst students from different faculties and with other faculties nation-wide is a 
missing element which can reinforce students’ social participation while increasing 
social capital stocks across faculties and cities. In particular, universities can contribute 
to students’ social capital development thanks to inter-faculty and community-wide 
networks involving several actors to generate structural, cognitive and relational social 
capital including public institutions, students, professors, administrative staff, 
community partners and private companies.  
For instance, findings confirm a medium level of student-to-student academic 
social capital as around a third of respondents ask other students to explain course 
material and nearly half of them explain course material, as well as participate in team 
project (red answers).  
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Table 19 – How often have you experienced the following situations this year185? 
ALL SAMPLE Quite often Often Sometime Never  
Ask another student to explain class materials 7,5% 24,5% 60,4% 7,5% 
Explain other students class materials 9,4% 35,8% 54,7% 0% 
Team study project  15,40% 30,8% 34,6% 19,2% 
Understand others perspective in class discussion  23,5% 25,5% 39,2% 11,8% 
Discuss with people of different race/ethnic origin 31,5% 22,2% 31,5% 14,8% 
Discuss with people of different economic status 32,7% 34,6% 25% 7,7% 
Discuss with people of different religious beliefs 17,3% 28,8% 46,2% 7,7% 
Discuss with people of different political views 41,5% 37,7% 18,9% 1,9% 
Use information to understand social problems 20,8% 24,5% 45,3% 9,4% 
Connect class materials to social problems 18,9% 20,8% 35,8% 24,5% 
Learn class materials by heart 15,1% 39,6% 30,2% 15,1% 
Apply learnt theories to practical problems 8% 30% 42% 20% 
Develop competences of informed/ active citizen 8% 16% 44% 32% 
Discuss with a Professor class contents outside 
classroom  
13,50% 21,2% 48,1% 17,3% 
Discuss with a Professor  study/professional career  1,9% 24,5% 45,3% 28,3% 
 Take part in an internship 13,2% 9,4% 41,5% 35,8% 
Volunteering via faculty or academic professors 13% 16,7% 50% 20,4% 
Volunteering  via student union or other 
organisation 
20,8% 17% 35,8% 26,4% 
 
To the same extent, students also bridge relations via sharing knowledge/information 
in classroom or during group exam preparation and open discussion with students from 
different socio-economic, religious or political opinions (red answers), fostering also 
mutual understanding, information exchange and cooperation. On the other hand, 
around 40% of respondents stated they use class materials to understand and engage 
                                                 
185List of 10 items in addition to the Other category (see Appendix V on research questionnaire (English version).   
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with social problems; although 23% have never done so and 19% never applied learnt 
theories to practical problems, with over 50% of participants confirming that they have 
learnt class material by heart (green answers). Findings then suggest that universities 
have not yet structurally adopted a pedagogical framework to foster critical and 
engaged students. To the same extent, around 30% never developed competences as 
informed and active citizens and 44% only sometimes, confirming underdeveloped 
university SR in terms of courses on civic engagement and education for democracy 
that are crucial to students’ formation conducive to civic engagement (contrary to 
students’ expectations as previously explored in relation to university social 
responsibility). 
In relation to students-professor networking and social capital building (blue 
answers), students seem to reconfirm that they do not often engage with professors in 
relation to discussing class materials or career development, confirming weak ties and 
low level of interactions or social networking. The lack of communication, inter-
personal connections and information sharing can often lead to antagonistic and 
power-based dynamics, limiting also generalised trust. In fact, a student and member 
of the NGO, argued that: 
The problem was mainly at communication level, it was not 
easy to communicate with professors or the administration. 
There has always been a barrier, we could not improve things. 
Even if we, the students, had some ideas to improve the 
environment and information, we had no ears who could hear 
us. They wanted to impose everything and they did not want to 
listen to our propositions on what we really wanted (Interview 
M1, N). 
 
To the same extent, student-professors and student-administrative staff networks, 
shared norms and trust have not been consistently embedded in Tunisian public 
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universities. Limited channels for open and cohesive dialogue or constructive 
confrontation amongst students, the administration and faculty members, seems to 
play a crucial role, affecting on-campus interactions and cooperation. In particular, 
findings seem to further suggest how the development of co-constructive relations with 
professors can improve students’ self-esteem not only in terms of commitment to study 
programs but also social/civic awareness. In fact, a student pointed out how:  
 
It is fundamental to have communication in a framework of 
respect and improvement. Administration needs to provide for 
the optimal conditions for students and professors to work 
properly for good learning. Professors need to contribute to 
improve the faculty and the nation […] they need to instruct 
them (students) at level of consciousness…you do not have to 
be passive, you need to be responsible and aware of the situation 
we live in. Students need also to be responsible towards the 
other two parties. It is required respect and motivation 
(Interview M1, E). 
 
Furthermore, in relation to university third missions fostering student-
community and students-industry networking (grey answers), findings suggest that 
only one out of five have participated quite often or often in professional internship, 
while 36 per cent have never done so, reinforcing previous considerations on public 
universities’ low commitment to students professional development via internships, 
despite being one of both government and student’s main priority. Seemingly, as 
previously explored, 29 per cent of respondents confirmed having participated often 
in volunteering via university while 37 per cent via their student union or other 
organisations; however, over 1 out of 5 have never done it. These assumptions can 
suggest the significance of further fostering academic social capital for social 
responsibility in partnership with the local community. In fact, a student critically 
considered: 
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There are lots of shortcomings. Faculty has to support an 
education to form responsible, active and aware students. 
However, the education system is not able to provide for 
students' needs. For this, student's role needs to change from 
receiving to participate in order to make correction to the system 
with a cultural, political, social participation - student/student; 
student/university; student/society (S28). 
 
In this sense, Tunisian public universities have not yet constructively established a 
coherent campus-wide framework fostering social capital for social responsibility 
involving all parties (administrative staff, professors, students, industries and civil 
society). In particular, the imposition of a top-down authoritarian decision-making 
process resulted in: 
- disregarding students voices and expectations; 
- undervaluing the role of students as partners and members of universities; 
- limiting students actions in and outside the campus; 
- creating an us vs. them frame, often based on authority and mistrust.  
 
For this, in Tunisia, academic on-campus and off-campus social capital development 
seemed to be latent or rather fragmented, despite students’ personal awareness and 
commitment to democracy, social and civic engagement. Society-wide hierarchical 
power structures and limited university-community dynamics have had significant 
implications for students-professor-administration-society relations and networks’ 
development.  
Academic social capital creation in university, during the pre-revolution period 
might also have rather restrained wider political engagement or embedded democratic 
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attitudes. Nonetheless, the revolution experience has allowed for latent social capital 
development enabling social relationships for community engagement. Students, in 
fact, are active in socio-cultural, political, civic or religious activities fostering social 
cohesion beyond socio-cultural, religious or economic differences. Social networks in 
university contexts seemed to be characterised by loose bonding but wider bridging 
ties. Furthermore, internet related social media seemed also to complement class-
related student-to-student social capital creation, characterising new forms of virtual-
to-real social engagement amongst undergraduates. 
The next chapter further explores findings in relation to the literature review. In 
particular, it identifies future implications of democracy, social capital and social 
responsibility development in Tunisian public universities. 
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CHAPTER 7 –University Social Responsibility in 
Tunisia: Contextualising Research Findings 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter aims at further engaging research findings to the literature’s main 
debates and identified gaps, exploring what impacts and emergent considerations, 
university and students’ social responsibility, might have in present democratic 
transition in Tunisia. The interconnection between recent revolutionary movements, 
universities’ social role in the 21st century, Islam and democracy can help 
understanding political and socio-cultural changes in the region. As explored in earlier 
chapters, research limitations in terms of sample size and potential bias are important 
aspects to take into considerations in the light of presented arguments and critical 
reflections. In particular, three sub-sections explore the implications of: 
1- Islam as a re-emerging discourse in post-revolution Tunisia and its 
contribution to the development of democracy, social capital and social 
responsibility. 
2-  The role Tunisian public universities have in fostering on-campus inter-
communicative environments, curricular and extra-curricular civic 
engagement programs, including education for democracy. 
3- Students’ social networks and academic social capital in relation to 
students-professors-administration-community’s complex dynamics. 
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In the conclusion, the role and missions of Tunisian public universities are addressed 
in relation to socio-cultural, political and economic factors of a post-revolution 
changing society. 
 
Islam: Democracy, Student Identity and University Social 
Responsibility 
 
The predominantly bipolar post-World War II world order gravitated around 
US and USSR hegemonic superpowers. The end of the Cold war, instead, promoted a 
neo-capitalist economy and supported representative democracy as dominant 
paradigm based on political pluralism in the framework of civic, political and human 
rights. In the Arab world, however, post-colonial authoritarian regimes fostered a 
subaltern process of unaccomplished democratisation due to restricted political and 
civil freedoms, cultural censorship, corruption and clientelism. The post-independence 
social transition to modernity consolidated a hybrid system and conflicting discourses 
between Arab nationalism, favouring neo-colonial Western values-system and 
institutions; and, political Islamism rooted in socio-economic, cultural and religious 
traditions. The recent social uprisings in Arab countries suggest how unresolved 
tensions around the Islamic vs. secular divide affect society’s reconfiguration and 
democratic consolidation in the region. Popular demands for democracy, freedoms, 
justice, dignity and employment represented a landmark in North African modern 
history. However, in Tunisia, growing social tensions, political instability and public 
security concerns, swiftly exacerbated political dialogue and social pacification. 
Moderate and radical Islamic parties and associations are considered important 
actors in the new framework of social responsibility and social capital development 
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for social cohesion and democracy building. Democracy, social responsibility and 
civic engagement are increasingly determined by the confrontational interplay 
between Western-secular and Islamic-religious paradigms which are central to 
Tunisian societal development. Islamic values and beliefs can offer a shared cognitive-
emotional and social platform underpinning trust, social networking and volunteering 
activities. Islam then represents the most prominent and popular alternative discourse 
to identity building, personal and collective motivation for social or political 
engagement, as fulfilment of religious tenets. In this sense, what is the role of Islam in 
the aftermath of the Arab spring? How does the Islamic vs secular divide shape 
Tunisian society? Do Islamic values contribute to students’ identity to foster social 
responsibility? 
Public universities are critical not only for students’ professional formation but 
also for democracy and students’ civic and political engagement. For this, the research 
findings engaged to explore with three key issues: 
1- democracy and Islam; 
2- students’ identity and Islam; 
3- Islamic values and students’ social responsibility/civic engagement. 
In fact, universities can offer a platform where students from diverse economic, social 
and religious background engage to respond to complex societal challenges. In post-
revolution Tunisia, however, universities are facing growing pressure to address social 
issues related to democracy, community socio-cultural development, religious and 
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social tolerance while engaging with questions of teaching quality, research excellence 
and students’ unemployment. 
Islam and Democracy 
 
From an historical perspective, societies develop context-based socio-cultural, 
economic and ethical structures which shape local habits, traditions and specific value-
systems. In Arab countries, the embedded non-integrative semi-democratic model (see 
p. 160) often censored oppositional political and social forces, including Islamic 
associations and political parties to the detriment of integrative channels for public 
engagement. The conflicting paradigm based on a subjective adherence vs. rejection 
approach to democracy, unfolds an understanding of more complex processes linking 
personal and collective awareness to political participation, social responsibility and 
civic engagement. For this, how have recent socio-political changes and political 
processes in Tunisia impacted democratic attitudes? 
Findings show high levels of respondents’ awareness and adherence to 
democracy and democratic principles in relation to: freedoms, citizens’ rights and 
duties, respect, tolerance186, dignity and power to the people. The study considers 
government-citizens relationships within a more dynamic reality, characterised by 
coexisting and conflicting narratives within three groups: positivist/idealist; 
negativist/idealist and realist/pioneering (p. 157-160). In particular, public opinion in 
Arab societies confirmed how the majority would be ready and supportive of a 
                                                 
186 Democracy, however, was never directly associated to Islam or Islamic values but generally associated to 
religious tolerance, showing a progressive adaptation and contextual hybridisation to a Western-biased definition, 
limiting the scope to reconceptualise and redefine it to emerging socio-political and cultural realities. 
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democratic system (Ciftci, 2010).  However, findings rather revealed how democratic 
political systems and the practice of citizenship in Tunisia or Arab countries carries 
different challenges, analytical categories and conflicting understanding on politics, 
government’s role and Western influences. Personal awareness and identity building 
are often interlinked elements underpinning decision-making and actions. In these 
terms, democracy as a category and practice can become a contentious, incoherent and 
interchangeable concept readapted to changing political circumstances.  
To the same extent, the democratic gap in the Arab region was considered in 
relation to the presence of non-democratic and/or military regimes (Nasr, 2005); geo-
political international interests (Diamond, 2010), including US and Western countries 
supporting autocratic regimes (Bayat, 2007). In Tunisia, in fact, central government 
controlled and censored democratic participation, political opposition, including 
Islamic parties, social life and the media (Sadiki, 2002), affecting basic political, social 
and civil freedoms (Lawner, 2012). The top-down authoritative and self-reinforcing 
coercive system resulted in lack of opportunities for democratic participation and trend 
of social engagement’s under-development. In university context, findings seem to 
suggest that despite significant achievement of freedom of speech (p. 215), 
associational life (p. 220, 230) and access to information, including the internet 
(p.229); lack of university reform (p. 201, 202), the replacement of university police 
with new forms of faculty control and restricted freedoms of manifestation (p.200), 
have rather halted a process of wider democratic reforms. As a consequence, however, 
the democratic deficit rather derives to specific local and/or national contexts 
characterised by low level of trust in government institutions; the lack and 
infringements of basic freedoms; low political participation especially in the youth; as 
well as, non-democratic practices of corruption and clientelism (as during the Ben Ali 
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regime). For this, grassroot movements which allowed for unprecedented socio-
political reconfigurations did not impact much upon the crystallisation of reproduced 
social control and censorship187.   
Furthermore, oppositional forces (liberal-democratic, Islamist or leftist) have 
been systematically confronted with regime coercive, economic, political and 
bureaucratic power, suffocating also social mediating structures (Singerman, 2004). In 
particular, Islam has been identified as a key category impacting on post-revolution 
democracy building in Tunisia. In this sense, despite scholars often argued democracy 
and Islam (i.e. Islamic values and norms) are reciprocally exclusive, according to 
Tessler (2010) and Stepan (2011), Islam in not an obstacle to democratisation in the 
framework of a political project both democratic and Islamic. The study highlighted 
how the co-presence of alternative and conflicting discourses of public vs. private 
Islam in relation to moderate and radical political Islamic parties has impacted 
adversely upon the post-revolution democratic process. For this, in Tunisia, the 
political vacuum occupied by moderate Islamic party Ennahda has raised concerns of 
transparency and trust as political interests are mixed with religious purposes. Islamic 
political party, oppressed and marginalised during the regime, regained a public role 
despite the fact that Islam is not “something new to Tunisian society” (p. 164).  
On the other hand, the social and public confrontational role occupied by 
radical Islamists has challenged freedom of expression, political stability, public 
security and social cohesion undermining democracy and social engagement. Findings 
confirmed how the creation of parallel power structures (p. 165) such as political 
                                                 
187The new anti-terrorism law on 25th July 2015, approved by the Parliament with 174 votes in favour and only 10 
abstentions, confirms new national security measures, potentially also impacting on citizens’ rights. 
(http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/07/25/massacre-tunisia-anti-terror-law/30659205/, accessed on 
07/08/2015 at 13:58).   
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parties, associations, including university student unions, have exacerbated conflicts 
(especially in the faculty of humanities), confirming that the problem is “nor Islam or 
religion but the radical Islamists who are using religion for other projects and personal 
needs” (p. 166), linked to the use of Islam in the political and public sphere. In public 
universities, the secular project (p. 180, 182) has also disconnected Islamic values and 
principles in favour of a modern and scientific higher education. 
In Tunisia, nation-state building consolidated conflicting political, social and 
cultural relationships between a secular Western inspired citizenship and Islam socio-
political realities. Democracy thus opens to subaltern analytical categories in relation 
to political rights and basic freedoms within a post-colonial secular vs. Islamic 
political project. In this sense, the fragile and fragmented socio-political normalisation 
process is the real precondition to democracy sustainability. Post-revolution political 
cohabitation has marked a crucial step towards democracy building by re-establishing 
the contribution of an Islamic political and social agenda. However, the 2014 
parliamentary and presidential election’s success by Nidaa Tounes secular party seems 
to suggest a counter-alignment to redefine national political stability and social 
dialogue. In particular, the changing paradigm from private to public Islam has raised 
issues of political trust, public security and contribution to society. Furthermore, 
universities are rather regarded as secular institutions for scientific knowledge 
production. However, the secular vs. Islamic division might compromise dialogue 
between secular and Islamic-related students’ unions, affecting democratic attitudes of 
respect, dialogue and cooperation (as in the humanities faculty). 
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Islamic values and identity 
 
The research also aimed at further understanding what role Islamic values have 
on identity building, social trust and civic engagement. Islam and Islamic values are 
foundational to shape personal consciousness, social relationships and shared common 
beliefs in Tunisian society. Islamism has been defined as “liberticidal, anti-democratic, 
anti-feminist and anti-progress movement”, based on the indiscriminate use of 
physical violence and proselytism aiming at “Islamising” society (Charfi, 2008: 329). 
However, in Tunisia, findings highlight how identification with Islam is an important 
and complementary source, potentially promoting social capital and social 
responsibility in line with democratic principles. In particular, identification with 
Islam is not a self-evident, homogenous and static process as Islamic values coexist 
and interact with overlapping narratives - Islamic moderate and radical or secular (p. 
174-178). In particular, students tend to confirm a medium-high level of adherence to 
the five pillars of Islam as Shahada 79%; Sauf 72%; Salat 68%; and the holy book, 
Quran 77%; but to a less extent Zakat 51% and Hajj 30% (p. 175). Furthermore, in 
the Tunisian context, findings confirm the adherence to a moderate version of Islam 
with lower levels of identification with Hijab (22%); the notion of the Ummah (Islamic 
community/brotherhood) with only 24%; Romdhan (fasting month) with 48%; and 
Shariaa around 21% (p.175).  
Regime policies have also shaped the higher education system to accommodate 
the Arabic and Islamic tradition within the predominant framework of modernity, 
national identity and citizenship. Findings show how freedom of expression (22%), 
tolerance (19%), human rights (17%) and human dignity (14%) seem to constitute the 
most important secular/western values, linked to individual political, civic and social 
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rights and duties in reference to democratic principles188. On the other hand, Islamic 
principles mainly refers to ethical and spiritual values linked to devotion to God. As a 
consequence, Islamic values have not fostered directly a culture for civic engagement, 
limiting Islamic social capital. In particular, in relation to Islamic social capital, 
government censorship restrained opportunities to democratic and civic participation 
with limited influence of Islamic values on identity formation, fostering a fragmented 
and subaltern model for social responsibility. In fact, findings confirm how around 
51% of students identified with Zakat (compulsory donation or charity); 57% with 
Adal (Justice) and Sadaqa (community participation); 49% with Maslah (public good) 
and 36% with Tatawa (Volunteering). 
Findings then confirm previous study (Hassan, 2002), when Islam and Islamic 
political parties or associations have a lower impact on society’s cultural, political and 
social development, it normally leads to the development of a hybrid system. In fact, 
religious values coexist with other value-systems in influencing individual and 
collective identities. In Tunisia, moderate level of religiosity and identification with 
Islamic principles suggest the rejection of a conservative interpretation of Islam. 
However, the transition from a traditional to a modernised and globalised society can 
explain students’ exposure to an alternative value system (i.e. Western secular 
democracy), as Islam is not the primary framework of reference189. In fact the study 
highlights how, if Islamic values have a moderate influence in Tunisian society, this 
                                                 
188Democracy, nationalism, political rights, freedom of association and social participation are not perceived as 
core elements in students’ identity (p. 150). This might confirm a generalised under-developed status of social 
participation and civic engagement as result of passive adaptation to regime policies and low level of trust in public 
institutions despite individual high level of individual awareness.  
189 As such, cultural, linguistic, religious, political and socio-economic differences can lead to the development of 
subaltern and complex narratives in the definition Tunisian national identity impacting on individual value-
framework, including reference to: coloniser vs. colonised; tradition vs. modernity; religion vs. secular; French vs. 
Arabic; Berber vs. Arabic; urban vs. rural.  
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might increase complexity due to subaltern adaptations between embedded Islamic 
and secular traditions.  
In university contexts, findings confirm how universities’ role in promoting 
religious activities was largely dismissed with 73 per cent of preferences, mirroring 
emergent post-revolution conflicting relationships between Islam, society and politics. 
This might confirm how the construction of a secular education system (Kazem, 1992) 
has hindered Islamic values and norms to determine structural, relational and cognitive 
social capital that are central to identity building and civic behaviours. On the other 
hand, radical Islamist groups also had a negative impact inside and outside universities, 
posing a threat to democracy building (Torelli et al, 2012). In fact, post-revolution 
confrontations in universities have exacerbated degree of co-habitation. Findings 
(p.180-183) seem then to confirm how Islamic activists sustain a conflicting system 
based on the development of “states within states”, offering an alternative model to 
democracy and social capital (Clarck, 2004).  
In post-revolution Tunisia, the Islamic revival, in its moderate and more 
extremist version, has undoubtedly reconfigured political and social contexts. 
However, findings highlighted how Islamic values and norms can foster social 
cohesion and democratic dialogue (p.183) but, also it is also fuelling social 
fragmentation within the present process of unfamiliar democratisation (Boose, 2012). 
On the other hand, findings highlighted how Islam and Islamic values might not 
represent a primary source of students’ identity formation; although this might change 
as moderate and radical Islamic parties and associations are increasing their influence 
in society. In public universities, religious traditional and modern secular sets of values 
are rather complementary, although still evolving within a conflictual and politicised 
framework. In fact, if Islamic and Western value-systems seem to be both supportive 
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to social responsibility, trust and commitment to society; confrontational elements, 
specifically in faculty of humanities, might limit academic social capital, democratic 
dialogue and social responsibility. Islamic values then could contribute to foster 
democratic and civic attitudes for active engagement. However, existing political and 
socio-cultural barriers are hindering a change in socialisation patterns, fostering social 
conformism and the under-utilisation of Islamic social capital for social responsibility. 
 
Islamic values and civic engagement 
 
Religions are important resources not only for individual identity formation but 
also can be foundational also to democracy building, social capital creation and civic 
engagement (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Bourdieu, 1990; Fukuyama, 2002; Smidt, 1999; 
Furrow et al, 2004; King, 2003; Ozorak 2003), as well as, Islam in Arab countries 
(Faour, 2010; Sarkissian, 2012; Hunt-Hendrix, 2011). Islamic beliefs, values and 
social practices have a direct influence on students’ identity, their sense of belonging, 
trustworthiness, social awareness and commitment to society. However, family, 
education and religious institutions form complex and, at times, competing paradigms 
for social and ethical norms. According to findings, in fact, family is the most trusted 
group, followed by friends (most important group across dataset), associations (third 
with 47% of preferences); and, to a lesser extent, mosques/religious associations 
(p.171). Trust in government institutions, instead, was the lowest rated as the third 
most important group190. Religious associations in comparison to families, friends and 
                                                 
190 This, in turn, also suggests controversial issues related to democracy building due to lack of citizens’ confidence 
and low levels of political participation. 
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associations are considered less influential to build students’ trust and to promote 
context-based engagement.  
In this framework, Islamic associations and mosques have only partially 
fostered social responsibility, volunteering and civic engagement. The control exerted 
by the regime over Islamic associations restricted their role in offering a platform for 
volunteering, to educate to tolerance, respect and democratic values of social justice 
and mutual cooperation. In fact, students’ participation in religious associations/groups 
is relatively low, on average around 10% across the dataset. Furthermore, respecting 
religious values or acting in accordance with them, is considered as third most 
important reason for students’ participation with only 10,6% of preferences (p. 225). 
This reflects a different situation if compared to catholic associations in Western 
countries (Marta, Rossi, & Boccacin, 1999; Putnam, 2000). To the same extent, 
findings have also confirmed low participation across the dataset in religious activities 
(i.e. mosque, religious associations). Engineering students rated participation only 
between 9 and 4 per cent; whereas humanities students rated it as most important group 
with 26% (p. 237), corresponding to higher level of on-campus secular-religious 
polarised and conflicting environments. As a result, Islamic associations have 
generated higher levels of spiritual capital while developing political subversive 
emancipatory actions against government’s repressive policies, to the detriment of 
promoting volunteering based on Islamic social values. 
In relation to students’ decision-making processes, findings further confirm 
how family, friends and media technologies are the most influential determinants. 
Religious institutions are only rated alternatively 19% in engineering and 14.3% in 
humanities students as fourth within second most important opinion-making reference 
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(p. 173). Most likely, these assumptions reconfirm how coercive policies191 have 
restrained the opportunity to develop Islamic social capital and social networks in the 
public sphere. In this framework, findings suggest that there is not a strong relationship 
between students’ trust, opinion-making, identity building and civic engagement in 
relation to Islamic values and participation to mosques/religious associations. The 
study seems to confirm previous studies (Jamal, 2007), since political participation, 
civic engagement and Islamic social capital might not be self-reinforcing (contrary to 
Western contexts). In fact, there are interrelated factors undermining social capital 
creation, civic engagement and democracy building, such as: 
-  The lack of civic engagement activities promoted by mosques or Islamic 
associations. 
- The under-utilisation of Islamic values as a framework to foster social capital 
for social responsibility and volunteering projects. 
- Islamic institutions’ low influence on students’ decision-making, trust and 
motivation for engagement. 
- Existing conflicting tensions between Islamic vs. secular socio-political 
agenda.  
 
On the other hand, it is also relevant to assess if post-revolution changes might 
contribute to allow Islamic associations to foster the development of democracy in 
Tunisia, given the risk of repressive policies to prevent the extremist drift (Cavatorta, 
2006). In fact, post-independence secularisation and nationalisation policies have 
reproduced a positivistic and modern conception of universities as sites of scientific 
                                                 
191 In Tunisia as in other Arabic countries, Islamic charitable institutions were replaced with state-run substitutes 
ending independent Islamic charitable institutions (Bremer, 2004). 
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knowledge production. Findings also suggest how universities should have a neutral 
stand without promoting religious activities (p. 182), despite the need in universities 
for dialogue and tolerance between politicised student unions (p.167). Public 
universities can facilitate the establishment of intercultural and inter-faith coexistence 
as in the case of the engineering faculty. However, as in the faculty of humanities, they 
can also experience in-campus tensions, lack of dialogue, trust and cooperation due to 
secular vs. religious polarisation (see Raill et al, 2006). In particular, in the engineering 
faculty, the presence of a students’ parliament representing all students has created a 
platform for mutual understanding, respect and dialogue (p. 210), limiting oppositional 
dynamics related to the secular-religious divide. In university contexts, political Islam 
can potentially unsettle social participation while fostering academic social capital 
fragmentation, detrimental to the development of campus cohesive and democratic 
environments.  
In particular, the development of an Islamic-dominated public sphere has 
fomented new conflicting tensions confirmed by the establishment of “parallel 
institutions” linked to Islamic political parties/associations. Furthermore, findings 
show how the return of public Islam has raised confrontations and conflicts. In 
universities, students do not seem to be relating civic engagement, trust and identity 
formation to Islamic values. In the current transition period, the development of new 
narratives for social responsibility and democratic participation might not be 
flourishing due to the political instability, reproducing patterns of control and 
censorship (Lawner, 2012). In addition to this, the emergence of radical Islamic 
movements can jeopardise political dialogue, transparency, accountability and social 
cohesion, engendering social mistrust and a sense of cultural threat, determining a re-
interpretation of personal freedoms. In Tunisia, if successfully implemented, the 
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undergoing normalisation and pacification is an important step to build a more 
inclusive and democratic environments beyond nationalism/secularism vs. political 
Islam power-struggle dynamics, limiting centripetal radical social forces in order to 
sustain the co-development of society. 
The next section addresses and explores the development, limits, barriers and 
implications of universities’ social responsibilities in Tunisia. 
 
University Social Responsibility 
 
 In the last 20 years, higher education has globally grown in investment, 
demand, offer differentiation, national wealth production and jobs’ creation. Fast 
changing socio-cultural de-colonisation and post-hegemonic political contexts have 
shaped North vs. South unequal economic development based on knowledge 
production and consumption dynamics. The predominant neo-liberal and Western-
centred model favoured the implementation of privatisation policies, redefining public 
services, labour dynamics and social agency. Universities have thus become key actors 
in developing knowledge-based and market-driven economies based on scientific vs. 
humanities profitability logics, social-cultural commodification and standardisation, 
redefining students as customers or consumers.  
In Arab countries, national privatisation policies supported the implementation 
of a university-industry-government development model, placing national economic 
and graduates’ employability at the centre of universities’ entrepreneurship. However, 
growing socio-economic inequalities, structured unemployment, unaccomplished 
economic liberalisation and brain-drain dynamics, undermined social sustainability 
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and the capacity of public universities to foster corporate social responsibility and 
democracy in the region. In this sense, in post-revolution undergoing democratic 
processes, Tunisian public universities have been unable to reconfigure their role to 
meet job market requirements, to effectively commit to its social role and to develop 
an engaged university model. 
 
Tunisian Public Universities Mission-s 
 
The adoption of a dominant university-industry-government triple Helix model 
(Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 2000) increased global competiveness and innovation 
strategies, dividing universities in centres of excellence and centres of reproduction 
(King et al, 2011). The distinctive market-oriented institutional mission of economic 
utility and income generation readapted the notion of service, management, 
accountability and corporate responsibility (Bridges, 2007). However, the 
revitalisation of universities third missions for civic engagement has favoured the 
development of new ethos, supporting social responsibility and democracy (Cooper, 
2011; Mollas-Gallart, 2002; Vasilescu, 2010; Watson et al, 2011). In Arab countries, 
modernisation and globalisation have gradually hybridised society, determining 
conflicting binary value-systems (Camilleri, 1984) and deepening political, social, 
economic and cultural “subaltern mundialisation” (Bensaad, 2011). Furthermore, 
government policies supportive of economic growth, technological innovation and 
students’ employability undermined the development of an engaged university model 
(Bouhamed et al, 2010), leaving universities in the Arab region with a deficit in 
community-university engagement initiatives (GUNI, 2014). In this sense, Tunisian 
public universities have adopted a subaltern model characterised by limited autonomy 
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due to government control, low levels of Arab-Arab higher education cooperation and 
limited university social responsibility programs (UNESCO, 2009).  
In particular, the 2008 HE national law emphasised knowledge transfer, 
economic development, students’ employability, research and education quality as key 
priorities,  marginalising important issues such as democratic citizenship, civic skills 
and social responsibility. Findings identified public universities as institutions which 
ought to provide free education (41%); excellence in teaching (21%); transfer 
employability skills (21% - 32% for humanities students); promoting professional 
internship (13% - 20% for engineering students); as well as, developing its social 
dimension mainly via civic engagement courses (15%) and promoting civic and moral 
behaviour (12%) (p. 190).  For this, education is considered a public good, contrary to 
global trends of privatisation and commodification. Tunisian public universities are 
also intended as sites for civic engagement and democratic citizenship, promoting 
volunteering, community-wide research project and supporting on-campus socio-
cultural initiatives. Students seem then to value university third missions, in 
partnership with economic and social stakeholders in line with international trends (pp. 
81, 82) while questioning the establishment of a semi-entrepreneurial triple-helix 
model, potentially contributing to social tensions. In particular, contrary to government 
policies, the under-developed university-community-industry-government model 
limits the potential to reduce the gap between knowledge acquired in the classroom, 
students’ expectations and community well-being. 
Furthermore, teaching quality and employability skills are still regarded as 
underachieved, despite government’s endeavour to develop a knowledge economy via 
human capital formation. For this, institutional autonomy, competitiveness, teaching 
and research quality and outreach initiatives, emerged to be as key areas of reforms. 
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In fact, findings suggest how strategies to achieve a market-driven education within 
the triple-helix model might have neglected: 
- teaching quality and professional formation (p. 191); 
-  degree devaluation pushing graduates into under-demanded careers 
(p.192, 193); 
- opportunities for public/private internships (p.193, 194). 
 
Low commitment to support students’ professional internships, fragmented strategies 
and unresponsive management can affect students’ learning experience. The 
reproduction of a traditional educational model based on face-to-face teaching 
modules detached from context-based knowledge, failed to address socio-economic 
challenges and to adapt to socio-political democratic changes.  
In fact, professional internship and university social dimension lie at the heart 
of university third missions. To the same extent, respondents believe universities need 
to be more active in promoting civic behaviour (83%); civic engagement courses 
(81%); social inclusion (80%) and volunteering (78%), which are key to both 
curricular and co-curricular education objectives (p. 197). Findings also highlight a 
potential pattern characterised by a humanities theoretical vs. engineering practical 
divide, as humanities students, rated higher courses on civic engagement while 
engineering students volunteering and civic engagement activities. (p. 190, 197). As 
such, public universities have only partially embraced an engaged university model 
and only marginally developed partnerships with public-private external stakeholders 
within the local community (Cooper, 2011). In fact, findings suggest how “universities 
need to make a contribution in the formation of an attitude and an 
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understanding/awareness of social problems” (p.195). In Tunisia, outreach activities 
are still fragmented; whereas universities’ social mission, as per the governmental 
2008 HE reform, has not yet been institutionalised (Bahri 2012), undermining 
students, professors and administration cohesive cooperation. In addition to this, 
findings also confirm how students’ welfare192, needs, interests, learning expectations 
and faculty services might be under-performed, affecting the development of a student-
centred university (Neary, 2012). 
On the other hand, political participation (40%) and engaging in political 
debates (30%) are not regarded as central university missions. Reflections upon a de-
politicised public university might imply a rejection of students’ traditional forms of 
political activism. The general resentment against the presence of a university police 
(p.200, 216), controlling and censoring on-campus activities (confirming previous 
studies Holmes, 2008; Hussayini, 2012), might also open new windows for students’ 
social and civic engagement, adopting a socialisation model based on cohesion and 
consensus rather than conflicts. However, the low level of trust in government and 
political parties, instead, have deepened post-revolution political power-struggles and 
confrontations between radical right and left-wing student unions (Boukhars, 2014). 
In this sense, findings, contrary to the literature, open up to further understanding how, 
in Tunisia, students’ civic engagement and social responsibility might not be linked to 
political participation and democracy building (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Campante & 
Chor, 2012). In this sense, freedom of expression, civic engagement and political 
participation can re-establish a new sense of citizenship, despite the challenges of 
political instability and social violent confrontations.  
                                                 
192 In fact, students’ socio-political and economic right defence was rated by 70% of respondents (p.195). 
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University Social Responsibility: Barriers and Implications 
 
As previously explored, in the Arab region and particularly in Tunisia, there is 
a lack of research on universities social responsibility programs (including students’ 
social responsibility) and data availability in reference to outreach programmes 
(GUNI, 2014; UNESCO, 2009). In pre-revolution Tunisia, findings highlight how 
government’s control and censorship over universities and students’ life, fostered 
habits of political dis-trust and civic dis-engagement. University social responsibility 
and students’ civic engagement could not have flourished in the absence of basic 
freedoms, influencing students’ awareness and attitudes (p.207, 216). Civil society 
organisations have also been either functional to government national propaganda or 
confronted with censorship and violations (Sadiki, 2002), limiting their public role in 
society. In this framework, the gradual removal of regime control redefined the 
political and social life, opening to civil associations. After the revolution, the 
flourishing of new associations has changed attitudes and available opportunities, 
confirming how 52% of respondents believe universities should fund civil society 
organisations (p.197). However, universities slow responsiveness in developing a 
framework for university-community relationships (p. 222-225), can still hinder 
students’ participation.  
In Tunisia, university social responsibility would necessarily imply a 
progressive change in attitudes and habits rooted into campus life. As findings suggest, 
universities seem to act more as a brake rather than a vector, highlighting how a 
political consensus is required to identify the nature, definition, scope and strategies to 
be implemented in order to support universities and students in their respective wider 
societal roles (p.206-209). Moreover, despite students’ awareness to civic participation 
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(motivation), there is a lack of institutional capacity and under-developed social 
networks to enhance civic life (see Kirlin, 2002; Ridha, 2013). In this sense, 
universities would need also to promote an alternative social agenda, moving beyond 
crystallised dynamics, historically based on confrontations, authority and mistrust.  
In this perspective, if the Arab spring has encouraged individual and collective 
awareness and commitment to political and social change, socio-political dynamics 
can still generate low cooperation, passive adaptation or growing dissent. If fact, 47% 
of respondents never took part in volunteering activities whether via their faculty, 
professors, student union or other organisations (p. 240). For this, participatory 
opportunities might not flourish in the presence of non-supportive professor-students-
society integrated learning programs. Professors can lead to educating students as 
aware and critical citizens promoting civic engagement courses to understand and 
address social problems193. In particular, if students tend to foster academic and social 
networks by bridging relations with students from different socio-economic, religious 
or political opinions, universities need to support students’ engagement in local 
communities, public institutions and businesses (p.240-242). This is an important 
missing element that can be considered foundational to support cohesion and dialogue 
in contexts characterised by diverse social settings.  
 In this sense, findings have suggested how different factors can explain the 
under-development of university and students social responsibility, as the: 
- low level of volunteering and social responsibility’s embedded culture;  
- lack of trust/cooperation amongst students, professors and administration; 
- lack of institutional autonomy, transparency and accountability; 
                                                 
193 Only 8% of respondents applied quite often theories to practical problems and developed competences of 
informed/active citizens; whereas, respectively 20% and 32% have never done it (p. 238). 
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- campus police control and censorship over associational activities; 
- semi-democratic system limiting social, political and civic engagement.  
 
These barriers shed a light on how, in Tunisia, political and civil rights’ restrictions 
based on government control over universities’ autonomy, transparency and 
accountability limited also the development of a social dimension. The study suggests 
that the promotion of USR in Tunisia is still marginal194 and fragmented and the 
development of a more democratic society is a precondition for establishing a 
normalised society.  
In countries like Tunisia, characterised by pseudo-liberal economies and semi-
democratic political systems, social and civic participatory attitudes have suffered 
from restricting freedoms, governmental disincentives, clientelism and corruption. In 
this sense, there is an inverse and negative connection between university social 
responsibility and student participation. Social responsibility’s under-development can 
be mainly associated to context-based political and socio-cultural environments, rather 
than linked to lack of students’ interests, identity building or personal awareness. Post-
revolution dynamics suggest that students and civic associations have emerged as main 
social actors and drivers of social change. However, new opportunities need to be 
considered in the framework of political and social tensions, restricting available 
resources (including the development of Islamic social capital), channels of 
expressions or individual freedoms. Tunisian public universities are witnessing 
political changes and emergent socio-economic challenges that could be addressed 
                                                 
194 Findings also showed a difference in USR development between Engineering and Humanities faculties, being 
the former more pro-active in the development of in-campus events, clubs and external relationships with both 
companies and local communities; and the latter, more characterised by a fragmented approach to USR often led 
by professors or single departments. 
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successfully only by adopting common strategies with public institutions, the 
industrial sector, civil associations and community leaders, potentially leading to the 
gradual redefinition of their role and missions in society. 
The next section explores social capital development as a central factor to students’ 
social responsibility. 
 
Academic Social Capital and University Social 
Responsibility 
 
Social capital is a multi-dimensional and context-based concept referring to 
embedded social, economic, cultural or political interrelationships, determining social 
agency. In this sense, type and complexity of social relations might lead to information 
sharing, trust and community cohesiveness. Social and political participation can also 
favour better democratic and civic environments (as explored in Western-centred 
contexts). However, in Arab countries, social relations can be rooted in different value-
systems and socio-cultural environments within semi-democratic political systems, 
exerting control over civil society and restraining civic and political participation. As 
a consequence, social trust, civic engagement and political participation might not be 
self-reinforcing. In Tunisia, the government tended to control social mediating 
structures in the public space, including Islamic associations. In this sense, the 
development of social capital in autocratic political systems might not be conducive to 
democracy but rather supporting a co-opted paradigm where the state confronts civil 
society, fostering habits of passive adaptation. Secular and Islamist associations can 
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be antagonist to central governments and disenfranchised from active engagement or 
political participation.  
Universities also contribute to social capital generation. In fact, they can 
enhance channels of communication, information sharing and most often knowledge-
led socialisation which are basic characteristics of academic social capital. Students, 
professors and the administration determine the type and nature of social ties, 
connecting intra-faculty networks with private companies, public institutions and local 
communities. In particular, social exchanges can develop and support intellectual, 
cognitive and relational social capital but also social capital for social responsibility 
and civic engagement.  
 
Academic social capital 
 
Social capital often implies social relations based on power relations. 
Individual and/or collective economic and non-economic interests often reproduce 
shared norms of reciprocity, trustworthiness, community-wide associational 
membership and political participation for higher levels of community well-being 
(Hanifan, 1916; Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2007). 
However, in the Arab region, Islamic social capital specifically refers to universal 
Islamic principles within conventional social settings based on Islamic welfare and 
social participation (Farooqi, 2006; Bremer, 2004). In Tunisian public universities, 
however, the study identified three main categories of academic social capital and 
social networks: 
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1. Student-to-student: primary form of social capital, as students tend to share 
time and spaces, information, interests and habits; but also functional to socio-
cultural, political and civic engagement. 
2. Students-to-professors: referring to students’ formation (i.e. class delivery; 
exams and evaluation); but also linked to professional career and internship, or 
community programs. 
3. Students-to-community/industry: linked to university third missions to 
enhance institutional social responsibility in cooperation with local community, 
associations, public institutions or companies. 
 
Multi-layered and multi-dimensional social networks interconnect 
simultaneously different institutions (i.e. public, associational and private companies), 
and actors (i.e. students, professors, administrative staff, community leaders or 
company managers). In particular, findings confirmed how students-to-students’ 
academic social capital is only moderately developed, as 32% of students ask peers to 
further explain class content (60% only sometimes); and 45% explained it to others 
students (55% only sometimes). To the same extent, 46% of respondents have taken 
part in team projects, although 19% never did. These elements confirm how 
universities offer an important platform of dense interactions as students co-share 
direct benefits primarily linked to their academic performances. Furthermore, 
academic social capital is particularly relevant in promoting dialogue amongst students 
from different race/ethnic origin (54%), economic status (67%), religious beliefs 
(46%) or political views (79%) which can be conducive to mutual understanding and 
trust but also tolerance and social cohesion (p. 240, 241).  
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On the other hand, universities only marginally have achieved to educate 
students as informed and active citizens, as only 24% of students stated to have often 
or quite often developed such competences. This, in turn, can undermine civic 
engagement and, foremost, democratic behaviour. In particular, critical learning is a 
central element that prepares students to understand social problems and make 
informed decisions. On the other hand, findings confirm previous study, as 45% of 
respondents have used information to understand social problems; while 39% have 
connected class material to social problems and only 38% applied theories to practical 
problems (Kazem, 1992). Furthermore, 55% of respondents confirmed learning often 
class material by heart and 30% of them only sometimes. In particular, lack of 
pedagogies and curricular design, connecting students’ learning to society, can be 
detrimental to their formation, individual engagement and self-awareness. Seemingly, 
the development of fragmented networks can limit opportunities, impacting on 
available channels for dialogue, students’ involvement and ownership (Morgan & 
Streb, 2001).  
To the same extent, student-professors relations seem to be characterised by 
weak ties based on authoritative relationships (p. 214), affecting shared information 
and informal networking including norms of trust and trustworthiness. In fact, only 
26% of respondents discussed study or professional career with a professor (28% never 
did); and 35% discussed class material outside class (17% never did) (p.239). To the 
same extent, professors seem to have low influence on students’ opinion-making (rated 
fifth within third most important group with less than 10% of preference) (p.170), 
despite the fact that undergraduate students often find motivation or consider them as 
leading figures (p. 206). Findings have also highlighted the extent to which students 
might develop an antagonistic attitude and sense of dissatisfaction towards both 
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professors and administrative staff, negatively affecting dialogue, cooperation and 
social capital formation (Mitchell, 2010).  
In relation to university third missions, findings confirmed that 68% of 
engineering but only 30% of humanities students had the opportunity to participate in 
social, cultural, political or religious engagement via the university or student union. 
This divergent result has suggested the extent to which faculties are central to support 
favourable conditions for academic social capital. However, findings also confirm how 
taking part in an internship or volunteering activity is still relatively under-developed 
due to lack of available opportunities. In fact, only 22% of respondents took part in an 
internship during their study against 36% who never did. Furthermore, students tend 
to participate more often in volunteering activity promoted by student union (37.8%) 
than by the university (29.7%). Notwithstanding, around 23% of respondents never 
took part in any volunteering projects, whereas on average 43%, only sometimes (p. 
240).  
In this sense, the lower degree of engagement outside the university can 
undermine both employability skills and levels of “civicness” development 
(UNESCO, 2009 - p. 93). In fact, academic social capital creation in Tunisian public 
university might not have fostered political and social participation, often under-
resourced and fragmented (contrary to Putnam 1993, 2000). To the same extent, 
volunteering, voting, political party engagement or associational membership are rated 
relatively low (p.227, 229), identifying a weak link between civic engagement, trust in 
the government and support for democratic institutions in Tunisia. In particular, 
universities social responsibility and academic social capital need to be understood 
within a wider framework of social-political censorship, reproducing attitudes of social 
conformism or adaptation. Furthermore, findings confirmed how in semi-democratic 
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political systems, authority favours lower level of social trust, participation and civic 
engagement (Hussainy, 2012; Youth Arab Report, 2007). Universities’ third missions 
can directly address questions of democracy sustainability, corporate social 
responsibility and civic engagement to generate social capital and social cohesiveness. 
In Tunisia, the possibility to foster latent social ties for civic engagement and 
democratic participation can support decreasing confrontations in public universities. 
 
Students’ Identities, Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
In the Arab region, opportunities for civic engagement and volunteering are 
often largely limited, unstructured and under-developed (Hamami, 2012; Marseille 
Conference, 2010; Duncan, 2012). Students’ social participation is determined by 
several factors and preconditions: personal identity; family background; campus 
environment, students-professor relations; as well as, socio-cultural and political 
context. In particular, identity building is a key element (Younnis et al, 1997) as 
students develop self-awareness, sense of belonging, trust and commitment. 
Furthermore, social networks are characterised by complex dynamics defining three 
different but interconnected dimensions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998): 
 
- Relational: social trust, obligation, social participation and community  
improvement. 
- Structural: institutional network ties and network configuration. 
- Cognitive/emotional: spaces, interests, habits, narratives, emotions and  
languages.  
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In the research context, findings confirm how family and friends are an 
important source of socialisation, combining relational and structural social capital 
foundational to engagement (p.171). To the same extent, 23% of participants were 
born and resident in the same city and nearly 23% were resident there for three or more 
years (while 31% up to two years), suggesting a low to medium level of sense of 
community belonging, trust and networks’ building, connected to cognitive and 
emotional social capital195. Furthermore, respondents perceived others as helpful 
(52%) and trustful (around 17%), and only 22% had a more neutral stance, defining 
others as neither helpful nor trustful (p. 224). Level of personal trust is central to social 
capital generation as it can reinforce students’ participation and personal motivation. 
To the same extent, in university contexts, findings also suggest students’ engagement 
in associations is characterised by a low level of group homogeneity with 66% of 
responses (p.236), identifying stronger/inclusive or “bridging” ties but looser 
exclusive or “bonding” ties within groups/associations (Putnam, 2002) 196.  
High density of campus social relations generates weaker bonding ties but 
stronger bridging networks. Bridging social capital is considered positive as it fosters 
dialogue and mutual understanding amongst members of different socio-economic, 
political, religious and cultural backgrounds (as explored earlier). It also fosters social 
cohesiveness and inclusiveness which might favour civic engagement. For this, 
enhancing opportunities for civic engagement with local associations can strengthen 
and deepen social commitment during post-conflict’s transition process. In particular, 
respondents rated associations as the third most important group of trust in a difficult 
situation (p.171), highlighting how associational life con foster trust. In this sense, if 
                                                 
195 Lower level of community belonging might be connected to less developed social networks in new context, 
often away from neighborhood where they have grown up. 
196 Research, however, did not aim at further understanding associations’ activities in relation to social capital “dark 
side” (Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010) and also could not assess level of students’ involvement. 
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universities continue to sustain a dis-engaged model, latent social capital formed 
within faculties might remain under-developed.  
In particular, in university contexts friendship helps to generate trust, 
confidence and tolerance. Findings confirmed previous studies,  as students engage in 
society aiming at improving quality of life; fostering dialogue or easing social tensions; 
making new friends and addressing community problems197 (p.225) (Cicognani et al, 
2008). For this, personal awareness associated with the possibility to make a change 
in local communities is an important aspect for identity building to support democracy 
in non-democratic countries (Paxton, 2002). To the same extent, In particular, findings 
show that students tend to perceive their engagement as positively improving/changing 
people lives (71% of responses) and around 50% believe that can positively impact the 
community they live in (p.231, 232). In fact, social participation can reinforce self-
confidence. Furthermore, change community social and political participation 
represents the most important reason of personal engagement (p.225), confirming how, 
during the post-revolution period, active citizenships is based on shared 
responsibilities.  
As explored earlier, engineering students identify themselves with civic/social 
activities  (i.e. local communities activities; volunteering; human rights promotion; 
charity); while humanities, to political ones (voting; party activism; manifestation 
against unjust laws) 198 (p. 227). On the other hand, social capital indicators such as 
volunteering, voting, newspaper reading or religious-linked activities are all rated very 
low. As such, in the research context, exposure to government-controlled media (i.e. 
                                                 
197 Post-revolution socio-political and economic tensions linked to social and civic activism have had most likely a 
major impact on respondents’ perceptions. 
198 This might suggest students’ traditional vs. post-modern forms of personal engagement. The former related to 
political protests, manifestation, active dissents towards government policies; the latter related to charity, 
community engagement, volunteering, social networking and manifestation for social or global concerns, 
addressing new awareness and perspectives to the role of engineers in society. 
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radio, television, newspaper) can distort access to information and foster lower social 
trust towards the government (p.229). In this sense, information that is central to social 
networking and trust amongst members, in non-democratic settings, seems to be rather 
endangered and often bypassed via indirect channels. In fact, regime policies of control 
and censorship have also restrained channels for students’ expression, democratic 
practices (i.e. voting) and opportunities for volunteering activities, including Islamic-
oriented.  
In this sense, regime policies promoted a conformist social capital based on 
clientelism, corruption, passive adaptation to pro-regime socio-political propaganda. 
In this framework of subaltern and asymmetric social capital creation, the regime also 
arbitrarily limited university social dimension, fostering the under-utilisation of 
academic social capital for social responsibility. In particular, social injustices, police 
repression and restrictions on basic freedoms can undermine students’ self-confidence 
and imaginary; but also can increase level of awareness and capacity building 
(Carmon, 1997 in Larsen et al, 2004). In fact, social capital can be latent but not absent 
as students form their identity despite the lack of self-expression and participatory 
opportunities. In particular, personal awareness and identity building reflect students’ 
aspirations and commitment to improving community life. However, under 
authoritarian regime, social capital under-utilisation can have a negative impact upon 
political participation and civic engagement.  
In post-revolution Tunisia, pre-existing latent social capital ties can enhance 
new channels of social networking, communication and exchange. Politics, once a 
taboo during the Ben Ali regime, became a main topic of discussion in the media, 
including the internet. Furthermore, participation in public demonstration and strikes, 
have become common practices of direct citizenship, once banned by the regime. In 
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fact, findings also indicate a shift in social capital creation from pre-revolution 
traditional participation in socio-cultural activities to post-revolution non-traditional 
internet-related engagement199 (p. 237). In particular, this might suggest how new 
generations tend to form their identities and construct networks via new media 
technologies, expanding the range of opportunities to engage while developing on-line 
to off-line connections (in Ellison et al , 2007; Angrist, 2013; Saleh, 2012). In parallel, 
engagement in socio-cultural associations/activities still is relatively high, mirroring a 
continuity with pre-revolution forms of engagement (Duncan, 2012). On the other 
hand, humanities students reconfirm a higher level of personal engagement in political 
(30%) or student union groups (22%); whereas engineering in socio-cultural (29, 2%), 
volunteering (17%) and professional union (17%)200.  
In this sense, students’ academic social capital is linked to available 
opportunities universities develop with external stakeholders. In Tunisia, academic 
social capital and student social responsibility still remain underdeveloped201, 
confirming how government policies have failed to fully develop students as socio-
economic entrepreneurs of their future (UNESCO, 2009). For this, students’ learning 
experience and professional career are important priorities that can be pursued in 
connection with civic engagement and social responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
199 Internet and social media (partially censored during Ben Ali regime), is across dataset the most important 
group/mean of students’ engagement. 
200 Only engineering students confirmed being member of professional association, highlighting once more existing 
differences between the two faculties in relation to career and employment opportunities. 
201 In this sense, student social responsibility reflects a sociology of emergences, “which could develop an inquiry 
into alternatives that are contained in the horizon of present possibilities, by adding to the existing reality the 
possibilities and future expectations it contains” (Santos, 2012: 56). 
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Summary 
 
The relationship between Islam, university social responsibility, students’ civic 
engagement and democracy has been explored in the context of post-revolution 
Tunisia. In relation to university social responsibility, the entrepreneurial model 
government-industry-university paradigm has revealed structural deficiencies and 
limitations. In particular, students’ employability and internship opportunities are still 
under-achieved. On the other hand, the side-lined development of a university engaged 
model, yet to be consolidated in Tunisia, holds the potential to implement a framework 
to develop democratic and civic skills bridging the gap between public universities and 
their surroundings (Najem, 2012). However, the contextual underdevelopment of 
university social responsibility is a critical factor contributing to students’ academic 
social capital underutilisation. For this, social capital creation resulted in fragmented 
and only partially connected to civic engagement or not directly associated to students’ 
political participation. Seemingly, students-to-professors ties were defined as weak 
and often antagonistic, affecting trust, cooperation and dialogue. To the same extent, 
lack of structured university-community partnerships undermined the promotion of 
professional internships and volunteering activities. 
In the Tunisian context, students show understanding, commitment and self-
awareness of what democracy, social responsibility and civic engagement refers to. 
The relationships between students’ identities, Islam and democracy confirmed the 
presence of a binary but non-exclusive value-system. Western-secular and Islamic-
religious frameworks contribute to identity formation, although still within conflicting 
narratives. In this sense, Islamic values and Islamic social norms are complementary 
to modern ideals of freedoms, tolerance, human rights, social justice and civic 
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engagement. However, families and friends rather than Islamic institutions, civil 
associations or government institutions are considered primary source of social trust, 
influencing students’ decision-making and personal opinion. The existence of a 
fragmented and conflicting socio-political paradigm, where the government acts as 
competitor and opponent to both Islamic and civic associations, has fostered political, 
religious and cultural cleavages, limiting citizenship and democracy. After the 
revolution, the emergence of centripetal social forces, in particular the involvement of 
radical Islamic extremists, has affected political stability and social cohesion. In public 
universities, the presence of an Islamic-affiliated student union has also fostered 
tensions, undermining trust, cooperation and dialogue while reshaping campus life. In 
this framework, universities are called to address new social challenges co-constructed 
around secular vs. religious conflicting lines and to reconsider their role towards social 
responsibility and civic engagement for democracy sustainability. 
The next section presents research conclusions exploring main contributions and 
recommendations for further research in relation to university social responsibility and 
academic social capital in Tunisia.  
 
 
 
 
 
280 
 
CHAPTER 8 - Conclusion 
 
 The study has emphasised how legal, structural, educational, political as well 
as collective and subjective dynamics are major factors influencing the nature, 
definition, implementation and development of social responsibility in the university 
context. Governmental policies regulating universities’ governance, autonomy and 
academic freedom have had an impact on the development of both curricular and extra-
curricular programs. To the same extent, political, social and cultural habits also play 
an important role in determining university-community partnerships. These elements 
are central in order to grant universities the capacity to develop a coherent strategy to 
implement institutional third missions. In particular, both local and national contexts 
can enhance main identified barriers, resulting in lack of available opportunities. 
Social networks and academic social capital have been considered as two intertwined 
elements, defining the type and nature of relations amongst different actors within 
universities.  
The importance of creating bonding ties across faculties and bridging ties 
amongst faculty members with local communities are key aspects to support 
collaborative participation and inter-communicating networks for information sharing. 
At an individual level, students’ identity building, civic engagement courses and 
participating in community projects are interrelated features defining students’ social 
responsibility. Furthermore, family, friends and personal values, including Islamic 
values, are considered central to students’ awareness and motivation. Social and 
political participation, however, might be adversely affected if antagonistic narratives 
such as secular vs. Islamic, democratic vs. authoritative/semi-democratic, Arabic vs. 
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Western, are framed and reproduced fuelling socially or politically constructed 
tensions and conflicts.  
 The study has underlined how Tunisian public universities have only 
marginally developed their social dimension. At present, there is a dominant pattern 
of under-utilisation of social capital for social responsibility. In this sense, despite 
recent efforts to reform the higher education system, following also undergoing waves 
of change from recent revolutionary movements, the existing legal framework, 
supporting the development of a university entrepreneurial paradigm, is limiting public 
universities to coherently implement third missions and wider societal engagement. 
As a matter of fact, university social responsibility could potentially foster partnerships 
with civil society organisations to enrich students’ civic skills and the development of 
more democratic environments. However, students have been largely kept aside as 
potential partners, constraining their active involvement in society and limiting their 
contribution to university social responsibility due to the reproduction of non-
integrative approach to university-community partnership.  
 
Considerations on University Social Responsibility and 
Academic Social Capital 
 
 
 In the Tunisian context, public universities are institutions rooted in social and 
economic environments, endowed with rights and duties defining their role and 
missions. In fact, they implement strategies to meet objectives in relation to the: 
- provision of professional formation (i.e. teaching); 
- pursuit and advancement of knowledge (i.e. research); 
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- commitment to local communities’ public service (i.e. public-private 
partnerships). 
 
In particular, universities, operating within a framework of top-down decision-making 
dynamics, need to address their missions in line with existing barriers and constraints. 
Freedom of expression, association and participation are not only foundational rights 
and essential components of a democratic society but are also basic requirements for 
individuals and institutions to act free from censorship, threats or other kind of 
interferences in respect of cultures, values, national laws and religious principles. 
Restrictions to basic freedoms limit available opportunities to express ideals, emotions 
and opinions or sharing information to move beyond authoritative and coercive 
systems.  
These elements had also an impact on students’ education, the pursuit of 
knowledge, employability and direct involvement in the local community as an 
integral part of their learning experience and endowed rights and duties. The present 
situation in the Arab region calls for developing democratic mediating structures to 
avoid social fragmentation. In higher education, it is a compelling need to develop 
appropriate conditions to enhance university social responsibility by creating a new 
legal framework based on political support and new social dynamics within campuses 
to foster professors, administrative staff and students’ interrelationships. In this sense, 
supporting academic social capital for social responsibility is an important 
precondition for a sustainable and self-supportive model of an engaged university.  
 In this sense, there are four main aspects to be considered and re-assessed in 
order to foster university social responsibility in public universities: 
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a) Legal framework: the 2008 HE reform enacted before the regime change in 
Tunisia failed to address specifically university’s social dimension - including 
civic engagement programs and education for democracy – unlike other 
international experiences. In particular, pre-revolution policy identified 
universities as central players for economic growth and national development, 
overshadowing institutional commitment to social, civic and democratic 
development. At present, after the 2011 regime change, despite greater 
freedoms of expression, association and enacted decentralised reforms (i.e. 
appointment by election of faculty deans), governments in power have not yet 
presented an integrated higher education national reform, failing to recognise 
universities and students’ role as agents of democracy building. 
b) University autonomy: the centralised system of governmental control over 
university autonomy has been limiting university third missions in three 
important aspects: academic freedom, curriculum and extra-curriculum 
development and funding availability. In particular, governments have not only 
provided general guidelines regulating university missions and objectives but 
also rather limited and defined budget expenditures; imposed faculty subjects, 
degree, examination and curriculum contents as well as the development of 
extra-curricular activities. In this framework, restrained institutional autonomy 
has limited institutions’ flexibility to develop external partnerships and 
community projects, whereas the lack of academic freedom has prevented the 
establishment of innovative pedagogies promoting context-based knowledge, 
reflecting critical and problem-solving approach to theories. In particular, the 
absence of extra-curricular or co-curricular courses on civic engagement, 
democracy and social participation have undermined universities’ capability to 
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meet students’ demands and to address socio-cultural cleavages and post-
revolution emerging challenges. 
c) Campus life: university social responsibility foremost begins from within 
faculties as faculty ethos, embedded culture and opportunities represent 
institutional wider commitment to public good. Post-revolution removal of 
police in the campus has guaranteed more freedom for associational life to 
flourish; however, informal control and bureaucratic barriers are still in place. 
The necessity not only to remove informal control, threats or interference but 
also to fully promote new student-run societies; on-campus awareness raising 
events; faculty awards for civic engagement; funding projects and foster a 
community-oriented campus, is still far from established. To the same extent, 
international cooperation and inter-faculty projects can be key in fostering 
networking, good practice sharing and wider pedagogic and research-intensive 
partnerships. 
d) External partnerships: social responsibility is rooted in specific context-
based environments in cooperation with associations and local communities to 
promote volunteering or related civic engagement projects, including research-
led partnerships. Universities ought to be more pro-active in establishing a 
structured framework and offering students a platform with available 
participatory opportunities to the benefits of local communities, contributing 
to society’s democratisation process. However, the lack of government support 
in promoting social participation was linked to pre-revolution legal restrictions 
of national associational law; under-developed institutional commitment; lack 
of faculty embedded culture and limited funds. These factors have all 
contributed to a gradual impoverishment of university-community social 
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relationships. In this sense, university social responsibility is still an emergent 
element of universities’ third missions. 
In this framework, students’ social responsibility, closely linked to university 
social responsibility, has been largely affected. Students are not educated to 
become promoters of democratic practices and to develop comprehensively 
citizenship rights. In fact, they are often secluded from faculty decision-making 
process and engagement to society mainly due to the presence of a socio-political 
system based on control and censorship. To the same extent, the 2008 HE reform 
did not clearly identify what role students might have in society or evaluate 
education for citizenship and democracy. The centrality of volunteering and civic 
engagement was not acknowledged, limiting also students’ potential contribution.  
These considerations further highlight existing structural constraints in 
opposition to research findings reporting students’ high degree of awareness and 
demands for courses on civic engagement and opportunities to actively engage in 
society, both relevant to their learning experience. The establishment of a society 
generally promoting a democratically inspired system is distinctly characterised by 
tensions and contradictions. However, it cannot be pursued if the same democratic-
like values and principles are not shared within public institutions and further 
fostered in society at large. In particular, the divergence between students’ 
identities, self-awareness and individual experiences and expectations in their 
everyday life reflects shortcomings of an unaccomplished modernisation and 
democratisation process, affecting also available channels for dialogue, 
communication and expression. To the same extent, growing disillusionment in 
relation to government policies and public institutions’ administration has fostered 
286 
 
habits of passive adaptation or subversive opposition linked to lower levels of 
generalised trust and non-active political participation. 
In terms of university and students’ social responsibility in support of academic 
social capital, Tunisian public universities are still dominated by an inadequate and 
conflicting framework amongst different actors, both on-campus and with external 
partners. As mentioned earlier, university and students social responsibility can 
only be achieved if all parties are considered in its development and 
implementation. At present, universities are affected by several lines of cleavages 
which are counterproductive to academic social capital understanding and 
development: 
 
a) Students’ formation: academic social capital for social responsibility is 
primarily formed by student-to-student interactions. Despite significant time 
spent in contact with other students on a daily basis, social relations are often 
either linked to courses/exams’ revision or to developing friendship ties (i.e. 
fun, hobbies, going to cinema or meeting for a coffee); but less interconnected 
to social engagement and extra-curricular volunteering activities. In particular, 
course content and class materials are often not integrated and connected to 
real-life problems; students’ formation as engaged citizens is either low or in 
some circumstances absent; associational life opportunities inside or outside 
the campus are also generally lacking or fragmented. Academic social capital 
then is not generally linked to students’ social responsibility. As a result, 
universities need to revise strategies to offer wider opportunities to critically 
engage students in local communities; to redefine class material contents, 
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scope and purposes; to promote an inter and intra-faculty platform for students 
to share spaces, information, common goals, expectations and activities. 
b) Intra-campus relations: secondary forms of social relations are developed 
amongst different agents: namely students, professors and/or faculty 
administration staff. Campus hierarchical and authoritative environments have 
supported a system based on top-down power relations which cemented 
separation, limited dialogue and, to the same extent, lack of reciprocity. After 
the revolution, the removal of government censorship and control has gradually 
questioned and partially undermined authority leading to open confrontations. 
In this sense, faculty social trust has further fragmented along antagonistic 
dividing lines creating what can be defined as a multi-layered us vs. them 
frame, preventing the flourishing of bonding and bridging ties. In this sense, 
the recognition of the Islamic-inspired students union has to some extent 
increased conflicts and tensions with the secular left-wing one (i.e. humanities 
faculty). These aspects have highlighted a peculiar dynamic which emerged 
more clearly in the post-revolution period. In fact, existing barriers and 
limitations have led to the gradual impoverishment of campus social networks, 
reducing opportunities for information sharing, trust, dialogue and the 
realisation of a shared culture of respect and active participation, functional to 
the promotion of society-wide benefits. 
c) Political context and external relations: political context has been a central 
element in developing social capital for social responsibility in Tunisia. Social, 
civic and political participation has been largely organised and shaped by 
government policies selectively granting or denying legal recognition to 
associations with wider implications to campus civic and political activities. 
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As a result, political and democratic participation was often prevented for 
security reasons or closely monitored to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, 
in higher education, the development of a government-centred triple-helix 
model has de facto limited available funds and thus excluded local 
communities to create social networks with universities. Despite post-
revolution changes, universities are still hesitant to open partnerships with 
associations. As a result, university-community cooperation are mainly 
restricted to cultural or sport activities, jeopardising commitment to political, 
social and civic programs for students’ awareness raising and volunteering.  
 
In this sense, universities have not yet embraced the revolutionary ethos in line with 
the aspiration for a more democratic and participative society based on new public-
private partnerships. In fact, this has also precluded university-community social 
networking, thus limiting the latent potential behind students’ formation to include 
professional, humanist, democratic and civic skills. This confirms how during the 
transitional and post-revolution period the old system might still endure. Unchallenged 
embedded cultural, political and social habits can reproduce and be compliant with 
pre-revolutionary regime settings rather than implementing radical changes. In turn, 
this has suggested that long-term social political and economic reforms are crucial for 
a university social responsibility framework to be adopted and implemented.  
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Considerations on the Role of Islam and Islamic Values on 
Students’ Identity, Democracy and Social Responsibility 
 
Universities form public arenas often built upon shared places, interests, habits 
and values. In modern societies, traditional religious and modern secular values have 
often played an important role in identity building, creating a reference framework for 
individual awareness and motivations to engage. In particular, in Tunisia the binary 
secular vs. religious paradigm has over the last sixty years created contrasting and 
often controversial policies in relation to what role Islam plays or ought to play in 
society. This approach has often implied Islamic associations being oppositional and 
subaltern to mainstream government secular ethos to the detriment of Islamic 
principles and values’ positive valorisation. As a matter of fact, this has also 
determined processes of dysfunctional re-adaptation from traditional to modern 
identities and frames of reference. After the revolution, society has been further 
fragmented along moderate vs. radical Islamic lines affecting political stability and 
social cohesion under the present democratic process. The following themes are then 
considered relevant to understand existing connections amongst democracy, university 
social responsibility and Islam:  
 
a) Islam, politics and democracy: the abrogation of constitutional ban on 
political parties, allowing also Islamic political parties to run for national 
election, has been a major democratic achievement as it ended over fifty 
years of regime’s undemocratic one-party rule. On the other hand, despite 
political balkanisation, the Islamic Ennahda party became a key political 
force actively contributing to the development of a rather successful 
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democratic transition. However, the democratisation process left 
unresolved the rise of religious extremist groups, pursuing an alternative 
agenda often via violent public acts to destabilise political dialogue 
between moderate secular and religious parties. To the same extent, this has 
affected universities as confrontations have exacerbated campus 
environments and students’ welfare. As such, the socio-political 
contribution to democracy provided by Islamic-inspired parties or 
associations, has been partially controversial, leading in some cases to anti-
democratic activities - including recent terrorist attacks - questioning the 
role, scope and extent to which Islam as a religion and political Islamic 
parties/associations have to play. On the other hand, there is a growing need 
to foster inclusive policies for marginalised social and religious groups 
within mainstream politics to foster a more deliberative decision-making 
process and structured dialogue across different sections of society based 
on religious tolerance. 
b) Islamic values and identity: Islamic faith, values, norms and beliefs are 
historically considered central elements of Tunisian society. Islam as a 
social, political and ethical system of reference has influenced national 
development, as it also constitutes state religion in Tunisia, interconnecting 
shared identity with other neighbouring Arab-Islamic countries. Post-
revolution social and political tensions have impacted upon students’ 
perceptions of Islam as a religion and Islam in the public domain embedded 
in political and social discourses. Furthermore, the ambivalent relationship 
between the private and family sphere and, after the revolution, the 
political, ethical and social role of Islam has raised concerns of 
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transparency, authenticity, trust and governability. On the other hand, 
Islamic values are not the only or most influential in terms of students’ 
social responsibility and civic engagement but rather complementary for its 
realisation. In fact, students seem to build their identity based on a hybrid 
system including both modern-secular-democratic and Islamic-traditional 
values. These considerations have confirmed how both sets of values are 
perceived and can be understood as theoretically synergetic rather than 
antagonistic to social responsibility. In this sense, there is a clear necessity 
of re-evaluating and re-habilitating the contribution of Islamic values 
towards democracy building in the Tunisian context, rather than 
marginalising it, while fostering the recognition and respect of both value-
systems. 
c) Islamic association and social responsibility: since Tunisian 
independence, Islamic associations played a marginal social and civic role 
in the creation of social capital for social responsibility. In fact, government 
dominated the political power-struggle, affecting dialogue and the positive 
contribution to community-wide shared public good. Furthermore, it also 
paved the way for Islamic associations’ political and social defensive-
aggressive strategies to grant survival through independence. The demise 
of traditional Islamic waqf, government control over mosques’ activities 
and limited space available for Islamic associations in the public sphere, 
have further restrained the flourishing of social, civic and cultural activities. 
Underground and outlawed political activities were often carried out in the 
shadows, reducing Islamic associations’ public visibility and counter-
narrative. In this sense, the Jasmine revolution allowed Islamic associations 
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to act freer from government restrictions, opening new windows for civic 
engagement based on Islamic philanthropy supporting social responsibility. 
However, for this to happen, a wider political, cultural and social 
normalisation and pacification process is needed to reconcile existing 
cleavages. 
 
  In this framework, Islamic associations have often operated in seclusion from 
society due to conflicting and antagonistic dynamics against government policies, 
adopting a subaltern role. Another key element identified, in post-revolution transition, 
is the extent to which socio-political forces will succeed in supporting a cohesive 
dialogue and tolerance, also inside universities. The re-integration of Islamic 
philanthropic associations and Islamic social corporations in the development of 
welfare provisions via Islamic social capital and related networks such as charities 
supporting volunteering and active civic engagement are key preconditions to 
widening students’ participatory opportunities in the creation of shared public good.   
 
Research Relevance 
 
The research aimed at investigating the extent to which university and students’ 
social responsibility have been framed and implemented in Tunisian public 
universities. It explored how socio-political and cultural settings have shaped 
academic social capital, democracy, the role of Islam and Islamic values in society. 
The literature review has evidenced that there are little and no substantial studies in 
the Arab and specifically Tunisian context with reference to both the pre and post-
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revolution transitional periods. In fact, this empirical study offers a significant 
contribution to the understanding of universities and students’ social role in factual 
settings in relation to educational implications and embedded social relations 
interlinking democracy and Islam. In particular, the research raised critical questions 
and provided understandings about the relationships between governmental policies 
and universities’ social and democratic contribution to students’ social agency and 
civic role. It considered the nature, recent developments and existing constraints, 
Tunisian higher education institutions are facing as providers of education. It also 
offered an understanding of how post-revolution tensions and contradictions are 
impacting upon evolving socio-cultural contexts, universities’ missions and students’ 
expectations.  
In Tunisia, universities’ contributions to democracy have been historically 
delegitimised, being largely secluded from society while delimiting institutional latent 
potentialities of existing infrastructures and available human resources. Faculties can 
be enablers of change supporting partnerships with economic and social partners. 
However, it would be necessary to reconsider critically their role to improve their 
public and civic responsibilities. In this sense, despite the limited scope of the research 
as part of an individual effort, it is considered an original study as: 
- It questions constraints while revaluating public universities, students and 
local communities’ role towards democracy in the Arab region. 
- It examines Tunisian public universities’ missions and role in society 
within the Arab and international trends of higher education reforms and 
specifically in relation to the development of democracy and social 
responsibilities. 
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- It highlights structural factors contributing to the realisation of university 
and students’ social responsibility in Tunisia. 
- It explores social capital and in-campus social networks as key elements 
supporting university social dimension and students’ civic engagement. 
- It considers the role of Islam, Islamic values and Islamic associations for 
social, political and civic participation, influencing campus life, students’ 
identity and democracy building. 
 
In particular, it has offered a contribution to understanding the extent to which 
the “Arab spring” favoured social and democratic changes through grassroot 
movements supporting democracy sustainability in the region. In particular, the 
demise of the authoritarian regime has paved the way to a re-articulation of social 
agency and the role of Islam in state-citizens relationships. The investigation of a 
relatively under-researched topic in the Arab region - particularly the case of Tunisia 
- highlighted how shifting political and social changes have led to the emergence of 
new challenges and constraints, also in universities’ environments. The lack of studies 
focusing on universities’ social role in Tunisia and generally in other Arab countries 
has not only restrained the scope for wider debates within HE national reforms in the 
region but also limited available data for comparison and scientific analysis between 
national universities in Tunisian, but also across universities in neighbouring North 
African countries.  
Indeed, in Tunisian public universities, social responsibility, despite its crucial 
implication and significance, is still rather marginalised and it presents structural 
under-achievements. To the same extent, the study has offered a primary 
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understanding of the main issues related to university social responsibility, social 
capital formation, the role of Islam and Islamic values in a critical and comprehensive 
way by using both questionnaires and interviews which are foundational for 
comparative further studies in this field of research. In fact, to the researcher's 
knowledge, this study is the first of this kind in Tunisia or in any other Arab country 
approaching the issues of university third missions in its wider cultural, political, 
religious and social contexts. As such it can contribute to national and international 
debates on higher education reforms in the Arab region, as well as, within international 
cooperation programs. Specifically, it has considered the implications of a new 
institutional paradigm for the realisation for third missions in public universities 
reconsidering the role of universities as social agents of change.  
In particular, this can be better understood in relation to the potential and 
synergetic role that both secular and Islamic associations can have to promote civic 
engagement, against embedded habits of under-utilisation of students’ social capital 
for social responsibility. Government policies limiting universities’ autonomy and 
governance might have undermined cohesive policies for democracy sustainability 
while downgrading students’ civic engagement. To the same extent, universities’ 
social dimension functional to academic social capital can play a crucial role in 
bridging connections to foster agency within and across faculties. Students’ civic skills 
for social responsibility are best enhanced if new public spaces are created to promote 
social engagement. Furthermore, it is relevant to consider and to understand Islamic 
social capital and Islamic values contribution to students’ identity development, social 
capital formation, civic engagement and democracy building in the framework of 
supporting society-wide dialogue, tolerance and cohesion. In particular, Islamic social 
capital, values and civic norms can be functional to addressing social responsibility 
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issues and community engagement, despite existing challenges presented by the 
extremist drift. 
 
 
Research Limitations 
 
The need for further research in the field of university third missions is key to 
identify educational paradigms linking students’ social responsibility to democracy 
building within a wider framework of international economic and socio-cultural 
changing global order. In this framework, the present research has been conducted in 
a specific period of political and social turmoil in the aftermath of the “Jasmine 
revolution”, generally limiting the time for data collection. On the other hand, the study 
has also been limited to the following elements: 
 
1- It draws data from only two faculties, engineering and humanities, within one 
public university and does not offer a comparison across public institutions 
nationwide in Tunisia, nor across other institutions in neighbouring countries. 
Furthermore, it does not include private institutions including international 
universities which are more likely to have more autonomy in terms of 
governance, type of funding, performance criteria and accountability. Private 
institutions might also attract a different type of student including most likely 
international students, developing different types of social network and 
academic social capital. To the same extent, it did not include Islamic 
institutions of higher education such as Ez-Zitouna University to investigate 
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different accounts and explore more directly Islamic social capital and the role 
of Islam in society. 
2- The sample is restricted to mainly undergraduate students who are most 
directly involved in higher education and, to a lower extent, university 
professors. However, it excludes post-graduate students, administrative staff, 
deans or government policy makers, key actors to developing an integrated 
framework for university social responsibility. Furthermore, the sample did not 
include international students who would bring important insights on global 
trend of international mobility linked to education, job markets and 
interconnected social networks. 
3- The sample could not represent more conservative religious students, as well 
as, other religious minorities, limiting information gathered on students’ views 
and attitudes towards social responsibility, relevant to analysing coexisting and 
alternative social realities linked to Islamic social capital. 
4- The study mainly focuses on the relationship between universities’ third 
missions, specifically its social dimension, students’ social responsibility, 
students’ identity formation and Islam, as well as academic social capital in 
university contexts. However, it does not include accounts from civil society 
organisations and other community partners. To the same extent, it did not refer 
to Islamic associations that are active in the development of volunteering and 
community service, including charity and social fund raising. 
5- Literature review, official documents and other related reports have been 
mainly drawn from English, French sources. However, due to the researcher’s 
background, it was not possible to read directly Arabic sources which might 
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have enriched the analysis, presented other lines of investigation or alternative 
approaches to the present study.  
 
 
In this sense, the exploratory empirical research focused on a limited case study to 
understand contextual social dynamics in Tunisia. For this, it is intended as a 
contribution to knowledge, opening novel and innovative frames to explore gaps in 
knowledge in the area of higher education in Arab countries. 
 
Recommendations for further studies 
 
 The study has raised critical questions, provided information, explored new 
arguments, debates and offered recommendations regarding public universities’ 
missions, students’ role in society and the relations between Islam, democracy and 
civic engagement in post-revolution Tunisia. Findings and related data analysis 
presented in chapter 5, 6 and 7 have therefore highlighted and suggested other lines 
for further and possible investigation in the field: 
 
1- There is a need for more data regarding university social responsibility and 
third missions’ activities across different public universities in Tunisian and 
the Arab region to allow for comparison, identification of best practices and 
definition of common patterns in order to assess enabling factors or existing 
barriers. To the same extent, it is important to explore further students’ social 
responsibility to propose alternative strategies in order to enhance their 
engagement in society. 
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2- It is crucial to understanding the role and missions of private universities, 
including religious higher education institutions to define alternative trends in 
university social responsibility to be studied and best practices shared, relevant 
to the region. 
3- It is important to include more than just one university and more than two 
faculties within a wider national framework to better understand the nature, 
level and type of academic social capital developed within and across faculties, 
exploring constraints and opportunities. Furthermore, academic social capital 
for social responsibility needs to be explored in relation to its economic 
relevance, such as students’ employability and career development (as these 
have also emerged as central element in the study). 
4- To the same extent, academic social capital needs to be studied as a separate 
category in a wider context, including Islamic-led social networks in relation 
to its diverse and contextual development of student-student, student-professor 
and student-community social networks. The analysis of different categories 
could help to better understand students’ identity building; barriers to civic 
engagement; degree of engagement; type and nature of engagement within 
complex dynamics. 
5- It is crucial to include religious conservative or ultra-conservative students in 
order to consider their views and the role Islamic associations, Islamic values 
and Islamic social capital play towards democracy, social participation and 
civic engagement. In particular, the increasing involvement in the public 
sphere of Islamic political parties, associations and also affiliated student 
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unions can determine a shift in the definition of public good, welfare and social 
services in the post-revolution context. 
6- There is a necessity to examine views from other actors not accounted for in 
the present study, including faculty deans, university rectors, policy makers 
and civil society organisations to better understand and to explore existing 
dynamics with specific reference to complementary approaches, interests and 
existing relations amongst universities, government and local community 
leaders. In other terms, consistency in the development of a common platform 
for communication and actions within local communities is foundational to 
explore social change and latent individual/collective agency.  
 
In this framework, understanding the development of underlying socialisation 
processes defines also the level of democratic-ness a determined society can develop, 
supported by shared norms and civic attitudes. Social change is often transitory and 
permeates across generations sharing values, personal/collective awareness and norms 
of social behaviours. In fact, the interplay between subjectivity and social agency is 
often framed by overlapping narratives. 
A shift in socialisation patterns also involves new assessment, categorisation 
and understanding of emergent connections between subjective reflections and 
changing contexts and dynamics. In this sense, contexts determine social agency as 
much as social networks, values and human relations frame civic behaviours. Social 
relations are co-constructed as patterns of social change are interconnected and can 
originate from unanticipated events as, for example, revolutionary movements. Latent 
narratives often are restricted by oppositional push-pull processes, as they strive to 
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find a voice within power-embedded discourses in an attempt to influence social 
consciousness. This can also be related to democracy within a framework of structural 
re-adaptations. In particular, the interface of both synergetic convergences and 
incompatible resistances between global neo-capitalist trends and Tunisian-North 
African-Arabic national contexts have determined complex and conflicting dynamics. 
In these terms, the establishment of a new political, economic, cultural and social order 
is considered key to integrate undergoing transformations while limiting 
confrontations and tensions dominating a contested public sphere to allow emergent 
social forces to actively redefine social consensus, political legitimacy, citizens’ 
freedoms and rights. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix I - Cover Letter to the Rector 
 
 
The Rector  
 (edit as necessary) 
 
        
Dear Sir 
Introducing Simone Temporin 
 
It is my great pleasure to introduce to you, Mr Simone Temporin, who is a doctoral 
student at the University of Nottingham under the joint supervision of myself and 
Professor John Morgan. Simone is visiting Tunisia to conduct fieldwork for his PhD 
on student social engagement in Tunisian higher education. 
Simone is hoping to be able to gain access to a small number of staff and students at 
the University to explore experiences in supporting students’ social engagement.  It is 
intended that this research will inform both national and international debates about 
the roles of students, staffs and institutions in supporting such engagement, and 
Simone will discuss with the University how best to feedback the analysis.  I can 
confirm that his proposed work has been through a full ethics review at the University 
of Nottingham, and that data will be anonymised. 
I would be very grateful for any assistance you could provide him in accessing both 
staff and students and any relevant University and national policy documents whilst 
he is Tunisia. Please contact me if you have any queries about this. 
 
With many thanks in anticipation. 
Sincerely Yours 
Professor Simon McGrath 
Centre for Research on Higher, 
Adult and Vocational Education 
School of Education 
Jubilee Campus 
Wollaton Road 
Nottingham, NG8 1BB 
 
Telephone:  + 44 [0] 115 951 4508      
e-mail:  simon.mcgrath@nottingham.ac.uk 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/education 
343 
 
 
Professor Simon McGrath BA Hons PGCE MSc PhD FRSA 
Chair in International Education and Development 
Director of Research 
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Appendix II - Confirmation and Consent Form 
 
Simone Temporin 
Email: ttxst17@nottingham.ac.uk 
University of Nottingham 
 
Main Supervisor: 
Professor Simon McGrath 
simon.mcgrath@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
School of Education Research Ethics Office: 
educationresearchethics@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
I ……………………confirm that I have freely agreed to participate in the 
research project.  
 
 
I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose of the 
research project has been explained to me.  
 
I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it. 
 
I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage and 
that this will not affect my status now or in the future. 
 
I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, 
I will not be identified and my personal results will remain confidential.  
 
I understand that I will be audiotaped during the interview.  
 
I understand that data will be stored, both survey hardcopies and audiotapes by 
the researcher and only the researcher will have access to them. 
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I understand that I may contact the researcher or supervisor if I require further 
information about the research, and that I may contact the Research Ethics 
Coordinator of the School of Education, University of Nottingham, if I wish to 
make a complaint relating to my involvement in the research. 
 
 
 
 
Participant Signature: _____________ Name: _________________ Date: _____  
Researcher Signature: _____________ Name: _________________ Date: _____   
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Fiche de confirmation et consentement: 
Simone Temporin 
Email: ttxst17@nottingham.ac.uk 
University of Nottingham 
 
Encadreur: 
Professeur Simon McGrath 
simon.mcgrath@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Bureau Éthique de la Recherche: 
educationresearchethics@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
Je........................ confirme que j'ai librement accepté de participer au projet de 
recherche.  
 
J'ai lu la fiche d'information des participants et la nature et le but du projet de 
recherche a été expliqué. 
 
Je comprends l'objectif du projet de recherche et ma participation. 
 
Je comprends que je peux me retirer du projet de recherche à tout moment et que cela 
n'affectera pas mon statut, maintenant ou dans l'avenir. 
 
Je comprends que les informations obtenues lors de l'étude peuvent être publiées, 
mais je ne vais pas être identifié/e et mes résultats personnels resteront confidentiels. 
 
Je comprends que je vais être enregistré/e lors de l'entrevue. 
 
Je comprends que les données seront stockées, les copies papier de l'enquête et des 
enregistrements audio-parlé chercheur et seul le chercheur aura accès à eux. 
 
Je comprends que je peux communiquer avec le chercheur ou le superviseur si j'ai 
besoin de plus d'informations sur la recherche, et que je peux communiquer avec le 
coordonnateur de la recherche en éthique de l'École d'éducation, Université de 
Nottingham, si je veux déposer une plainte concernant ma participation dans la 
recherche. 
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Signature du participant: _____________ Nom: _________________ Date: _____ 
 
Signature du chercheur: _____________ Nom: _________________ Date: _____ 
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 :تأكيد وموافقة
 
 سيمون تمبورين
 جامعة نوتنغهام
 
 niropmeT enomiS
 ku.ca.mahgnitton@71tsxtt :liamE
 mahgnittoN fo ytisrevinU
 
 :المؤطر
 htarGcM nomiS rosseforP
 ku.ca.mahgnitton@htargcm.nomis
 
 :أخلاقيات البحوث المكتب
 ku.ca.mahgnitton@scihtehcraesernoitacude
 
 
 أنا ........................ أؤكد بأنني وافقت طوعا على المشاركة في مشروع البحث.
 
 .لقد قرأت ورقة المعلومات المتعلقة بالمشتركين ولقد تم شرح لي طبيعة مشروع بحثي وغرض منه
 
 .لقد فهمت الغرض من مشروع بحثي ومشاركتي فيه •
 
 .أدرك أنه قد انسحب من مشروع بحثي في أي مرحلة وأن هذا لن يؤثر على وضعي الآن أو في المستقبل •
 
 وأنا أفهم أنه يجوز لي  نشر المعلومات التي تم الحصول عليها أثناء الدراسة، ولكن ستبقى النتائج نظرية الشخصية 
 
 .خلال المقابلة أفهم أن يتم تسجيل •
 
 . زين البيانات، والنسخ الورقية للمسح والصوت الوحيد من قبل الباحث والباحثة من الوصول إليهمأفهم أن سيتم تخ •
 
 943
 
أدرك أنه قد اتصل بالمؤطر أو المشرف إذا كنت بحاجة إلى المزيد من المعلومات حول البحث، وأنني قد اتصل منسق  •
  ب في تقديم شكوى بشأن مشاركتي في البحثأخلاقيات البحوث في كلية التربية، جامعة نوتنغهام، وإذا كنت ترغ
 
 _____ :توقيع المشارك : _____________ الاسم: _________________ التاريخ
 
 
  _________________ :توقيع الباحث: _____________ الاسم
 _____ :التاريخ
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Appendix III - QUESTIONNAIRE INFORMATION 
SHEET 
 
 
Simone Temporin 
Email: ttxst17@nottingham.ac.uk  
University of Nottingham 
 
Main Supervisor: 
Professor Simon McGrath 
simon.mcgrath@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
School of Education Research Ethics Office: 
educationresearchethics@nottingham.ac.uk 
  
 
 
The present research explores issues related to the role of education in Tunisia and in 
particular the external social dimension. It is intended to investigate the relationship 
between university and society through participation in existing networks with 
external stakeholders.  The questionnaire will ask questions related to individual 
activities through social networks and personal perceptions of social participation, 
citizenship, as well as, social and civic values. 
 
There is a double aim linked to the present research: the first is to further understand 
what role higher education in Tunisia could play in social engagement; the second is 
to evaluate students’ perceptions regarding the social vision of the university and their 
role as part of the society they live in. 
 
The questionnaire data will be anonymous and confidentiality regarding any of data 
collected is guaranteed. Data collected will be used only for research purposes and 
presented solely in educational settings at professional conferences and in academic 
journals, always in an anonymised form and no disclosure will be made to any third 
party.  
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Participants are not obliged to take part in this survey. Even if you initially agree to 
take part, you are free to withdraw at any time without prejudice, without providing a 
reason and without any personal consequences. Your participation will not affect your 
relationship with the institution involved in this project. 
 
The Survey consists largely of multiple-choice and some short open ended questions. 
It will take around 20-30 minutes of your time. At the end of the survey, you will 
find the possibility to leave your personal details if you wish to take part in an 
interview as a follow up of the present survey, in order to have the possibility to 
discuss further the themes of the survey.  
 
This is the second part of the research: intended to guarantee a fuller account on the 
answers given in the survey. If you indicate a willingness to participate in the 
interviews and you are chosen for the final sample, then you will be contacted to 
arrange for the interview.  Again, you may change your mind at any point of this 
process and withdraw your consent without prejudice. 
 
 
My gratitude for your participation to the survey! 
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FICHE D'INFORMATION DU QUESTIONNAIRE: 
 
Simone Temporin 
Email: ttxst17@nottingham.ac.uk  
University of Nottingham 
 
Encadreur: 
Prof. Simon McGrath 
simon.mcgrath@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Bureau Éthique de la Recherche: 
educationresearchethics@nottingham.ac.uk 
  
 
La présente recherche explore les questions liées au rôle de l'éducation en 
Tunisie et en particulier la dimension sociale. Il vise à étudier la relation 
entre l'université et la société à travers la participation à des réseaux 
existants avec les acteurs public-privés externes. Le questionnaire pose des 
questions liées aux activités individuelles à travers les réseaux sociaux et les 
perceptions personnelles de participation, la citoyenneté sociale et les 
valeurs sociales et civiques. 
 
Il y a un double objectif lié à la présente recherche: le premier est de mieux 
comprendre comment l'enseignement supérieur en Tunisie pourrait jouer un 
rôle dans l'engagement social; le deuxième, est d'évaluer les perceptions des 
étudiants concernant la vision sociale de l'université et de leur rôle dans le 
cadre de la société dans laquelle ils vivent. 
 
Les données du questionnaire est anonyme et la confidentialité des données est 
garantie. Les données recueillies seront utilisées uniquement à des fins de recherche, 
présenté uniquement en milieu scolaire lors de conférences professionnelles et dans 
des revues académiques, toujours sous une forme anonyme et aucune divulgation ne 
sera faite à aucune tierce partie. 
 
Les participants ne sont pas obligés de participer à cette enquête. Même si vous avez 
initialement acceptés de participer, vous êtes libre de retirer à tout moment sans 
préjugés, sans fournir de raison et sans aucunes conséquences personnelles. Votre 
participation n’affectera pas votre relation avec l'institution impliquée dans ce projet. 
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L'Enquête se compose essentiellement de questions à choix multiples et des 
questions ouvertes courtes. Il faut compter environ 10 minutes de votre temps. À la 
fin de l'enquête, vous trouverez la possibilité de laisser vos coordonnées personnelles 
si vous souhaitez prendre part à une entrevue en tant que suivi de la présente étude, 
afin d'avoir la possibilité de discuter ultérieurement les thèmes de l'enquête. 
 
Cette deuxième partie de la recherche: vise à garantir un plus ample exposé sur les 
réponses données à l'enquête. Si vous indiquez une volonté de participer à des 
entrevues et vous êtes choisis pour l'échantillon final, alors vous serez contacté pour 
organiser l'entrevue. Encore une fois, vous pouvez changer d'avis à tout moment de 
ce processus et retirer votre consentement sans préjugés. 
 
Je vous exprime ma gratitude pour votre participation à l'enquête! 
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  ورقه استبيان معلومات
 
  سيمون تمبورين
 جامعة نوتنغهام
 
 niropmeT enomiS
  ku.ca.mahgnitton@71tsxtt :liamE
 mahgnittoN fo ytisrevinU
 
 :المؤطر
 htarGcM nomiS rosseforP
 ku.ca.mahgnitton@htargcm.nomis
 
 :أخلاقيات البحوث المكتب
 ku.ca.mahgnitton@scihtehcraesernoitacude
  
 
هذا البحث يدرس و يحلل القضايا المتصلة بدور التعليم في تونس ، خاصة في سياق البعد الاجتماعي.  و إنه يهدف إلى 
خلال المشاركة في الشبكات القائمة مع أصحاب المصلحة الخارجيين. التحقيق في العلاقة بين الجامعة والمجتمع من 
سوف يطرح الاستبيان الأسئلة ذات الصلة بالأنشطة الفردية من خلال الشبكات الاجتماعية والتصورات الشخصية عن 
 .المجتمع و المواطنة والمشاركة الاجتماعية، والقيم المدنية
 .
ول هو أن نفهم ماذا يمكن التعليم العالي في تونس أن يقدم  كدور في المشاركة هناك هدف مزدوج لربط هذا البحث: الأ
الاجتماعية، والثاني هو تقييم تصورات الطلاب حول الرؤية الاجتماعية للجامعة ودورها كجزء من المجتمع الذي يعيشون 
 .فيه
 
، فيما يتعلق بأي من البيانات التي تم سوف  يتم التعامل مع الاستبيانات بتكتم و سرية مع عدم الكشف عن  أي هويه
جمعها. وسيتم استخدام البيانات التي تم جمعها فقط لأغراض البحث حيث سيتم استعراضها ضمن المؤتمرات المختصة و 
 .المجلات الأكاديميه، و دائما بتكتم على الهويه وسوف لن يتم الكشف عنها إلى أي طرف ثالث
 
ستطلاع. أنت حر في الانسحاب في أي وقت، حتى لو وافقت في البداية يحق ل  سحب المشاركة ليست ملزمة في هذا الا
 .موافقت  دون إبداء الأسباب. مشاركت   سوف لن  تؤثر على علاقت  مع المؤسسة المشاركة في هذا المشروع
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دقائق من وقت . في  01المسح يتكون من اختيار من عدة إجابات وبعض الأسئلة المفتوحة قصيرة. سوف يستغرق حوالي 
نهاية الدراسة، وسوف تجد إمكانية ترك التفاصيل الشخصية الخاصة ب  إذا كنت ترغب في المشاركة في مقابلة لاحقة 
 .كمتابعة للمسح الحالي، من أجل الحصول على إمكانية لمواصلة مناقشة موضوعات الدراسة
 
فاصيل أكثر فيما يخص الاجابات التي قدمت في المسح. إذا الجزء الثاني من البحث يهدف إلى الحصول على معلومات و ت
أبديت الرغبة في المشاركة، و في حال تم اختيارك، سوف يتم الاتصال ب  وترتيب لقاء، مرة أخرى، في حال غيرت 
 . رأي  في أي لحظة من هذه العملية تستطيع سحب مشاركت  بدون أي إحراج
 
 . المشاركة في هذا البحث، وموافقت  على تحليل البيانات المتضمنة إعادة ورقة الإجابة تعني موافقت  على
 !لكم امتناني على مشاركتكم في المسح
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Appendix IV - RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE: French 
version 
QUESTIONNAIRES SUR LES RELATIONS UNIVERSITÈS-COMMUNAUTÉ-
ÉTUDIANT. 
PART A: Définitions préalables.  
Selon ta propre expérience, que signifie pour toi le mot « Démocratie »? 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu’est-ce que la « Responsabilité Sociale » selon toi? 
 
 
 
 
 
À ton propre expérience, qu’est-ce que signifie être un étudiant en Tunisie et quel rôle 
doit-il avoir?  
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PART B: Participation à groupes et/ou associations. 
1. Marquer un X sur OUI ou NON dans le groupe/association formelle ou 
informelle dont vous faites partie. Pour chaque case marquée avec ‘’OUI‘’, 
veuillez spécifier  à quelle fréquence: 
 
     Quelle fréquence? 
Groupes/Associations 
 Participatio
n  
1 fois 
par 
semaine 
2-3 fois 
par 
semaine 
1-2 fois 
par mois 
1 fois 
par mois 
1. Groupes religieux ou spirituels (mosquée, 
église, groupe religieux informel, groupe 
d’études religieux, autre groupe à caractère 
spirituel) 
Oui Non          
2. Groupe sociale, culturel (arts, musique, 
théâtre, film, festival) 
Oui Non          
3. Groupe sportif (football, volley-ball, 
athlétique, natation, etc) 
Oui Non          
4. Groupe de service de base (éducation, 
santé, pollution, soutien jeunes/personnes 
âgées,  groupe d’étude) 
Oui Non          
5. Comité de voisinage ou organisation de 
communauté 
Oui Non          
6.  Syndicats/Unions (d’étudiants, de 
commerce, de travailleurs) 
Oui Non          
7. Partis politiques Oui Non          
8. Association professionnelle (docteurs, 
enseignants, ingénieurs, avocats, etc). 
Oui Non          
9. Action social, mobilité et manifestation 
publique. 
Oui Non          
10. Groupe or Association sur les Networks 
Sociales (Facebook, Blogs, Twitter, etc) 
Oui Non          
Autre groupe:                 
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2. De ces groupes déjà identifiés, dont tu appartiens, indiquer seulement les 
trois plus importants (par ordre d’importance du 1er au 3éme). Veuillez remplir 
les cases correspondantes au numéro de groupes dont vous faites partie 
(même si un seul ou deux).  
  1er  2ème  3ème  
1. Groupes religieux ou spirituels (mosquée, 
église, groupe religieux informel, groupe d’études 
religieux, autre groupe à caractère spirituel).         
2. Groupe sociale, culturel (arts, musique, 
théâtre, film, festival, etc).         
3. Groupe sportif (football, volleyball, athlétique, 
natation, etc).         
4. Groupe de service basic (éducation, santé, 
pollution, soutien jeunes/personnes âgées, groupe 
d’étude, infrastructure urbaine).         
5. Comité de voisinage ou organisation de 
communauté         
6. Syndicats/Unions (d’étudiants, de commerce, 
de travailleurs)         
7. Partis politiques         
8.  Associations professionnelles (docteurs, 
enseignants, ingénieurs, avocats, etc)         
9. Action social, mobilité et manifestation publique         
10. Groupe or Association sur les Networks 
Sociales (Facebook, Blogs, Twitter, etc)         
Autre groupe:         
 
3. Depuis combien de temps participes-tu dans les mêmes trois 
groupes/organisations identifiés? 
 
 1 mois 2-3 mois Entre 3-6 mois 1 an 1-2 ans Entre 2-3 ans plus de 3 ans 
1ére groupe               
2éme groupe               
3éme groupe               
 
4. Est-ce que ta participation à un ou plusieurs de ces trois groupes/associations 
est liée aussi à l’Université (cours d’étude, stages professionnels, examens, 
collaborations externes, etc)? 
OUI NON 
 
Si OUI, veuillez spécifier le lien: 
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5. En faisant référence seulement aux 
membres du 1er groupe le plus 
important identifié: est-ce que la 
majorité des membres est (marquer 
chaque case soit OUI ou NON): 
 
                 OUI NON 
La majorité est du même 
voisinage/village/communauté     
La majorité est de la même famille 
ou bien parentèle     
La majorité est du même sexe     
La majorité est de la même 
religion     
la majorité est du même niveau 
éducatif     
la majorité est du même niveau 
économique     
la majorité est de la même 
tribu/caste/ groupe ethnique-
linguistique     
 
 
 
6. À quel degré vous participez à la prise 
de décision au sein du 1er groupe le 
plus important? 
 
1. très largement    
2. largement    
3. assez/moyen   
4. marginale/peu   
5. très marginale/ très peu   
 
7. Dans quelle mesure les activités de ce 
1er groupe ont eu, à votre avis, un 
impacte/ changement/amélioration 
sur votre voisinage ou communauté 
locale?  
 
1. très largement    
2. largement    
3. assez/moyen   
4. marginale/peu   
5. très marginale/ très peu   
 
8. Es-que tu penses que ta participation 
dans ces groupes dans/avec la 
communauté locale puisse 
changer/améliorer la vie de gens? 
 
OUI  NON  Je ne sais pas 
9. Indiquer seulement trois raisons 
principales en total, par ordre 
d’importance, de ta participation aux 
groupes/associations? 
 
 1er  2ème  3ème  
Identité ou appartenance à la 
communauté       
Nécessité d’améliorer la qualité 
de vie       
 
Nécessité d’avancer le 
développement économique       
Remplacer le manque de services 
publics       
Diminuer les tensions socio-
économiques et favoriser le 
dialogue       
Aider les marginalisé et les 
intégrer dans la société       
Fournir services gratuit aux 
pauvres       
Avancer et donner une réponse 
aux besoins de la communauté       
Changer le system social et la 
participation politique de la 
communauté       
Rencontrer de nouveaux amis       
Respecter les valeurs religieuses       
Autre :       
 
10. En général, comment es-que tu 
définirais les autres personnes : 
1. très serviable   
2. serviable   
3. très confiant   
4. confiant   
5. ni serviable ni confiant   
6. égoïste/individualiste   
7. très égoïste/individualiste   
 
11. Dans une situation de difficulté 
(économique, de santé, personnelle, 
etc), marquer chaque case de 1 à 5, 
le groupe dont tu as plus de confiance 
(1 plus confiant, 5 moins confiant)? 
Famille et parents   
Amis ou voisins   
Groups et associations sociaux   
Gouvernement ou Institution publique   
Mosquée ou institutions religieuses   
Autre :   
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PARTE C: Perceptions, attitudes et attentes envers la société. 
 
12. Marquer pour chaque secteur, quels sont les problèmes actuels les plus 
importants en Tunisie.  
 
Marquer X à chaque problème pour spécifier quel/quels acteur/s parmi Gouvernement, 
Industrie, Société Civile, Université, Institutions Religieuses est/sont le/s plus 
capable/s d’apporter une solution?  
 
SECTEUR PROBLEME 1er  2ème   3ème  
Gouv. Indus. Soc. Civ. Univers. Inst. Rel 
ECONOMIQUE 
Chômage, absence 
de travail         
         
 Pauvreté         
 
 
      
 Inflation         
         
 
Absence de crédit 
bancaire         
         
 Taxes         
         
SANTE Maladie/Épidémies         
         
 
Situation du 
système des 
hôpitaux         
 
        
 
Manque d'eau 
potable         
         
 
Problèmes de 
pollution et 
l'élimination des 
déchets         
 
        
POLITIQUE Corruption         
         
 Instabilité politique         
         
 
Absence de Libertés 
fondamentales         
         
 Dialogue politique         
         
 Autonomie locale         
         
SECURITE 
Niveau de 
criminalité         
         
 Violence         
         
 
Absence/peu 
confiance dans le 
système policier         
 
        
 
Absence/peu 
confiance dans le 
système judiciaire         
 
        
 Absence de sécurité         
         
SOCIALE Éducation         
         
 
Marginalisation 
sociale         
         
 
SECTEUR PROBLEME 1er  2ème   3ème  
Gouv. Indus. Soc. Civ. Univers. Inst. Relig 
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Dialogue/ Cohésion 
social         
         
 
Division/lutte entre 
groupes 
social/économique/r
eligieux         
 
 
      
 
Problèmes de 
drogue/alcool/prosti
tution         
 
        
INFRASTRUCTURE Habitation/maison         
         
 
Système 
routière/ponts         
         
 
Système de 
transports          
         
 
Si vous voyez un autre problème important, veuillez le citer : 
 
 
 
13. Dans quelle activité publique te sens-tu le plus actif/active (Indiquer avec un 
X)? 
Activités politiques   
Activités sociales de volontariat   
Activités religieuses   
Activités culturelles   
Activités de défense des droits humains   
Autre: 
 
14. Dans quelles activités publiques aimerais- tu être plus actif/active (Indiquer 
avec un X)? 
 
Activités politiques   
Activités sociales de volontariat   
Activités religieuses   
Activités culturelles   
Activités de défense des droits humains   
Autres: 
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15. Indiquer seulement quatre aspects en total les plus importants qui 
caractérisent ton identité (par  ordre d’importance du 1er au 4éme) : 
    1er  2éme  3éme 4éme 
 Voter dans chaque élection politique         
  Participer activement dans de partis politique          
  Participer dans les campagnes électorales politiques          
  Lire la presse ou journaux régulièrement         
  S’engager dans de débats politiques         
  Participer à manifestations pacifiques contre une loi injuste         
  Participer dans activités pour protéger l’environnement          
  Participer aux activités sociales dans la communauté locale          
  Faire du volontariat chaque semaine          
  Participer aux activités pour la promotion de droits humains          
  
Participer à manifestations publiques pour avancer problématiques 
sociales          
  Faire de  la charité          
  Participer aux activités spirituelles/religieuses          
  Participer dans discussions/débats éthiques ou morales          
  
Participer aux activités pour la récolte d’argent d’organisations 
internationales          
  Soigner et s’occuper des autres          
  Manifester intérêt pour les problématiques globales          
  
S’engager sur internet ou les medias, sur problèmes sociales, 
morales, politiques, etc         
  Autres:         
 
16. Indiquer, de la liste suivante, seulement trois éléments en total, qui influence 
le plus ton opinion dans la prise de décision (par ordre d’importance du 1er au 
3éme).  
  1er 2éme  3éme 
La presse locale/nationale       
Radio       
Télévision       
Internet (Facebook, Youtube, blogs, twitter, etc)       
Ta famille       
Ton groupe sociale/ethnique/tribal, etc       
Gens autre que ton groupe sociale/ethnique/tribal, etc       
Associations/groupes dont tu appartiens       
Tes amis       
Les professeurs  universitaires       
Les institutions gouvernementales       
Les institutions religieuses       
Autres :       
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17. De la liste suivante, indiquer seulement 4 valeurs en total, qui sont pour toi 
fondamentales dans ta vie quotidienne? (par  ordre d’importance du 1er au 
4éme): 
 
   1er  2éme   3éme  4éme 
Liberté d’expression         
Liberté d’association         
Droits politique         
Tolérance (religieuse, de sexe, ethnique, race, 
etc)         
Droits de l’Homme         
Dignité humaine         
Participation sociale et publique         
Démocratie         
Égalité         
Respect des autres         
Fraternité/solidarité         
Patriotisme/Nationalisme         
 Autres :         
 
 
18. À quelles de notions suivantes tu t’identifies à présent dans ta vie, quand-on 
parle d’Islam?  
 
 ناتداهشلا   
 جحلا   
موصلا   
 ةاكزلا   
ةلاصلا   
 لدعلا   
عوطتلا   
 ةيملاسلاا ةملاا   
ناضمرلا   
ةقدصلا   
 ةماعلا ةحلصملا   
باجحلا   
نأرقلا   
ةنسلا   
ةعيرشلا   
: Autre   
: Autre   
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PART D: Les relations Étudiants-Université. 
19. Au cours de la présente année universitaire combien de fois environ avez-
vous expérimenté les suivantes activités ou bien situation? 
 
 
Très 
souvent Souvent Parfois Jamais 
Demander à un autre étudiant de vous aider à 
comprendre le matériel de cours         
Expliquer le matériel de cours à un ou plusieurs 
étudiants         
Faire un projet ou un travail avec d'autres étudiants 
pendant le cadre d'un cours         
Faire un lien entre ce que vous avez appris et des 
problématiques ou des enjeux sociaux         
Présenter ou essayer de mieux comprendre différentes 
perspectives (Politique, religieuse, raciale/ethnique, de 
genre, etc) pendent les discussions en classe ou dans 
vos travaux         
Discuter avec un professeur, à l'extérieur de la classe, 
de sujets, d'idées ou de concepts étudiés dans un cours         
Discuter de vos projets de carrière ou de performance 
scolaire avec un professeur         
Mémoriser le matériel de cours         
Appliquer des faits, des théories ou des méthodes à des 
problèmes pratiques ou à de nouvelles situations         
Utiliser de l'information pour examiner un problème ou 
un enjeu du monde réel (chômage, changement 
climatique, santé publique, changements politique, etc)         
Discuter avec des personnes de race ou origine 
ethnique différents         
Discuter avec des personnes d'un milieu économique 
différent         
Discuter avec des personnes des croyances religieuses 
différentes         
Discuter avec des personnes ayant des opinions 
politiques différentes des vôtres         
Participer à un stage, à un programme d'enseignement 
coopératif, à une expérience sur le terrain, à une 
expérience d'enseignement, etc         
Développer compétences de citoyens informés et actifs         
Participer à des activités de volontariat dans le campus 
ou dans la communauté, organisées par l’Université, ta 
faculté, ton professeur, etc         
Participer à des activités de volontariat dans le campus 
ou dans la communauté, organisées par l’Union des 
étudiants, club ou associations culturel des étudiants         
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20. Au cours d’une semaine typique de 7 jours combien d’heures consacrez-vous 
aux activités suivantes? 
 
Heures par semaine 
 0 
1-
5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 
Plus 
de 30 
Activités parascolaires (club et associations, 
journal étudiants, sports, syndicat, etc)                 
Emploi rémunéré sur le campus                 
Emploi rémunéré hors  campus                 
Service communautaire ou bénévolat                 
Détente et activités sociales (passer du temps 
avec vos amis, regarder la télé, garder les 
contacts avec vos amis sur internet, théâtre ou 
cinéma, etc                 
Soin de personnes à charge vivant sous le 
même toit (enfants, parents, famille, etc)                 
Déplacement vers le campus (en automobile, à 
pied, avec le train, etc                 
Activités religieuse de prière ou spirituelles                 
Préparation pour les cours (étude, rédaction, 
travaux à la maison, analyses de données, etc.)                 
Autre :                 
 
21. Quelles sont, à ton avis, les missions les plus importantes de l'Université? 
Indiquer seulement quatre en total, (par ordre d’importance du 1er au 4éme). 
  1ère  2ème  3ème  4ème 
De promouvoir une éducation gratuite pour tous          
De promouvoir l’écologie dans le campus          
D’éduquer les étudiants pour obtenir un travail pour la croissance 
économique         
De promouvoir l’honnêteté et des comportements civiques et moraux          
De promouvoir des opportunités pour des activités religieuses          
De promouvoir des activités pour le volontariat et l’engagement social          
De promouvoir des opportunités de stage professionnel avec les entreprises          
D’investir plus dans projets d’utilité publique et pour la communauté locale         
De financier et coopérer avec des organisations non gouvernementales pour 
avancer problèmes sociaux          
D’engager directement sur de débats ou participation politiques          
De donner de cours autour de la participation sociale et civique dans la société          
D’utiliser internet et nouvelles technologies dans l’enseignement          
De garantir un accès plus équitable pour les étudiants économiquement 
marginalisés          
De defender les intérêts et droits socio-politique et économique des étudiants          
De développer un enseignement d’excellence           
De développer  une recherche d’excellence           
Autre :          
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22. Quelle rôle penses-tu l’Université doit jouer en Tunisie? Marquer OUI ou NON 
pour chaque case.  
  OUI  NON 
De promouvoir une éducation gratuite pour tous      
De promouvoir opportunités de participation politique pour les étudiants      
De promouvoir stratégies écologiques dans le campus      
D’éduquer les étudiants pour obtenir un travail dans le marché     
De promouvoir l’honnête et des comportements civiques et moraux      
De promouvoir des opportunités pour des activités religieuses      
De promouvoir des activités pour le volontariat et l’engagement social      
De promouvoir opportunités de stage professionnel avec les entreprises      
D’investir plus dans projets d’utilité publique et la communauté locale     
De financier et coopérer avec la société civile pour avancer problèmes sociaux      
D’engager directement sur de débats politiques      
De créer des emplois et participer à la croissance économique du pays      
De donner de cours autour de la participation sociale et civique dans la société      
D’utiliser internet et nouvelles technologies dans l’enseignement      
De garantir un accès plus équitable pour les étudiants économiquement marginalisés      
De defender les intérêts et droits socio-politique et économique des étudiants      
De promouvoir projets de développement régional       
De promouvoir projets et formation d’Entreprenariat social      
Autres :     
 
As-tu voté dans la dernière élection de représentants de l’Union des étudiants?  
OUI NON 
  
23. Quelle rôle es-que tu penses l’union des étudiants doit avoir au sein de 
l’Université? 
  OUI  NON 
Promouvoir le dialogue entre étudiants et professeurs     
Défendre et protéger les intérêts individuels des étudiants     
Défendre le droits religieux des étudiants pour toutes religions (inclus minoritaires)     
Représenter les étudiants au sein de comités de Faculté, départements, etc     
Promouvoir de clubs sportifs, organisations culturels, etc     
Influencer les décisions concernant le cours, les évaluations, le curriculum, etc      
Garantir meilleures conditions de résidence universitaires     
Favoriser et organiser projets de volontariat pour engager les étudiants avec la société     
Engager les étudiants politiquement     
Promouvoir dialogue et cohésion entre groupes différents de étudiants       
Organiser débats publiques      
Engager les étudiants pour améliorer la qualité de vie dans le campus      
Faciliter plusieurs réseaux entre étudiants pour les échanges/ coopération entre eux      
Autre :      
367 
 
PART E: Informations personnelles: 
 
Âge :   Sexe : 
M       ou        
F      
         
Faculté/Titre 
d’étude/Profession  
  
  
 
Cycle/année 
d'études:   
 
Es-que tu vives avec ta famille?  OUI  NON   
Si non, indiquer où (ex. Résidence 
universitaires, en location, etc): 
  
  
 
Depuis quand es-que tu résides dans la 
ville (Si tu ne résides pas dans la ville, 
indiquer autrement  la ville où tu 
vives):  
    
 
Plus haut titre d'études acquis par tes parents (ex. Baccalauréat, formation 
professionnelle, Université, Master, Doctorat, etc... Si applicable): 
Père 
 
  Mère 
  
 
 
Quelle est la profession de tes parents (Si applicable): 
Père 
  
 Mère  
 
De quelle ville tes parents sont originaires (Si applicable): 
Père 
  
 Mère  
 
Dans le cas vous voudriez être contactés pour un entretien d’environ 20 minutes pour 
approfondir les thématiques abordés dans ce questionnaire, prière de remplir la fiche 
ci-dessous:   
Prénom   Portable   
email:   
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Appendix V - RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE: English 
translation 
 
SURVEY ON UNIVERSITY-COMMUNITY-STUDENT RELATIONSHIPS.  
PART A: General definitions.  
According to your experience, what does democracy mean?  
 
 
 
 
 
According to you, what is social responsibility? 
 
 
 
 
 
According to your experience, what does it mean being a student and what role should 
they have in Tunisia?  
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PART B: Groups/associations’ participation.  
1. Use an X on YES or NO on formal or informal group/association you belong 
to. For each group you have marked ‘’YES‘’, please specify how often you 
take part to: 
 
     How often? 
Groups/Associations  Participation  
Once a 
week 
2-3 
times/w
eek 
1-2 
time/mo
nth 
1 per 
month 
1. Religious or spiritual groups (mosque, 
church, informal religious group, religious 
study group, other spiritual group). 
Yes No          
2. Socio-cultural group (arts, music, 
theatre, film, festival, etc.). 
Yes No          
3. Sport group (football, volleyball, 
athletic, swimming, etc.). 
Yes No          
4. Volunteering group (education, health, 
pollution, social care children/senior, 
study group, urban infrastructure). 
Yes No          
5. Neighbourhood committee or 
organisation 
Yes No          
6. Union (Student, professional, worker) Yes No          
7. Political party Yes No          
8.  Professional associations (doctor, 
teacher, engineer, lawyer, etc.) 
Yes No          
9. Social action, public manifestation Yes No          
10. Online social networks (Facebook, 
Blogs, Twitter, etc.) 
Yes No          
Other group:                 
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2. From the groups above identified, which you belong to, please specify only 
the three most important (in order of importance from 1st till 3rd). Please fill 
in the box in relation to the number of groups you are member of (even if only 
one or two).  
  1st 2nd   3rd  
1. Religious or spiritual groups (mosque, church, 
informal religious group, religious study group, 
other spiritual group).         
2. Socio-cultural group (arts, music, theatre, film, 
festival, etc.).         
3. Sport group (football, volleyball, athletic, 
swimming, etc.).         
4. Volunteering group (education, health, 
pollution, social care children/senior, study group, 
urban infrastructure).         
5. Neighbourhood committee or organisation          
6. Union (Student, professional, worker)         
7. Political party         
8.  Professional associations (doctor, teacher, 
engineer, lawyer, etc.)         
9. Social action, public manifestation          
10. Online social networks (Facebook, Blogs, 
Twitter, etc.)         
Other group:         
 
3. How long have been member of the above three most important 
groups/organisations? 
 
 1 month 2-3 months 3-6 months 1 year 1-2 year 2-3 year > 3 year 
1st group               
2nd group               
3rd group               
 
4. Is it your participation to one or more group/association linked to the 
University (study subject, professional internship, subject exams, external 
collaboration, etc.)? 
YES NO 
 
If YES, please specify: 
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5. In relation only to members of the 1st 
most important group identified: Is 
the majority of members … (cross YES 
or NO for each box): 
 
                 YES NO 
The majority is from the same 
neighbourhood/village/community     
The majority is from the same 
family or within family relatives      
The majority is of the same gender     
The majority is of the same 
religions     
The majority is of the same 
educational level     
The majority is of the same 
economic status     
The majority is of the same 
tribe/caste/ethnic or linguistic 
group     
 
 
 
6. In relation to the 1st most important 
group identified, to what degree do 
you take part to the decision-making 
process?  
1. To a very large extent   
2. To a large extent   
3. Average/medium   
4. Marginal   
5. Very marginal    
 
7. In relation to the 1st most important 
group identified, to what extent, 
according to you, the activities 
developed had an 
impact/change/improvement in your 
neighbourhood/local community?  
1. To a very large extent   
2. To a large extent   
3. Average/medium   
4. Marginal   
5. Very marginal    
 
8. Do you think your participation to 
these groups in/with the local 
community can change/improve 
people’s life? 
YES  NO  I do not know 
9. Indicate only the three most 
important reasons, in order of 
importance, explaining your 
participation to groups/associations? 
 
 1st  2nd  3rd  
Identity or community sense of 
belonging        
Necessity to improve the quality 
of life        
 
Necessity to favour economic 
development        
To compensate lack of public 
services        
To reduce socio-economic 
tensions and foster dialogue        
To help and integrate into society 
marginalised people        
To give free services to poor 
people        
To foster and give a solution to 
community’s needs        
To change the social system and 
political participation in the 
community         
To meet new friends        
To respect religious values        
Other:       
 
10. In general, how would you define 
other people :  
1. very helpful   
2. helpful    
3. very trustful    
4. trustful   
5. nor trustful or helpful    
6. selfish/individualist    
7. very selfish/individualist    
 
11. In a situation of difficulty (economic, 
health, personal, etc.), tick each box 
from 1 to 5, for the group you would 
trust the most (1 most trustful, 5 less 
trustful)? 
Family and relatives    
Friends or neighbours    
Social groups/associations   
Government or public institutions   
Mosque or religious institutions    
Other:   
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PART C: Perceptions, attitudes and expectations towards society.   
 
12. Indicate for each sector, what are the most important problems in Tunisia at present. Use an 
X for each problem to specify which actor amongst Government, Industry, Civil 
Society, University, Religious Institutions is/are the most apt to favour a solution?  
 
SECTOR PROBLEM 1st  2nd   3rd  
Govn. Indus. Civ. Soc. Univers. Rel Inst.  
ECONOMIC 
Unemployment, lack 
of jobs          
         
 Poverty         
 
 
      
 Inflation         
         
 
Lack of financial 
credit          
         
 Taxes         
         
HEALTH Illness/Epidemic         
         
 Hospitals’ conditions          
         
 
Lack of drinkable 
water          
         
 
Pollution and waste 
system          
         
POLITICS Corruption         
         
 Political instability         
         
 
Lack of basic 
freedoms          
         
 Political dialogue         
         
 Local Autonomy         
         
SECURITY Level of criminality         
         
 Violence         
         
 
Lack/low trust in the 
police system          
         
 
Lack/low trust in the 
judicial system         
 
        
 Lack of security         
         
SOCIAL Education         
         
 
Social 
marginalisation          
         
 
 
SECTOR 
 
 
PROBLEM 
 
 
1st  
 
 
2nd   
 
 
3rd  
 
Gov. 
 
Indus. 
 
Civ.Soc.  
 
Univers. 
 
Relig Inst.  
 
Dialogue/ Social 
cohesion         
         
 
Division/clash 
amongst 
social/economic/reli
gious groups          
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Drugs/alcohol/prosti
tution problems          
 
        
INFRASTRUCTURE Housing          
         
 
Road system, 
bridges          
         
 Transportations          
         
 
If you would like to add another important problem, please specify: 
 
 
 
13. Which public activity are you most active in (Cross with an X)? 
Political activities    
Social volunteering activities    
Religious activities    
Cultural activities   
Human rights’ defence   
Other: 
 
14. Which of the following activities you would like to be more active in (Cross 
with an X)? 
 
Political activities    
Social volunteering activities    
Religious activities    
Cultural activities   
Human rights’ defence   
Other: 
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15. Indicate only four aspects in total the most important which characterise your 
identity the most (in order of importance 1st to 4th) : 
    1st  2nd  3rd 4th 
 To vote in each political election          
  To participate actively in a political party          
  To participate in a political campaign          
  Read newspaper regularly          
  To engage in political debates          
  To participate in a public manifestation against an unjust law          
  To participate in activities for the protection of the environment          
  To participate  in social activities in the local community          
  Volunteering each week          
  To participate in activities for human rights’ promotion          
  To participate in public manifestation to address social problems          
  Charity          
  To participate in religious/spiritual activities          
  To participate in ethical/moral debates/discussions          
  
To participate in fund raising activities for international 
organisations          
  Take care of others          
  Raise interest for global issues          
  To engage on internet or media for social/political/moral problems          
  Other:         
 
16. Indicate, from the list below, only three elements in total, which influence 
the most your opinion in decision-making (in order of importance from 1st to 
3rd).  
  1st 2nd  3rd 
Local/national journals       
Radio       
Television       
Internet (Facebook, YouTube, blogs, twitter, etc.)       
Family       
Your social/ethnic/tribe group, etc.       
Other people different from Your social/ethnic/tribe group, 
etc.       
Associations/groups you are member of       
Friends       
University professors       
Government institutions       
Religious institutions       
Other:       
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17. From the list below, indicate only 4 values in total, which are significant for 
you in your daily life. (in order of importance from 1st till 4th): 
 
   1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
Freedom of expression         
Freedom of association         
Civil rights         
Tolerance (religious, gender, ethnic, race, etc.)         
Human rights         
Human dignity         
Social and civic participation         
Democracy         
Equality         
Respect for others          
Fraternity/solidarity         
Patriotism/Nationalism         
Other:         
 
 
18. From the list below, which notions do you identify the most with in your life, 
in reference to Islam?  
 
Vow (Shahada)   
 Pilgrimage (Hajj)   
Fasting (Saum)   
Alms (Zakat)   
Prayer (Salat)   
(Adal)Justice     
Volunteering (Tatawa)   
Islamic nation (Umma)   
Ramadan   
Charity (Sadaqa)   
Public good (Maslaha)   
Veil (hijab)   
Qur’an   
Sunnah   
Shariaa   
Other:   
Other:   
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PART D: University-students’ relationships. 
19.  During the present year, how often have you experienced the following 
activities/situations?  
 
Very 
often Often Sometimes Never 
Ask to another student to explain you class materials          
Explain class materials to one or more other students          
Develop a team-project as part of a course examination          
Interlink what you have learnt in the classroom with 
social problems          
To explain or better understand different perspectives 
(political, religious, racial/ethnic, gender, etc.) during 
class discussions or workshop          
Discuss with a professor, outside the classroom, about 
themes or concepts explained in the class         
Discuss with a professor about career development or 
academic achievement          
Learn materials by heart         
Apply facts, theories or methods to practical problems 
or new situations          
Make use of information to examine a problem or issue 
of real life (unemployment, climate change, public 
health, political changes, etc.)          
Discuss with people of different race or ethnic origins           
Discuss with people from different economic 
background          
Discuss with people with different religious beliefs          
Discuss with people with different political opinions          
Take part to an internship, external teaching 
programme, field work, or other teaching experiences          
Develop competencies as informed and active citizen          
Volunteering inside the campus or in the local 
community organised by the University          
Volunteering inside the campus or in the local 
community organised by the Student union, student club         
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20. In a week, how many hours have on average dedicated to the following 
activities   
 
Hours per week 
 0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 
More 
than 
30 
Extra-curricular activities (club/associations, 
university press, sports, student union)                  
Paid employment in the University                 
Paid employment outside the campus                 
Volunteering or charity activities                 
Hobby and social activities (going out with 
friends, watch TV, spend times with friends on 
internet, theatre or cinema, etc.                 
Take care of family or other leaving in the same 
household (babies, parents, relatives, etc.)                 
Transportation to the campus (by car, walking, 
by train, etc.                 
Religious prayer or other spiritual activities                 
Preparation for an exam (revisions, writing, 
homework, data analysis, etc.)                 
Other:                 
 
 
21. What are, according to you, universities’ most important missions? Indicate 
only four in total, (in order of importance from 1st to the 4th). 
  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
To promote free education          
To promote ecology in the campus          
To educate students in order to find an employment to contribute to economic 
development          
To promote honesty, moral and civic behaviours          
To promote opportunities for religious activities          
To promote volunteering and social engagement          
To promote opportunities for professional internships          
To invest in projects for public and local community benefits          
To fund and cooperate with NGO’s to address social problems          
To engage directly on political debates and political participation          
To offer social participation and civic engagement courses/trainings          
To use internet and new technologies for teaching purposes          
To guarantee more inclusive policies for economically marginalised students          
To defend socio-political students’ interests and rights          
To develop teaching excellence          
To develop research excellence          
Other:         
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22. What role-s do you think universities should play in Tunisia? Cross YES or NO 
for each box.  
  YES  NO 
To promote free education     
To promote opportunities for students’ political participation     
To promote strategies for ecological campuses      
To educate students in order to find an employment      
To promote honesty, moral and civic behaviours     
To promote opportunities for religious activities     
To promote volunteering and social engagement     
To promote opportunities for professional internships     
To invest in projects for public and local community benefits     
To fund and cooperate with NGO’s to address social problems     
To engage directly on political debates      
To create jobs and to participate to the national economic growth      
To offer social participation and civic engagement courses/trainings     
To use internet and new technologies for teaching purposes     
To guarantee more inclusive policies for economically marginalised students     
To defend socio-political students’ interests and rights     
To promote regional development projects      
To promote projects and training for social entrepreneurship      
Other:     
 
 
23. Did you vote on the last student union’s election? 
 
YES NO 
 
24. What role do you think the student union ought to have inside the university?  
  YES  NO 
To promote dialogue between students and professors      
To defend and protect students’ interests      
To defend religious interests for all students (including minorities )      
To represent students within faculty committees, departments, etc.     
To promote sport clubs, cultural organisation, etc.     
To influence decision-making regarding curriculum, exams, classes, etc.     
To guarantee better conditions in students’  halls of residence      
To support and organise volunteering activities to engage students in society      
To engage students politically      
To promote dialogue and cohesion amongst students      
To organise public debates      
To engage students in order to improve quality life in campus      
To foster networks and cooperation amongst students      
Other:      
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PART E: Personal information: 
 
Age:   Sex : 
M       or        
F      
         
Faculty/Degree/Profession  
  
  
 
Year of study:   
 
Do you live with your family?  YES  NO   
If no, specify (i.e. University hall, 
private renting, etc.): 
  
  
 
Since when have you been living in the 
city (if you do not live in the city, 
specify where do you currently live):  
    
 
What is your parents’ education level (i.e. A levels, professional certificate, University 
degree, Master, PhD, etc.) (if applicable): 
Father 
 
  Mother 
  
 
 
What is your parents’ profession (if applicable): 
Father 
  
 Mother  
 
What is your parents’ town of origin (if applicable): 
Father 
  
 Mother  
 
In the case, you would like to be contacted for an interview of about 20 minutes to 
discuss in further details the themes presented in the survey, please leave your contacts 
in the section below :  
Name   Mobile   
email:   
 
 
 
380 
 
Appendix VI – T-test 
Table 20 – Results of the T-test for the statistical differences students’ responses 
on Islamic values. 
 Variable Frequency Mean Std. Deviation 
T Sig. (2-tailed) 
Islamic Value Shahada Engineering 24 1,21 ,415 
,013 ,990 
Human science 29 1,21 ,412 
  
Islamic Value Hajj Engineering 24 1,71 ,464 
,145 ,886 
Human science 29 1,69 ,471 
  
Islamic Value Sauf Engineering 24 1,21 ,415 
-1,090 ,281 
Human science 29 1,34 ,484 
  
Islamic Value Zakat Engineering 24 1,50 ,511 
,123 ,903 
Human science 29 1,48 ,509 
  
Islamic Value Salat Engineering 24 1,33 ,482 
,175 ,862 
Human science 29 1,31 ,471 
  
Islamic Value Adal Engineering 24 1,33 ,482 
-1,342 ,185 
Human science 29 1,52 ,509 
  
Islamic Value Tatawa Engineering 24 1,58 ,504 
-,793 ,431 
Human science 29 1,69 ,471 
  
Islamic Value Ummah Engineering 24 1,71 ,464 
-,704 ,485 
Human science 29 1,79 ,412 
  
Islamic Value Romdhan Engineering 24 1,33 ,482 
-2,714 ,009 
Human science 29 1,69 ,471 
  
Islamic Value Sadaqa Engineering 24 1,33 ,482 
-1,342 ,185 
Human science 29 1,52 ,509 
  
Islamic Value Public 
Good 
Engineering 24 1,38 ,495 
-1,802 ,077 
Human science 29 1,62 ,494 
  
Islamic Value Hijab Engineering 24 1,88 ,338 
1,614 ,113 
Human science 29 1,69 ,471 
  
Islamic Value Quran Engineering 24 1,25 ,442 
,367 ,715 
Human science 29 1,21 ,412 
  
Islamic Value Sunna Engineering 24 1,54 ,509 
-,572 ,570 
Human science 29 1,62 ,494 
  
Islamic Value Sharia Engineering 24 1,75 ,442 
-,683 ,498 
Human science 29 1,83 ,384 
  
*It has a significant statistical difference on P ≤0.05 
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Table 21 – Results of the T-test for the statistical differences students’ responses 
on Tunisian Universities Socio-economic Third Mission engagement. 
 
Variable Frequency Mean Std. Deviation T Sig. (2-tailed) 
Student Political Participation Engineering 26 1,6538 ,48516 ,873 ,387 
Human science 28 1,5357 ,50787   
Ecology in Campus Engineering 26 1,1923 ,40192 -2,171 ,035 
Human science 28 1,4643 ,50787   
Student Employment Engineering 25 1,1200 ,33166 -,241 ,811 
Human science 28 1,1429 ,35635   
Civic & Moral Behaviour Engineering 26 1,1923 ,40192 ,479 ,634 
Human science 28 1,1429 ,35635   
Religious Activities Engineering 26 1,7308 ,45234 ,175 ,862 
Human science 26 1,7308 ,45234   
Volunteering & Engagement Engineering 26 1,1154 ,32581 -1,843 ,071 
Human science 28 1,3214 ,47559   
Professional Internship Engineering 26 1,1538 ,36795 ,111 ,912 
Human science 28 1,1429 ,35635   
Investment in Public Project Engineering 26 1,2308 ,42967 -1,653 ,104 
Human science 27 1,4444 ,50637   
Funding Civil Society Engineering 26 1,4615 ,50839 -,278 ,782 
Human science 28 1,5000 ,50918   
Political Debate Engineering 25 1,7600 ,43589 -,917 ,363 
Human science 28 1,6429 ,48795   
Courses on Civic Engagement Engineering 26 1,2308 ,42967 ,821 ,416 
Human science 28 1,1429 ,35635   
Protect Students’ Rights Engineering 25 1,3600 ,48990 ,860 ,394 
Human science 28 1,2500 ,44096   
*It has a significant statistical difference on P ≤0.05 
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Table 22 - Results of the T-test for the statistical differences students’ responses 
on personal identity most important characteristics. 
 
Variable Frequency Mean Std. Deviation 
T Sig. (2.tailed) 
First Important Identity Engineering 23 9,2174 5,55924 
,310 ,758 
Human science 27 8,7407 5,29581 
  
Second Most Important Identity Engineering 24 10,8333 5,13866 
1,383 ,173 
Human science 27 9,0000 4,32346 
  
Third Most Important Identity Engineering 23 9,0000 5,68890 
-1,379 ,174 
Human science 27 11,1111 5,13160 
  
*It has a significant statistical difference on P ≤0.05 
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APPENDIX VII: Nvivo coding 
Figure 11. Nodes clustered by word similarity.
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Figure 12. Nodes clustered by coding similarity. 
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Figure 13. Example of coded transcript. 
 
 
